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Introduction
Why do so many parents vaccinate their children? On a superficial level, 
this seems like an odd question. In recent years, public health profes-
sionals around the world have been much more concerned with parents 
who do not. A high-profile outbreak of measles in 2015 in Disneyland, 
California created headlines around the globe, leading the state govern-
ment to reassess its policy for granting vaccination exemptions.1 Mean-
while, rising morbidity in Western Europe in 2017 caused many 
nation-states to increase efforts to vaccinate children against measles, 
with some even resorting to compulsion.2 Both in academic and popular 
media, anti-vaccinationism has been blamed for these trends. In the 
global North, communities of activists, buoyed by the internet and 
social media, have caused headaches even in long-established public 
health systems.3 Attacks on health workers in the twenty-first-century 
Global Polio Eradication Initiative showed that resistance to vaccines 
was still very much a live issue in low-income countries, too.4 Even 
where the scientific case has been successfully made that vaccines 
reduce the burden of infectious disease, moral and ethical concerns can 
cause much debate. For instance, in the 2010s the human papillomavi-
rus (HPV) vaccine has highlighted trials on human subjects in low-
income countries, the potential sexualisation of teenage girls and 
whether it is acceptable to gender public health responses by excluding 
boys from routine vaccination programmes.5
Despite these anxieties, most citizens and media commentators have 
appeared to be convinced of the power of vaccination. In February 
2016, when the Zika virus was found to cause microcephaly in children 
born to infected mothers, governments and research institutions around 
the world clamoured for a vaccine to stem the outbreak.6 The same was 
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true six months earlier, when the Ebola crisis was declared a Public 
Health Emergency of International Concern.7 As for Britain, in 2014–15, 
92.3 per cent of children under the age of two years in England received 
their first dose of measles-mumps-rubella vaccine (MMR) and 94.2 per 
cent completed their course of vaccines against diphtheria, tetanus, 
pertussis (whooping cough), polio and Hib (the five-in-one vaccine).8 
Rates in Scotland were even higher.9 In a 2016 survey conducted by the 
Vaccine Confidence Project at the London School of Hygiene and 
Tropical Medicine, 89.6 per cent of British respondents agreed or 
strongly agreed that vaccines were important; 84 per cent agreed that 
they were safe; and 86.7 per cent agreed that vaccination was effective.10 
These vaccines have been actively accepted, not just passively tolerated. 
British parents actively demanded protection for their children. When 
Faye Burdett, a two-year-old girl from Kent, died of meningitis in Feb-
ruary 2016, her parents began a campaign to raise awareness of the 
existence of the meningitis B vaccine. Ex-England Rugby Union captain 
Matthew Dawson, whose own son nearly succumbed to the disease, 
gave added publicity to the cause and it caught national media atten-
tion. Over 800,000 people signed a petition demanding that the vaccine 
be given free to all children, not just those who had been born after 1 
July 2015. It was the most-signed online petition since the UK govern-
ment set up the UK Government and Parliament petitioning system.11 
It appeared that Britain, like the United States, had accepted what Jacob 
Heller calls “The Vaccine Narrative” – ‘We simultaneously understand 
vaccines as a shield against diseases, a rite of passage for children and 
parents, and an expression of our science, civilization and morality.’12
This book examines how the routine immunisation of children 
became the status quo in Britain after the Second World War. It tells 
the story of how vaccination programmes became established in the 
modern British welfare state, how they expanded and how they were 
maintained. Successive British governments achieved this by respond-
ing to various challenges, including vaccine shortages, public scepticism 
over safety, scientific controversies and supply logistics. The schedule 
expanded from just two disease-prevention programmes in 1945 
(smallpox and diphtheria) to around twenty routine and optional vac-
cines in 2018.13 But this was not simply a government project to improve 
public health. The British public played a key role in shaping the priori-
ties of the programme, in turn placing expectations on the British state 
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and their fellow citizens. To turn the subtitle of Stuart Blume’s latest 
volume on its head: this is not about “how vaccines became controver-
sial”; it is about how they became ordinary.14
It would be obtuse to suggest that vaccines and vaccination are – or 
have ever been – uncontroversial. There have been countless disputes 
over the role of the pharmaceutical industry, state power, individual 
liberty, the diseases from which people require protection, the extent 
to which science should interfere in “natural” disease patterns and many 
more besides.15 We have seen periods in which immunisation rates 
dropped dramatically as a result of losses in public confidence, most 
notably the 1970s (whooping cough) and 2000s (MMR). But such 
drops suggest a relatively robust “normal” from which they could fall. 
Parents in post-war Britain were much more likely to vaccinate their 
children than not, and compliance with recommended schedules 
increased significantly over that time. This volume does not attempt to 
analyse the individual or social psychologies surrounding decision 
making about vaccines (topics better addressed by other social science 
disciplines). Instead, it uses periods of disagreement between various 
government and public bodies over the post-war period to show how 
the relationship between the British state and its citizens forged the 
modern vaccination programme. In the 1940s it was not inevitable that 
public health and the British public would embrace vaccination in the 
form that they did. Rather, this emerged from a series of developments 
in vaccine technology, the expansion of the welfare state and changing 
expectations on the part of both the government and the public. More-
over, through investigating how vaccination policy changed in post-war 
Britain we begin to understand the fluid and changing role of the public 
in the practice of public health.
Vaccination in history
When the story of post-war vaccination is told by public health advo-
cates, it is usually one of progress.16 This is said to occur on both a sci-
entific basis (the discovery of new techniques leading to the development 
of new vaccines) and a political one (the development of various 
administrative and bureaucratic systems for the effective delivery of 
vaccines to the masses).17 While vaccines have not been the only factor 
in reducing morbidity and mortality from once-common diseases, 
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epidemiologists are almost unanimous that improvements in the manu-
facture, administration and education surrounding vaccination have 
been vital.18 Such narratives stress how dangerous infectious diseases 
were in the past and how their risks have been significantly reduced 
through the work of public health.19
While these Whiggish histories serve a useful political purpose, 
enhancing the reputation of disciplines and governance structures 
allied to public health, they do not critically reflect on how the growth 
in vaccination came about. Where there have been investigations into 
problematic areas of vaccination, they have focused on crises in confi-
dence, but do so in a way that assumes that the default and rational 
position of the public is to support vaccination. Declines in vaccination 
rates or resurgences in once-controlled diseases are thus framed as aber-
rations caused by outside, irrational factors. Thus, the pertussis vaccine 
scandal of the 1970s or the MMR controversy of the 1990s and 2000s 
are studied from the perspective of “what went wrong”, in order to 
prevent or manage such crises in the future.20 Historians of medicine 
are wary about “learning lessons”.21 Rather, we tend to investigate the 
past to understand how people understood health, illness and medical 
care. These concepts are held to be historically contingent, and meant 
different things to different peoples at different times. How the public 
responded to new medical technologies or impositions from govern-
ments and health authorities can tell us much about cultures of the past. 
Existing studies of vaccination, for instance, have exposed Victorian 
attitudes towards the limits of local and national government,22 while 
comparative analyses of poliomyelitis vaccines have shed light on the 
cold-war geopolitics surrounding the trustworthiness of capitalist or 
communist epidemiological practice and medical ethics.23 Crucially for 
this study, work on diphtheria and tuberculosis immunisations has 
highlighted how different nation-states’ cultural attitudes towards med-
icine and science produced very different interpretations of the same 
scientific data.24 This, in turn, resulted in very different policy choices 
and outcomes.
Given this history, it is clear that vaccination programmes – like any 
other political project – are rooted in a wider social context. This book 
explores this through a series of case studies which highlight the ways 
in which the public and governments interacted, shaping public health 
as they went. What was expected of the public and of the government 
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changed over this period; and the debates over vaccination show wider 
concerns about the relationship between the state, its citizens and the 
nature of public health governmentality.25 The book does this by build-
ing on existing histories of specific diseases and vaccine crises. This has 
been a common feature of the historiography of British immunisation 
policy. Works on the introduction of BCG (Bacillus Calmette-Guérin, 
an anti-tuberculosis vaccine), diphtheria immunisation, polio vaccine 
and hepatitis B vaccine have given insight into the scientific, political 
and cultural context of vaccination and how it was received by the 
public.26 Less attention has been paid to the mundane business of estab-
lished immunisation programmes which did not cause significant con-
troversy. It is generally assumed that health care priorities shifted away 
from infectious disease control to hospital medicine in the National 
Health Service (NHS) era, giving an impression that there is nothing 
of note to study. Where public health is covered, more attention is paid 
to the management of lifestyles and risk factors.27 Indeed, Rudolf Klein 
does not even mention public health in his comprehensive history of 
the NHS until the HIV/AIDS crisis of the 1980s.28
This volume also finds meaning in periods of contestation and in the 
public attention generated by new vaccines; but by analysing the vac-
cination programme across the post-war period, we also gain a sense of 
what made vaccination normal for so many parents. Indeed, the une-
ventful, mundane administration of vaccination programmes was not 
peripheral to the history of public health as one might suppose from 
the literature: it was central to it. The very fact that it has not excited 
much attention is a testament to how well the concept was established. 
This book traces how this was done through the early post-war period, 
and expanded and entrenched during the 1970s and beyond.
This is not to say, however, that notable works on immunisation in 
general do not exist. James Colgrove’s excellent study of vaccination in 
the twentieth-century United States acts as an instructive contrast to 
the British story; for instance, there was little fear in the United Kingdom 
that polio was the harbinger of “socialized medicine”, nor did British 
subjects have problems accessing many vaccines on account of fees 
charged by private family physicians.29 Similarly, Bob Reinhardt and 
Sanjoy Bhattacharya have expertly analysed the smallpox eradication 
programmes in Africa and Asia with a critical gaze on dominant con-
structions of global public health and the scientific and administrative 
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procedures which underpinned their success in eliminating the disease 
in the wild.30 Most recently, Stuart Blume has detailed the scientific 
development of vaccination technology and the reasons why vaccina-
tion has been controversial across the world.31 These are still rare excep-
tions, and until now there has not been such a comprehensive review 
of the public and vaccination in post-war Britain.
There are also works that have explored the relationship between the 
public and public health in the United Kingdom. There is a well-
established scholarship on such matters in the nineteenth century and 
on the changing nature of public health governance in the first half of 
the twentieth century.32 For the period after 1945, there is growing 
interest in the meaning of the concept of “the public” within public 
health, on the part of practitioners themselves and of historians. But 
while vaccination has been used in part to illuminate this relationship 
– notably in the work of Roberta Bivins on ethnicity and public health 
with regard to tuberculosis and smallpox in immigrant populations – 
none has centred their analysis on the wider context of mass vaccina-
tion in post-war Britain.33
This is important because Britain’s vaccination programmes give new 
insights into how the relationship between the government and its citi-
zens changed after 1945. It was precisely because infectious disease had 
become preventable that the public placed greater expectations on the 
government and fellow citizens.34 Outbreaks became less common, but 
were a bigger scandal when they occurred. Governments that were 
unable to plan and run large-scale immunisation programmes were 
seen as deficient. This book helps to explain how and why vaccination 
was a key tool in protecting not just the health of the British people but 
the reputation of public health and the British state in general. These 
issues of citizenship were not simply a product of an age of consumer-
ism or individualism that is assumed to have developed during the 
1970s and under the New Right governments of the 1980s.35 During 
immunisation campaigns in the 1940s questions were raised about the 
role and responsibility of citizens for their own and their families’ 
health. Similarly, the technologies of managing risk, often attributed to 
the 1970s and beyond, were present in an earlier period.36 Many of the 
facets of a supposed golden age of technocracy existed both before and 
after the heyday period of the late 1950s to mid-1970s.37 As these 
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chapters show, targets, statistical monitoring and central direction of 
regional authorities were employed throughout the post-war period in 
attempts to immunise the population and reduce the burden of prevent-
able disease.
As with any work of historical scholarship, the researcher must make 
choices not just about what is included, but also about what must, for 
reasons of space, time and coherence, be excluded. This book will at no 
point attempt to assess whether or to what extent vaccines “really” 
worked, or their relative safety. History does not use the same tools as 
epidemiology, and these are scientific questions that must be answered 
using the methods laid out by other disciplines. In any case, these sub-
jects have been tackled in depth both by contemporaries and by those 
reading back over the extant data.38 Similarly, deep qualitative analysis 
of the public’s understanding and construction of narratives surround-
ing vaccination across time are not possible in a volume such as this. 
Aside from methodological and philosophical issues in determining 
who the “ordinary” person is, governments have produced far more 
documentary evidence, and have preserved it in such a way that it is 
much more accessible to historians.39 Folklorists are better positioned 
to explore this terrain, but even here there will be significant issues in 
accessing the memories of those who are no longer alive to tell their 
stories.40 This is not to say that the public is not present in this volume. 
Members of the public continued to speak back to authorities and each 
other through letters, public utterances and more diffuse behaviours for 
which we can find empirical evidence.41 Instead, this analysis addresses 
how concepts such as safety and efficacy were expressed by health 
authorities, politicians, the medical profession, the media, non-
governmental organisations and, indeed, members of the public them-
selves. It is through these that the wider relationship between the public 
and public health can be grasped.
Not every vaccine used in Britain since the Second World War can 
be covered in detail. This book focuses on routine childhood immunisa-
tion – which necessarily excludes vaccines given to foreign travellers 
(such as yellow fever), to protect individuals at immediate risk (rabies), 
to protect subgroups of people considered to be at potential risk (hepa-
titis B, before 2017) or to protect the military from bioterrorism 
(anthrax). Even widely used vaccines, such as those against influenza, 
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HPV or tuberculosis, are not given their own chapters. There were also 
vaccines for which the public and medical authorities expressed a desire 
(such as for HIV/AIDS) but which were never developed.42 Where 
these diseases and their associated immunisation are relevant to the 
overall narrative, they will be discussed. However, the chapters that are 
included here exemplify the broad trends and concepts that are crucial 
to understanding the relationship between the public and public health 
authorities during the post-war period.
Finally, any history of Britain needs to engage with the “four nations” 
question. Political events from devolution in the 1990s to the Scot-
tish and European independence referenda in the 2010s have made 
British citizens even more aware that “Britain” is not simply “England”. 
The Ministry of Health and its successors had direct jurisdiction over 
England and Wales, and evidence from these regions is given greater 
focus than that from elsewhere in the Union. However, it is important 
to stress that vaccination policy in Britain was British. Until 1974, local 
authorities had responsibility for the implementation of vaccination 
programmes through Section 26 of both the National Health Service 
Act 1946 and National Health Service (Scotland) Act 1947. But many 
of the decisions over immunisation policy at national level were taken 
cooperatively. As will be shown in Chapters 2 and 3, the “Joint” in Joint 
Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation refers to the cooperation 
between the Scottish, Northern Irish and English health authorities 
on vaccination. Local and national bodies worked with and learned 
from each other within this framework. Where appropriate, Scot-
tish examples are used to highlight these national issues (such as the 
1949 Glasgow smallpox outbreak, or differences in approach between 
English and Scottish health authorities during the MMR crisis). The 
focus here is not on particular British cultures of vaccination, but on 
the British vaccination system. The administrative links between and 
across regional, national and transnational public health bodies were 
all important in creating that system.
Vaccination and the public
As indicated in much of the existing literature, the development of vac-
cination programmes in Europe during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries was intimately connected with the expansion of central state 
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authority over the public’s health, and a widespread political contesta-
tion of the precise limits of state authority in relation to the citizen-
subject. Vaccination has been associated with state power ever since. 
Indeed, this contested relationship between individual liberty and col-
lective responsibility with regard to infectious disease control has been 
central to debates over vaccination and other public health pro-
grammes.43 Who “the public” are within these structures is difficult to 
define precisely. Where we can discern attempts to define publics (both 
by contemporaries and by later analysts), we see them mainly through 
two lenses. There is what we might call a demographic approach, which 
views publics as populations of people that can be measured according 
to some set of common criteria. Then there is an identity approach, in 
which the public as a mass collection of individuals believes itself to 
have common attributes that allow it to exist as a political force. Thus, 
publics could be constructed through governance structures as well as 
construct themselves through voluntary or mutual action.44 Publics 
could and did speak and act in myriad ways that disrupted public health 
policy, and their concerns changed over time. However, this book does 
not provide a grand unifying vision of who or what the public really 
was in post-war Britain. Instead, it investigates the ways in which 
authorities constructed ideas of the public through their vaccination 
policies. Here, governments identified problems, measured their effects 
and interpreted the public’s behaviour on their terms. But, in doing so, 
the public spoke back, often complicating authorities’ plans and forcing 
new interpretations of policy. For the government, the voices of indi-
viduals and of the public in general were always mediated through these 
interactions – and the complex ways in which these shone through tell 
us much about post-war British politics.
Whatever our conception of “the public”, public health has main-
tained a disciplinary function, and much has been written about how 
governance structures acted upon the public from a medical perspec-
tive.45 Somewhat paradoxically, the imprecision of definitions of “the 
public” and “public health” have, according to Jane Lewis, been both a 
strength and a weakness of public health governance and the public 
health profession.46 In the supposed heroic age of the nineteenth 
century, large-scale infrastructure projects, such as water purification 
and sewerage, had a demonstrable impact upon the health of urban 
environments following the rapid urbanisation that began in the 
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previous century. Such projects were pushed through by national gov-
ernments despite objections from local authorities; although it should 
be noted that local innovation and pressure often had an impact on 
national policy and the understanding of public health problems.47 As 
health systems developed and the power of medical science increased, 
Medical Officers and local authorities became more heavily involved 
with the running of municipal hospitals and other Poor Law institu-
tions such as asylums. The looseness of the definition of public health 
thus allowed Medical Officers to gain significant power during the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries. Yet, as Lewis argues, it also meant 
that once health systems became increasingly complicated and relied 
upon ever-centralised power (such as the creation of the NHS), public 
health became a side-lined profession.48
John Welshman and Martin Gorsky have questioned this narrative, 
arguing that Medical Officers of Health (MOHs) continued to perform 
important public health functions.49 It is generally acknowledged, 
however, that public health transitioned from concerns about infectious 
disease and epidemic control towards the management of chronic con-
ditions. As hygiene improved, issues such as lung cancer and heart 
disease proved more pressing. Virginia Berridge tracks this evolution in 
post-war public health through the lens of smoking.50 The story of post-
war vaccination complicates this picture. MOHs and the British gov-
ernment in general put significant resources into vaccination in the 
name of controlling infectious disease. This was not in the same vein as 
the large Victorian sanitation projects, nor were MOHs called into 
action to contain outbreaks of diseases such as smallpox with the same 
regularity as in previous decades. But infectious disease did not disap-
pear. Rather, the risk of infectious disease became the subject of public 
health intervention. And, as Berridge also notes of smoking, this did 
concentrate more closely on individual behaviour, use of the mass 
media and evidence-based medicine.51
Practices of immunisation are woven into this wider history of public 
health, with the resistance against, and slow uptake of, these technolo-
gies haunting government perceptions of the public and vaccination 
long into the twentieth century. Variolation – the introduction of small-
pox into a healthy person to give them a mild form of the disease and 
confer immunity – was popularised among the British nobility in the 
early seventeenth century by Lady Mary Montagu.52 The development 
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and growing acceptability of inoculation techniques, and statistical 
methods for assessing their efficacy, led some local authorities to use 
the technique on a wider population as a form of public health protec-
tion.53 Edward Jenner’s experiments with cowpox provided a new, safer 
form of immunisation against smallpox in time for the aforementioned 
growth in the centralised state public health apparatus.54 Various Vac-
cination Acts over the Victorian period placed a duty on local authori-
ties to provide vaccination free of charge, and in 1853 made routine 
childhood vaccination compulsory.55 This caused much resentment 
from a number of constituencies, creating large anti-vaccination socie-
ties that objected to the procedure on the grounds of local autonomy, 
scientific doubt, personal freedom, the intrusion of the state into private 
matters of child rearing, religious objection, animal rights and resent-
ment at the use of Poor Law institutions to treat the middle classes.56
Developments in bacteriology and medical procedures that had 
given rise to the power of biomedicine and hospital-based medicine in 
the late nineteenth century also provided new avenues for vaccination.57 
Louis Pasteur’s work with anthrax, rabies and fowl cholera showed that 
attenuated forms of the microbes could perform a similar function to 
vaccination – and, more crucially, that it was possible to mass produce 
them.58 However, these were products of a pre-immunology age; it 
would not be until the very end of the nineteenth century that such 
developments in bacteriology were met with reformulations of scien-
tific conceptions of immunity and disease transmission.59
The production of diphtheria anti-toxoid and its use in mass immu-
nisation campaigns was, as Esteban Rodríguez-Ocaña has described it, 
‘the crucial link between public excitement about Pasteur’s rabies 
vaccine and the establishment of national campaigns against tubercu-
losis, sustaining the development of bacteriology-based public health 
service’.60 The growing power of biomedical sciences was thus embod-
ied in these new technologies that borrowed from generally accepted 
principles of immunity.61 Through example, mass vaccination pro-
grammes showed that science possessed the tools not only to discover 
new prophylactics, but to use them effectively to prevent disease. The 
articulation of the concept of “herd immunity” in the 1920s gave further 
statistical credence to the emerging science of immunology.62 It also 
showed science’s power to react to contemporary problems. Pasteur’s 
anthrax vaccine, for example, was a direct response to the effects of the 
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disease in cattle on agricultural output.63 Diphtheria had been identified 
as a distinct and significant epidemic disease only in the wake of mass 
urbanisation in Europe during the mid-nineteenth century. By the end 
of the century, an anti-toxoid had been developed.64
These advances were embraced by local and national governments 
as symbols of their own advancement and ability to solve complex 
problems. Governments employed developments in mass communica-
tion to ensure that people took advantage of the new vaccines. In New 
York City, newspapers, poster advertising, the cinema and the wireless 
were all employed to proclaim the benefits of diphtheria immunisation. 
Vaccination was offered as a choice, advertised as one might market an 
automobile; not imposed by the state as had been common for small-
pox.65 When Britain initiated its diphtheria programme in 1940, it fol-
lowed New York’s lead by focusing on education rather than compulsion. 
Such tactics had worked in other fields (such as domestic cleanliness), 
and helped to establish the narrative that liberal British public health 
worked with its public, rather than imposing an authoritarian state 
medical police as had been seen in imperial Germany.66 British public 
health authorities openly sought the cooperation of their subjects, 
rather than compliance alone – though it is instructive that the Ministry 
of Health continued to refer to its advertising efforts as “propaganda” 
well after the end of the War. The role of education in constructing and 
communicating with the public is a key theme of twentieth- and twenty-
first-century public health, and will be a recurring theme throughout 
this book.67
While diphtheria immunisation and BCG were embraced by some 
nations and integrated into their public health programmes in the 
inter-war years, Britain was more cautious about using these new tech-
nologies.68 Linda Bryder’s and Jane Lewis’s work has shown that epi-
demiological evidence on vaccination could be interpreted in different 
ways by nation states.69 Thus, while one country could justify the use of 
a particular vaccine, another could see the same immunisation as unsafe 
or ineffective as compared to existing practices. The British medical 
establishment considered its anti-tuberculosis measures – including 
inspection, notification, sanatoria, dispensaries, hospital care and pas-
teurisation – to be adequate. Rates of infection from tuberculosis and 
diphtheria also appeared to be lower in Britain than they were in coun-
tries that used immunisation, such as France and the Nordic states.70 
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Such a significant change in public health policy was a risk which the 
British authorities were not willing to take in the 1930s for fear of 
damaging their reputations. Local governments were given the power 
to initiate their own campaigns if they so wished but, given that they 
needed to pay for the vaccines themselves, coverage was inconsistent 
and often depended on the priorities of the MOH.71 The continued 
strength of anti-vaccination and anti-vivisection voluntary societies in 
the mid-twentieth century also made central government wary of the 
public backlash from instituting any national mass immunisation pro-
gramme.72 High-profile incidents in which people had been injured or 
killed through improper use of immunisation gave authorities further 
justification for remaining cautious.73 This book draws attention to the 
ways in which national public health programmes framed scientific 
findings and reached divergent conclusions in the post-war period. 
The burden of proof required before British authorities would declare 
a vaccine safe or effective was influenced by politics as much as by 
science. Once Britain finally did establish a national anti-diphtheria 
strategy, the success of this campaign softened attitudes. From the 
1940s onwards the Medical Research Council (MRC) began to seri-
ously consider other immunisations as potential additions to the public 
health system.74
The success of mass immunisation through the first half of the twen-
tieth century established it as a key tool in public health. This encour-
aged the development of new vaccines and the willingness of states 
to consider using them as part of immunisation programmes. During 
the Second World War, coordination of political aims and scientific 
research had seen a number of advancements in medicine as a direct 
contribution to the war effort, including the protection of troops from 
potential biological warfare and the demands of operating in foreign 
climates.75 Contemporary advancements in virology and immunology 
offered the possibility of controlling – perhaps even eradicating – other 
infectious diseases, old and new.76 It is these developments which the 
chapters of this book discuss in greater detail. The book starts in 1945, 
in the afterglow of a successful anti-diphtheria campaign by the wartime 
coalition government. Despite some initial scepticism, immunisation 
rates grew significantly over the course of the 1940s, and diphtheria 
morbidity and mortality dropped significantly. With the prospect on 
the horizon of using new vaccinations against tuberculosis and pertussis 
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(whooping cough), as well as the new state-run NHS, public health and 
vaccination were both primed for significant administrative and politi-
cal transformations.
Chapter outline
Given this history, it is clear that vaccination programmes – like any 
other political project – are rooted in a wider social context. The book 
explores this through a series of case studies which highlight the ways 
in which the public and governments interacted, shaping public health 
as they went. What was expected of the public and of the government 
changed over this period; and the debates over vaccination show wider 
concerns about the relationship between the state and its citizens. In 
explaining how vaccination became ordinary, the volume is split into 
two parts. Part I shows how the vaccination programme in Britain as 
we know it today was created and evolved. Part II deals with vaccination 
crises within an already-established system. The two parts comprise five 
chapters which explain these trends through five interrelated themes. 
Each represents a different area of responsibility or expectation on the 
part of both the public and public health authorities.
Part I begins with apathy. Chapter 1 explores this through the diph-
theria immunisation programme. Diphtheria immunisation was intro-
duced on a national basis during the Second World War and was initially 
successful – so much so, that it formed the basis of the voluntary vac-
cination system that replaced the Victorian Vaccination Acts with the 
birth of the NHS. In 1949, however, declining vaccination rates con-
cerned the Ministry of Health. The drop was blamed on apathetic 
parents (particularly mothers), and the Ministry hoped to combat this 
by reminding parents of young children how dangerous diphtheria still 
was. When parents did not have their children vaccinated, they could 
be accused of negligence. However, public health authorities also 
understood that the reasons for non-vaccination were various and 
complex. How they used apathy as a rhetorical device in setting local 
immunisation targets and health education said much about what was 
considered reasonable behaviour on the part of parents. And, indeed, 
what reasonable behaviour the public expected of each other.
Chapter 2 examines nation. The British vaccination programme was 
very much a national project. However, it could not function without 
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implementation at the local level and was dependent on international 
networks of vaccine knowledge. At the same time, the programme 
exposed the limits of national power and raised questions about who 
the “British public” were that required protection through public health 
policy. Elimination of disease within British borders was as vital as 
preventing the importation of once-eliminated infections from foreign 
places and peoples. This is examined through debates over the smallpox 
vaccine from the end of the war in 1945 to the end of routine childhood 
smallpox vaccination in 1971. Here too, apathy was an important 
concept. Vaccination rates remained stubbornly low for a disease long 
since eliminated from British shores. And yet, whenever there was a 
local outbreak queues would stretch from local Medical Officers’ clinics, 
demanding emergency vaccination to protect local citizens from the 
disease. The public’s view of what protections the government ought to 
provide – and the form they should take – were not always aligned with 
the Ministry’s.
This leads to the third and final chapter in Part I, which analyses 
demand. While governments were undoubtedly concerned with disci-
plining parents who did not conform with official advice, members of 
the public themselves demanded that the state should make immunisa-
tion services available to all. In an advanced economy such as Britain’s, 
the expectation that the state would protect citizens from managea-
ble risks became commonplace. Chapter 3 uses the inactivated polio 
vaccine programme to show the difficult relationship between what 
the public demanded and what the government was able or willing to 
provide. The place of the nation was still important here. This was a 
national programme, but, like all vaccination at this time, it was admin-
istered by local authorities who had differing results in terms of uptake. 
Despite the demand from some quarters, in others the government 
still had a hard time overcoming what it perceived to be an apathetic 
public. Similarly, production of the vaccine was made possible only 
through large-scale cooperation with other nations; and the relation-
ship between British pharmaceutical companies, foreign nations and 
the British government was key.
Part II begins in the early 1970s. By this time, smallpox vaccination 
had been removed from the schedule, while polio and diphtheria 
immunisation were now well established. They were joined by BCG (in 
schools), pertussis, measles and tetanus. Vaccination had become 
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commonplace, and it was widely accepted that routine childhood 
immunisation was a useful and important public health tool. However, 
controversies did rear their heads. The public had consented and coop-
erated with British public health authorities in developing the vaccina-
tion programme. This meant that when confidence in the medical and 
political establishments became strained, so did faith in vaccination – at 
least in the case of specific vaccines at specific times. And yet, such 
crises did not destroy the vaccination or public health systems entirely, 
and confidence soon recovered.
Thus, Chapter 4 examines risk through the 1970s pertussis vaccine 
crisis. Risk pervaded all aspects of vaccination policy – indeed public 
health is inherently about the management of disease risks. Attitudes 
toward which risks were acceptable and which risks were manageable 
changed considerably during the post-war period, however. Govern-
ments had to manage the risks of damage to their reputation from 
potentially unsafe vaccines versus the benefits of disease control. The 
public also pushed back against government policy when it felt certain 
that risks were unacceptable or were being poorly managed. Many 
other themes can also be identified here. Public health authorities 
struggled against a form of apathy: the idea that parents no longer feared 
pertussis because of the success of the vaccination programme. So too 
did they have to deal with a form of demand. Parents demanded protec-
tion for their children, both from the disease and from the vaccine itself. 
They understood the risks to their children differently from public 
health authorities, causing greater tension. Once the scientific basis for 
the vaccine was re-established and an epidemic loomed on the horizon, 
there was such demand for the vaccine that many local authorities ran 
short of it. This led to discussions which reflected wider contemporary 
concerns about the role of the national government and a deeper politi-
cal crisis in the welfare state.
Finally, Chapter 5 brings these themes together and examines hesi-
tancy, a concept that made an entry into global vaccination policy 
around the year 2010, but that is clearly a product of the lessons that 
public health has taken from its own history. Recent vaccine crises and 
narratives that changing approaches to the meaning of “health” in the 
World Health Organization have led social scientists to focus on indi-
viduals’ decision-making processes. These start from the premise that 
uptake of vaccination ought to be universal and that the declines in 
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vaccination rates are not only a sign of wider problems but are also to 
some extent preventable with adequate communication and monitor-
ing. None of this can be understood without reference to the changing 
face of apathy, demand, nation and risk in previous decades. This history 
is explained in Chapter 5 through the changes in government policy 
during the MMR crisis in the late 1990s and 2000s. Some parents were 
accused of apathy due to much-reduced measles morbidity since the 
introduction of measles vaccination in 1961 and of MMR vaccination 
in 1988. But this does not capture why the majority of parents made 
the decision to continue to vaccinate, even during the height of the 
crisis. Nor does it explain why many opponents of MMR vaccination 
demanded that the government make separate measles, mumps and 
rubella vaccines available to any parent who asked for them. As with 
the pertussis crisis, the public’s understanding of risk and the reasons 
for their hesitancy did not always accord with expert opinion. National 
and devolved authorities used risk-communication techniques and 
comparisons with other nations to reassert the safety and utility of 
MMR vaccination when it became clear that the health education 
tactics of previous decades were not having the desired effect. This shift 
from education towards analysis of decision making and risk would be 
a key facet of twenty-first-century public health.
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The development and 





In 1940, diphtheria became the first vaccine of the bacteriologi-
cal age to be offered free to British children on a national scale. It 
achieved impressive results in its first years, reducing the case load 
from over 46,000 in 1940 to just 962 in 1950, and deaths from 
2,480 to 49.1 Medical authorities celebrated this success, but were 
mindful of the paradox they had created. With diphtheria no longer a 
common disease, would parents stop immunising their children? And 
if they did, would a disease that should be eliminated make a deadly 
return?
These fears appeared to be realised in 1950. After solid progress in 
immunisation of the child population throughout the 1940s, there was 
a sudden decline in the number of children being presented for immu-
nisation. While a number of causes were investigated, the main culprit, 
in the eyes of the Ministry of Health, was apathy. A publicity campaign 
began and was maintained throughout the 1950s, coordinated through 
the Ministry of Health and Central Office of Information (COI) and 
supported through direct interactions with the public by local medical 
authorities.
This chapter discusses how “apathy” acted as an explanatory model 
and call to action for health authorities seeking to improve uptake 
of immunisation services among the population. It played a key role 
in constructing the public in the minds of policy makers, built out 
of long-standing paternalistic attitudes towards the working classes, 
particularly mothers. The Ministry considered apathy a problem 
because it threatened the successes achieved by public health policy 
up to this point. Immunisation had reduced the burden of diphtheria 
on the health services and, it was hoped, could eventually eliminate 
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the disease entirely. The risk was that this apparent progress might 
stall – or, worse, the disease would return to higher levels. By defining 
apathy as low uptake of immunisation, the problem could be identified 
and quantified. In turn, apathy tells us how these authorities viewed 
the public and their relationship with them. The Ministry of Health 
focused on encouraging individuals to immunise their children in 
order to minimise the risk of diphtheria’s return. Its campaign ran on 
the basis that parents no longer feared diphtheria and therefore were 
unmotivated to present their children for immunisation. Nevertheless, 
authorities also understood that there were many reasons why parents 
might not vaccinate. At the local level, medical officers worked with 
the public and responded to their needs. That is to say, the public 
was not simply lectured to; rather, policy makers consistently moni-
tored the public through various systems of surveillance for signs that 
could be interpreted. Apathy actively guided policy in ways that often 
made immunisation more convenient for parents and children. It was 
a form of communication; a translation of the diffuse behaviours of the 
public into a language which administrators and policy makers could 
understand.
Apathy is an amorphous concept. Indeed, the imprecise nature of 
the term in itself gives us insight into the motivations and thinking 
behind local and national policy. This chapter therefore attempts not to 
deconstruct how the concept was experienced by parents in 1950s 
Britain but, rather, to explore how it was used – often without precision 
– by various authorities. Apathy was often invoked to explain public 
behaviour, and attempts were made to combat it. It was a rhetorical 
device, one without an objective basis, yet still built into the longer 
history of British public health practice.
This chapter begins by outlining how the national anti-diphtheria 
programme came into being during the Second World War. It shows 
how this continued after 1945, and through the formation of the new 
NHS. In 1950, however, the Ministry of Health became concerned at 
declining vaccination rates. The reasons for this are explored, in terms 
both of changing patterns of behaviour and of the ways in which the 
statistical indicators available to the Ministry allowed it to “see” (or 
construct) apathy among parents. The chapter then goes on to explain 
what national and local government did to combat apathy over the 
course of the 1950s.
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Diphtheria immunisation before 1945
If the decline in immunisation rates suggested that the British people 
had become complacent about diphtheria, this was not always the case. 
After some initial difficulties, take-up of diphtheria immunisation was 
high throughout the later war years and into the late 1940s. Diphtheria 
immunisation developed out of the work in the emerging science of 
bacteriology at the turn of the twentieth century.2 As Claire Hooker and 
Alison Bashford have argued, ‘diphtheria is ideally placed for thinking 
through the historical connections between bacteriology and applied 
public health precisely because it was so strongly associated with labo-
ratory medicine and the new capacities to understand and therefore 
control disease’.3 The condition itself was discovered to be caused by a 
bacterium, Corynebacterium diphtheria, and tended to attack through 
the larynx and the tonsils. Complications could include heart disease 
and paralysis, sometimes leading to death. In Britain during the 1930s, 
before the introduction of immunisation, an average of 58,000 cases 
were seen each year, with 2,800 deaths.4
However, Britain had not always been so enthusiastic about the pro-
cedure. British public health authorities had come to adopt immunisa-
tion relatively late, compared to those in other Western nations. Toronto 
and New York City, for example, had run successful interventions 
during the inter-war years to significantly reduce morbidity and mortal-
ity.5 Despite this, and although some local authorities had used immu-
nisation prior to the Second World War, Britain was rather conservative 
with regard to new immunisation technologies. The anti-vaccination 
and anti-vivisection organisations were still relatively powerful in the 
1930s, and the experience of resistance to compulsory smallpox vacci-
nation in the nineteenth century still loomed large.6 There was also a 
widespread belief among medical authorities that the well-established 
public health system in Britain functioned perfectly well without the 
use of prophylactics. The main example cited was the much lower rates 
of tuberculosis in Britain as compared to France, despite the latter’s use 
of BCG. Sanatoria and health education were therefore seen by medical 
authorities as at least as good as BCG, if not better, and so they were 
not willing to risk introducing a new public health measure that might 
go wrong.7 There was no guarantee of vaccine safety, as evidenced by 
the poisoning of children with contaminated diphtheria toxoid in 
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Bundaberg, Australia, and contaminated BCG in Lübeck, Germany.8 
While the national government stayed clear of providing the toxoid or 
centrally funded advertising to promote immunisation, local authori-
ties had been permitted to use it before the war. However, they had to 
pay for supplies and manpower themselves.9 Thus, it was embraced with 
varying levels of enthusiasm and administered with varying levels of 
competence, resulting in very uneven coverage.10
The war provided an impetus to adopt immunisation as a mass 
public health measure. Mobile populations as a result of evacuation, 
bomb damage and general dislocation made traditional public health 
measures more difficult to maintain. Combined with the need to keep 
the home population healthy for industrial output and morale, diphthe-
ria immunisation was belatedly accepted.11 From late 1940, a campaign 
was initiated to immunise all school children. The minimum school 
leaving age was fourteen, and the school system provided a useful site 
for vaccination before leavers entered the world of work. The prophy-
lactic was supplied to local authorities free of charge, and the govern-
ment estimated that around a third of school children up to the age of 
fourteen had been immunised by September 1941.12
After the war
Although in many ways the war-time experience might be seen as atypi-
cal, given the number of controls imposed on public life and economic 
behaviour, immunisation had been shown to be invaluable. Parents thus 
understood that it was an effective tool and they were keen to have their 
children protected. If apathy was a problem, authorities were at no great 
pains to stress it. Indeed, they saw parents’ enthusiasm as a sign that 
modern preventative health care would be seen as a civic duty – states 
would be obliged to provide services, and good citizens would actively 
use them.13 While the British political classes had committed to the 
social rights of a comprehensive welfare state based on the war-time 
Beveridge Report, they also came to expect certain behaviours in 
return.14 These trends were common in the West during the twentieth 
century, and accelerated after 1945. Dorothy Porter has argued that it 
would become increasingly unacceptable for people to be unhealthy 
and that citizens would be under pressure from the state and from their 
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peers to avoid ill-health.15 As diseases became “vaccine preventable”, 
not vaccinating became an unacceptable practice. In a speech to the 
Council for Education and World Citizenship in 1946, Labour Minister 
of Health Aneurin Bevan cited immunisation as an example of what 
centrally coordinated health services backed by modern medicine 
could achieve. Morbidity from diphtheria had effectively halved from 
its pre-war levels; mortality had been reduced to a third. Bevan further 
argued ‘that in working for a better health service [the Labour Party 
was] not looking forward to a nation of hypochondriacs, enjoying bad 
health, but a nation whose members understood and practised the laws 
of health’. This encompassed a range of health technologies and lifestyle 
changes, of which immunisation was one. But it would require the 
‘energetic cooperation of every citizen’ to achieve its full effects.16 Citi-
zens were both the users of services and, through taxation, the funders. 
Government imposed moral and legal conditions on citizens in return 
for services, but through democratic channels also could claim to rep-
resent citizens. These inherent tensions in health care systems, between 
individual liberty and collective responsibility, were not new to this 
period, but they were recast.17 Indeed, later in the century, as the focus 
of welfare provision began to shift from a broadly social democratic 
model to one based more on markets and individual choice within a 
public-private framework, the relationship between public or preventa-
tive health and citizens would change.18
This interplay between citizenship and risk management is explored 
in greater detail in Chapter 4. What is important in the immediate post-
war era, however, is that citizens also demanded health protection from 
the government. The most obvious example of this is the creation of 
the NHS. T. H. Marshall would describe the coming of the new welfare 
state as an expression of social rights, a new age in which protection 
from hardship would be as important as equality under the law and the 
right to vote in previous decades.19 If there was a will for greater protec-
tion, state planning and modern science appeared to offer a means for 
its provision. Although much would later be made of the “technocratic 
age” of the 1950s and 1960s, it was in the 1940s that the British state 
would begin to take greater control of once-private industries in 
the name of efficiency and accountability.20 Indeed, it was through 
the establishment of monitoring statistics during this time that the 
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Ministry of Health was able to monitor the apathy that it would see in 
the 1950s and how it would come to see problems within the rest of the 
vaccination programme, as described in the later chapters of this book.
Throughout the period discussed in this chapter, the government 
recommended an initial immunisation of children under the age of 
twelve months. Young children were at the most risk of death, and early 
immunisation was considered necessary to increase the efficiency of the 
programme. This was initial immunisation was “boosted” with a rein-
forcing dose as the child entered primary school.21 A combined prophy-
laxis was also available in some areas, offering protection against both 
diphtheria and pertussis (whooping cough), which complicated this 
picture as the 1950s progressed, as authorities could run slightly differ-
ent programmes to those of their peers. Where the combined vaccine 
was used the schedule was amended to find a practical and epidemio-
logically sound compromise between protecting children from pertus-
sis as early as possible and maintaining safety standards. Trials had 
begun on the pertussis vaccine in 1942, and the combined vaccine was 
trialled from 1951.22 By 1957, almost all local authorities had applied for 
and been granted permission to vaccinate against whooping cough, and 
many chose the combined immunisation.23 Because whooping cough 
was even more dangerous for very young children, this dose was given 
to children at around six to nine months old. The relationship between 
the two vaccines – and indeed the two diseases – had implications for 
the campaign against apathy. The Ministry considered the public much 
more fearful of whooping cough, and therefore the combined prophy-
lactic was seen as an administratively convenient way of reaching 
otherwise-apathetic parents. Separate injections may have led parents 
to “choose” one form of protection over another, further reducing the 
diphtheria immunisation rate.24 These are discussions to which this 
chapter will return.
The use of schools as sites for vaccination was significant for two 
reasons. First, since attendance was compulsory, schools were histori-
cally important as a surveillance tool for health authorities. Height, 
weight and other measurements were taken in schools to track malnu-
trition and neglect, primarily to ensure that children grew up healthy 
enough to work in factories, fight in the army and bear children.25 
Through them, local MOHs could reach almost all children and produce 
records about their immunisation statuses for routine monitoring and 
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follow-up. Second, this greater efficiency in school-age surveillance 
meant that there was a significantly higher rate of immunisation among 
children over the age of five than those of pre-school age.26 Infants were 
immunised at clinics held at specific times, usually led by the MOH. 
This reflected the administrative arrangements for public health at the 
time, as well as practical considerations with regard to diphtheria 
toxoid. Immunising from local authority clinics made it easier to store 
the vaccine, order in bulk and keep track of usage statistics. Clinics 
could see more patients in a shorter period than general practitioners, 
who, before 1948, were not contracted to a national health service.27 
Supplying the vaccine to individual surgeries and collating the statisti-
cal returns demanded by the Ministry would also add an extra layer of 
administration. Parents could make arrangements with their own 
doctor if they wished, with the general practitioner then being compen-
sated by the local authority, but this was less common than attendance 
at a clinic.28 This meant that most parents had to make a specific trip to 
the clinic to get their children immunised, rather than having the pro-
cedure done at the same time as a routine visit or check-up at the doc-
tor’s surgery.
Through the statistical data available, the Ministry was well aware 
that uptake among children of different ages varied significantly. This 
was a cause for concern from the early days of the programme. Pre-
schoolers were specifically targeted in 1942, and again after the end 
of the war, in an attempt to combat the discrepancy.29 By the birth of 
the NHS, local authorities were tasked with immunising 75 per cent of 
children before they reached their first birthday.30 But uptake rates did 
not vary just by age. Geography was another major dynamic. Immu-
nisation was managed at the local level under the direction of local 
MOHs. Local authorities had traditionally enjoyed a good degree of 
autonomy from central government, meaning that they could often be 
resistant if the Ministry attempted to interfere too much with regional 
matters.31 However, the use of MOHs was administratively convenient 
– smallpox vaccination had been the responsibility of local authorities 
before 1948, and this was maintained and formalised by Section 26 
of the National Health Service Acts.32 There was an inherent tension, 
therefore, between national targets and local circumstances. The atti-
tudes of parents and priorities of MOHs could vary considerably from 
council to council, and local difficulties could suspend or severely derail 
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efforts to immunise children promptly. For example, in 1946 in London 
alone the diphtheria immunisation rate of children under five years old 
ranged from 68 per cent in one borough to just 28 per cent in another; 
and the figures for five- to fourteen-year-olds ranged from 20 per cent 
to 86 per cent.33
That “convenience” had an effect on immunisation uptake was sig-
nificant. Indeed, it would be a central part of debates about apathy. For 
while a parent’s unwillingness to surmount inconvenience could be 
criticised as apathetic behaviour, it could also be seen a reasonable 
response to failures on the part of public health authorities, in terms of 
both service provision and education. Regardless, this was something 
that needed to be tackled. If indeed the problem was one of willingness 
to act over convenience, the Ministry believed that this could be over-
come through education and persuasion. In this sense, apathy was 
bound to long-held liberal concepts of public health based on individ-
ual freedom and the capacity of informed people to make rational (and 
therefore “correct”) choices.34 Human behaviour was a contributor to 
the spread of disease, giving moral authority for medical officers to 
intervene for the good of national productivity and military power.35 As 
societies became more reliant on technologies and complex administra-
tive systems, these risks were considered to be manageable. The state’s 
role was therefore to ensure that individuals behaved in ways that did 
not expose the state or fellow citizens.36 However, such actions could 
not unduly interfere with the rights of private citizens. Thus, education 
was seen by English practitioners as a sign of the nation’s democratic 
values, especially when compared to states like Germany that employed 
a coercive medical police.37
During the inter-war years, national and local health authorities 
expanded education as a preventative strategy.38 The creation of the 
COI from the war-time Ministry of Information also showed that such 
tactics would become even more important in the NHS era.39 Apathy 
was therefore seen as something that could be eliminated, much like 
sewerage and other public health measures had rid the streets of other 
“nuisances”. Educating the public through “propaganda”, as it was 
termed by public health officials at the time (without the modern nega-
tive connotations), was a key tool in the MOH’s arsenal.40 And yet, this 
also gave rise to the possibility of “victim blaming”. Once education and 
information were put out to the public, only the stupid, obstinate or 
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wilfully neglectful would not follow the “rational” path set out by public 
health campaigners.41 The experience of the 1950s shows that this was 
not always the way apathy was used as a rhetorical tool. Many people 
who had been exposed to “education” and were still non-compliant 
could still be depicted as “apathetic”. Similarly, the Ministry accepted 
that lower immunisation rates were a predictable and rational response 
to the decline of the disease. Moreover, interactions between authori-
ties and the public showed that there were other costs and risks associ-
ated with immunisation that informed parents’ decisions about their 
children’s health.
Despite this subjective and vague notion of apathy, the Ministry of 
Health felt that it would undermine the immunisation programme and 
see the return of thousands of cases of a deadly illness.42 This attitude 
reflected a belief that citizens had a duty to be engaged in their own 
health care – to avoid illness and so not put strain on health resources 
or harm national productivity. The immediate post-war era was one in 
which citizens demanded health care as a right from their governments; 
but it was also one in which governments and fellow citizens demanded 
mindfulness of those who used those services.43 As a result, the govern-
ment identified apathy as a problem and sought to “measure” it, primar-
ily through tracking immunisation rates and commissioning studies 
from the Social Survey (both of which will be explored in this chapter). 
Yet as we will also see, publics responded in other ways which showed 
that they were not as disengaged as headline figures and official thinking 
might have suggested. This, in turn, affected the ways in which local and 
national authorities sought to engage the public. It had a major impact 
in the way in which the 1950s anti-diphtheria campaign would be run.
The 1950s campaign
All the evidence suggested that the immunisation campaign since 1940 
had been a public health success story. Local authorities were required 
to return statistics on the number of immunisations performed, and 
diphtheria was a notifiable disease. Case load and death rates dropped 
significantly over the period up to 1950. To celebrate ten years of the 
NHS, London County Council’s Annual Report for 1957 showed the 
significant decline in mortality in different age groups in an informative 
chart (Figure 1.1). A trend line was plotted to show just how successful 
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Figure 1.1 England and Wales: diphtheria deaths, 1931–48.
Source: J. A. Scott, MOH Report, 1957, p. 65. Reproduced from the digitised 
Medical Officer of Health Reports by the Wellcome Trust under Creative 
Commons licence (CC-BY 4.0).
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public health provisions had been in the 1940s by comparing actual 
death rates to a projection based on data from the 1930s.44 Other graphs 
produced in MOH reports in the 1950s also included a line plotting 
‘percentage of population (5–14) not immunised’, which further dem-
onstrated the correlation between immunisation rates and declining 
notifications in London County.45 Further proof of the impact of immu-
nisation came from official statistics. Those who had been immunised 
were four times less likely to develop the disease, and if they did, they 
were twenty times less likely to die of it.46
However, the Ministry became concerned at the sudden drop in the 
number of young children being immunised. In 1949, the government 
had achieved its target of 75 per cent uptake. Yet, preliminary figures 
for 1950 suggested a significant decrease, and in 1951 fewer than 30 per 
cent of children less than a year old were immunised.47 It was clear that 
the Ministry had a problem. The question was, what had caused it and 
what could be done? Very quickly, “apathy” among parents was identi-
fied as the main culprit.
The choice to focus on apathy seems at first glance to be a strange 
one. The decrease in the number of vaccinations was caused primarily 
by a lack of opportunity. Owing to a national epidemic of poliomy-
elitis, the campaign had been suspended in areas of particularly high 
prevalence.48 This meant that parents’ appointments were cancelled, 
and local authorities could not follow up on young children who had 
not been immunised.49 The reason for the suspension was that medical 
authorities had received some evidence that immunisation (against any 
disease) might exacerbate the onset of paralysis in the limb in which 
a person was injected during a poliomyelitis outbreak. Some medical 
professionals and commentators argued that the act of injection may 
actually cause polio, reflecting the gaps in knowledge about the disease 
at the time.50 A. Bradford Hill and J. Knowelden at the London School 
of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine performed an analysis on govern-
ment data and case reports from J. K. Martin,51 B. P. McCloskey52 and 
D. H. Geffen.53 They concluded that people who developed poliomy-
elitis within one month of being immunised were much more likely to 
experience paralysis in the limb in which they were injected. Despite 
this, it was found that the risks of a recently immunised person develop-
ing paralytic symptoms were no greater than those of an unimmunised 
person – i.e., immunisation did not cause paralytic polio.54 In subsequent 
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years, this allowed the national immunisation campaign to continue, 
with suspension occurring only in local areas with significant polio 
outbreaks. National propaganda was, however, suspended during the 
summer months, the “polio season” in which most cases developed.55 
Despite the clear decline in the percentage of children being immu-
nised, the second biggest reason for the decrease in absolute numbers 
of immunisations was the lower birth rate of 1949 as compared to the 
following year of 1950.56 If the polio season and declining birth rates 
explained most of the drop-off, then why was the Ministry of Health 
so concerned with apathy?
Part of the answer lies in how public health authorities monitored 
and identified public health problems. They concentrated on the areas 
of low uptake that they could combat directly – that is, the risks that 
could be managed. Convinced that rates were low even when one made 
allowances for polio and the birth rate, the Ministry surveyed parents 
to ascertain their attitudes towards immunisation. It hypothesised that 
apathy could be a problem; and sought to find it through its new 
research department, the Social Survey.
The Social Survey had emerged out of the war years and was the 
successor to the Wartime Social Survey, which was established by the 
Coalition government as a way of monitoring public attitudes and expe-
riences of government departments so that policies could be more effi-
ciently tailored to the conditions of war-time Britain.57 Building on 
sociological and survey methods developed in the earlier period by 
social research pioneers such as Charles Booth and Joseph Rowntree, 
and mass participation projects such as Mass Observation, it repre-
sented a shift towards technocratic solutions to social problems and an 
increasing faith in the state to be able to provide rational responses.58 
As Lord Moran showed in 1952, surveys were seen by many in the 
medical establishment as an excellent tool for judging the public’s 
mood and, in Moran’s words, ‘persuading them to fall into line’ by 
developing ‘new methods of interesting and educating the public’ 
against ‘prejudices and old wives’ fears’.59 The Ministry had used the 
Wartime Social Survey and its successor to assess the impact of its 
original propaganda campaign during and immediately after the war, 
interviewing mothers about their knowledge about diphtheria and 
where they had heard about it.60 In combination, they suggested that 
by 1945 most mothers knew about immunisation and almost all had 
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adequate access to clinics. Rates of immunisation were much higher 
than they had been in earlier years, and apathy is mentioned only as a 
side concern. By taking those parents who said that they ‘have not 
bothered, not had time yet’ and those who had incorrectly believed 
their children were too young, it estimated ‘about 12% of mothers have 
not had their children immunised owing to ignorance or apathy’.61 Nine 
per cent were considered to ‘have a positive resistance’ through not 
believing in the procedure, spousal objection or fears the child would 
be hurt or frightened.62
While the 1942 and 1945 surveys had specifically investigated the 
level of knowledge and effects of propaganda on parents, the 1951 
report focused more heavily on the reasons for declining uptake. Many 
of the questions were similar, to allow comparison across time, but the 
final report spent much more time analysing the reasons for non-
immunisation from mothers of young children. The Ministry hoped to 
find the extent of apathy and the deeper reasons for parents’ reluctance 
to immunise. Yet, it did not appear that – statistically – apathy could be 
considered a much larger problem than it had been six years previously. 
Indeed, direct resistance to immunisation appeared to be much lower 
than in 1945, with only 3 per cent of mothers considered to be opposed 
to the procedure.63 Thirty-five per cent of children who had not been 
immunised were ‘accounted for by apathy and ignorance on the part of 
the mother’. This, the report concluded, was a similar overall proportion 
to that identified in 1945.64 Even the new problem of poliomyelitis did 
not appear to have had much material effect. The Chief Medical Officer 
had claimed that the suspension of the programme in some areas had 
‘naturally aroused apprehension among parents’.65 But while this was 
the greatest cause of the lower immunisation rates in 1950, there was 
little evidence that it had affected parents’ decisions about whether to 
present their children. Very few mothers who had not immunised their 
children gave the fear of polio as a reason. The debate had received some 
coverage in the Manchester Guardian and Daily Express,66 but despite ‘a 
whole series of questions enabling them to reveal their knowledge on 
the subject … only 4% of mothers were even aware of the possible 
association’.67
Identifying apathy was not solely an exercise in statistical and socio-
logical methodology. Even if the Social Survey suggested that apathy 
had not increased, some MOHs and commentators at local and national 
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levels continued to report that they had seen or felt its effects within 
their communities. Apathy was not, necessarily, something the Social 
Survey could adequately and objectively capture. It was emotional, 
identified as a lack of fear among parents. While less tangible than 
objective survey results, it was no less real to medical officers at the 
national and local levels. Professional experience and intuition told 
them that apathy was a bigger problem than it had been in the past; and 
this perception guided action as much as any material reality. For the 
Ministry, this was confirmed by their interpretation of uptake statistics. 
For MOHs, interactions with local citizens confirmed their suspicions. 
The decline both of parental fear and of the efficacy of public health’s 
ability to communicate risk was reported in multiple forums. The COI 
had received a lot of praise for the cost-efficiency and positive effects 
of its campaigning in the 1940s,68 but the feeling was that the tactics 
that had been used in previous years were no longer sufficient. The 
Chief Medical Officer argued that it had become ‘less easy to bring 
home to parents the vital importance of protecting their children than 
it used to be when most of them had first-hand knowledge of this 
disease among their own and their neighbours’ children’.69 Others in the 
press and medical establishment agreed. The Times’ medical corre-
spondent wrote of ‘a sense of false security’ that had tended to ‘spread 
throughout the community’.70 The London County Council MOH 
added that ‘the low incidence of diphtheria … whilst itself resulting 
from the successful measures of immunisation, tends to produce apathy 
in parents to whom the old days of diphtheria scourge were unknown’.71 
Newspaper editorials also reflected concerns after the war that apathy 
with regard to health care extended beyond diphtheria. ‘All the efforts 
which are being made to improve the health of the nation will come to 
nothing if people, ignorantly or selfishly, neglect the precautions that 
are offered them free,’ argued the Daily Mirror.72 The Manchester Guard-
ian was particularly scathing. The uptake of free orange juice and cod 
liver oil in schools was at less than half of official targets. Child dentistry, 
too, was often neglected, despite its availability on the NHS. The public, 
it argued in an editorial, were apathetic about prophylaxis in general, 
and neglecting their civic duties.
We are being kept alive longer, we are surrounded by expensive welfare 
systems, and yet many of us are too lazy or ignorant to give our children 
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the safeguards to a healthy life that the State is ready to provide, and too 
dirty or slovenly in our personal habits to escape outbreaks of food 
poisoning that should never occur at all. …
We should be a far healthier nation if we turned as readily to free 
preventative medical services as we clamour for free aspirin and barbi-
turates. … It is a sad indictment of our society that we let free health go 
begging and then demand money in hundreds of millions to spend on 
“free” medicine.73
These observations, even if they were not borne out by the statistics, 
dominated the official narrative. They reflected contemporary concerns 
about good health citizenship in the post-war era, and (at least in the 
case of the Manchester Guardian editorial) appeared to project wider 
anxieties about other welfare programmes onto vaccination. While 
good health had come to be seen as a right across economically devel-
oped countries after the Second World War, there was also a sense that 
citizens had a duty to behave in way that did not put their health at 
risk.74 Good health meant fewer hospital visits, meaning lower direct 
health care costs and better productivity owing to fewer work days lost 
to sickness and disability.75 This meant citizens making use of welfare 
schemes that were provided for their own good. Parents ought to want 
immunisation, and they ought to present their children. If they did not 
do so, this apathy needed to be eliminated. The national government 
continued to remind the public of its obligations, but also appealed 
directly to parents about their own children’s health and wellbeing. It 
stuck to its original premise of attempting to educate parents about the 
dangers of diphtheria and the benefits of immunisation, in the hope of 
increasing immunisation rates so that the disease could continue its 
decline throughout the country. If such tactics had worked in the past, 
reframing them in the wake of declining fear of diphtheria ought to 
work again.
The national campaign
The campaign that followed borrowed heavily from posters and tactics 
that had been used to establish the diphtheria programme during the 
war. However, the emphasis turned away from simply extolling the 
virtues of immunisation and towards a concerted effort to explain to 
parents just why they should still fear the disease, in an effort to combat 
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apathy. The Ministry aimed ‘To persuade parents to have their children 
immunised against Diphtheria before  they reach the age of twelve 
months’, and ‘To raise the level of children immunised to 75% thereby 
eliminating Diphtheria as an epidemic disease’.76
The justification was three-fold. First, the Ministry warned that while 
morbidity had continued to decline in 1951, so had the immunisation 
rate. Second, preliminary figures showed the 1952 was on course to be 
the first year since immunisation began in which mortality had not 
decreased. Third, the impending introduction of nationwide whooping 
cough vaccination led the Ministry to worry that parents would choose 
to ignore diphtheria altogether unless they were made aware of the risks 
of the disease.77
At the national level, the Ministry of Health prescribed propaganda 
to treat the ailment. It hired billboards for large sixteen-sheet posters, 
as well as initiating a targeted press campaign. The message throughout 
the 1950s was that ‘diphtheria still kills’ and ‘diphtheria is deadly’.78 
However, resource constraints limited what the Ministry could do. For 
1953 it had wanted to run a nationwide poster campaign costing 
£21,700. This was denied by the Treasury, who instead allowed a budget 
of £10,000.79 The Ministry ‘fully agreed that [this] amount … was insuf-
ficient to counteract existing apathy, make parents fully aware of the 
dangers of diphtheria, and emphasise that the elimination of the disease 
is conditional upon the maintenance of an adequate level of immunisa-
tion’.80 But what could be done? The Churchill government had placed 
limits on expenditure – referred to by the Ministry as the ‘Salisbury 
ceiling’ – and this was a time of austerity for a number of departments.81 
To make best use of resources, the national campaign was targeted at 
those areas where the total immunisation coverage in children under 
five years old had dropped below 50 per cent.82
The Ministry of Health acknowledged that such efforts would be in 
vain without the cooperation of local authorities, showing that the 
diphtheria programme was not entirely “top down”. The Chief Medical 
Officer explicitly praised MOHs for their work, explaining that the 
national publicity operation could only help, not replace, the tried and 
tested campaigning techniques at the local level. This included further 
targeted advertising, but was also dependent upon the aid of voluntary 
organisations and efficient use of face-to-face contact between local 
authority medical staff and parents during the first years of their babies’ 
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lives. Thus ‘the health visitor, midwife and clinic doctor constitute[d] 
the joint spearhead of the attack on smallpox and diphtheria’.83 The 
campaign was aimed at ‘those mothers who have been lulled into a false 
sense of security’, but would ‘depend, more than ever, on local initiative’. 
‘If local authorities make effective use’ of the materials provided, ‘there 
will be fewer mothers saying “if only…” this year – and perhaps in future 
years too.’84
Elements of this campaign were universal in tone, seemingly targeted 
at all parents. We can see this quite clearly in the centrally produced 
propaganda materials. The 1951/52 campaign led with a striking and 
stark poster. It contained no images, but was a simple black typeface on 
a white background. It read, ‘if you had seen a child with diphtheria you 
would have yours immunised now’. The word ‘if ’ (all in lower case) was 
larger than the rest of the text, and emphasised by being picked out in 
red.85 A later version of the same poster used white text on a black 
background, but kept the red colour of the opening word.86 Many leaf-
lets and posters led with (or at least contained) the line ‘diphtheria still 
kills’, with emphasis often placed on the word ‘still’. Another common 
line was ‘diphtheria costs lives – immunisation costs nothing’.87 Having 
been armed with these facts, and being made aware of the real risks of 
diphtheria, it was argued, parents would make the right choice: ‘The 
wise parent knows … that with the best care in the world any child, and 
particularly a baby, may fall ill’, after all.88 The only way to insure against 
this was via immunisation.
Another universal approach was to send postcards to houses where 
a child was about to reach their first birthday. Decorated like birthday 
cards, the imagery of celebration helped to present the Ministry’s 
central message. First, it reminded parents of the need to get children 
immunised before they turned one; and second, it reinforced the idea 
that immunisation was a gift, and one that both parent and baby would 
appreciate in time. Local authorities in London found this a particularly 
helpful tactic, one that was both universal and, by physically entering 
the homes of potential contacts, in some ways personal. Not everyone 
could be met by a health visitor, but almost all could be reached through 
the Royal Mail.89 It played to the very personal relationship between 
parents and their young children. ‘Only if parents are wise enough to 
give their babies protection can this deadly disease be held in check,’ 
declared one leaflet.90 Such rhetoric also emphasised that central tenet 
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of the liberal British public health tradition: immunisation, while clearly 
desirable and implored by the government, was still a choice.
Despite the universalist overtones, the government was clearly selec-
tive in where it targeted its messages. It made very deliberate choices in 
how and where these messages were sent, telling us much about just 
whose “apathy” was considered a danger. In doing so, it focused on the 
group in whom it felt apathy was the most dangerous. As had been 
made clear from the Social Survey, investigations into parental responses 
to diphtheria and immunisation had questioned only mothers.91 Here 
it had found only a small number of families where immunisation had 
been refused on the basis of the father’s disapproval. These were not 
further sub-divided in the published statistics, though the report men-
tioned that about half of those questioned about the father’s objection 
noted bad experience of (smallpox) vaccination in the armed forces and 
among other parents. All other reasons for non-immunisation were 
attributed to the mother. Apathy was measured through four categories 
of response considered to be ‘unsatisfactory excuses’. These were ‘father 
does not agree’, ‘does not believe in it’, ‘never heard of it’ and ‘not both-
ered’. All placed the blame on the mother.92 This in itself is quite illumi-
nating. ‘Never heard of it’ would imply a lack of knowledge rather than 
a lack of care. Yet clearly the authorities were willing to conflate the two. 
In the midst of a long-running national and local campaign, ignorance 
was not an excuse. Similarly, ‘does not believe in it’ and ‘father does not 
agree’ would imply positive objection rather than apathy. At face value, 
only ‘not bothered’ would constitute indifference. In all of these cases, 
however, the assumption on the part of health authorities would be that 
these issues could be cured through education and persuasion. If, in the 
British liberal tradition of public health, apathy were overcome through 
giving rational actors the correct facts about health care, then, once 
mothers (and, in some cases, fathers) were properly educated, these 
problems would cease. For the Ministry of Health, apathy could cover 
a range of public responses, so long as they were surmountable through 
good education.
The focus on mothers can in large part be attributed to mid-century 
visions of the role of mothers within the family, with women tradition-
ally being seen as the primary – and, at times, only – caregivers.93 This 
had been a common theme in public health from the late nineteenth 
century, the point at which ‘motherhood’ became an ideological and 
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political state rather than simply a descriptive term for being a mother.94 
But it was not inevitable that fathers would be side-lined. During the 
interwar years, the role of fathers in the care and raising of children 
began to gain importance.95 An agony-aunt column in the Daily Mirror 
clearly felt that fathers had a role, with Sister Clare telling dads to ‘put 
[their] foot down firmly here and insist’ that the mother agree to immu-
nisation.96 The original survey in 1942 did investigate whether ‘hus-
bands’ were consulted in the decision to immunise the child. Fifty-four 
per cent of mothers said that they did consult their husband, with 40 
per cent declaring that it was their ‘own decision’. Husbands from more 
affluent backgrounds were more likely to be involved, but even in the 
‘D’ social classes, there was an equal split of ‘own decision’ and ‘con-
sulted husband’ from those who gave a positive response to the ques-
tion.97 The Social Survey did not follow up on this in 1945 or 1951. Since 
husbands did not appear to be a barrier to immunisation, and wives had 
shown their capacity to immunise unilaterally, it seems resources were 
moved to mothers, where they might achieve more immediate results. 
Apathy among fathers was hence viewed as largely irrelevant; and 
indeed, their place within this decision-making process was discussed 
only in relation to their refusal to immunise.
Only one press advertisement in the COI file on the diphtheria 
campaigns specifically spoke to ‘father’; and this had effectively the 
same content as a contemporary advert showing a picture of a mother 
with her child.98 This was a long-running theme. Of the thirty-one 
magazines listed in the 1942 campaign information brochure, nineteen 
contained words related to women readers, with none aimed at men.99 
Other actors within this process expressed similarly gender-imbalanced 
views. The press and local authorities both focused on the sensibilities 
of the mother. One secretary at a north London town hall objected to 
the ‘ghastly’ ‘if ’ posters, sending them straight back to the Ministry. She 
noted that the mothers in her area would be disturbed by the messages 
and the imagery, and made a request for the ‘pretty’ baby posters of 
previous years.100 In this specific case, at least, it was felt that apathy 
could be overcome through a more overtly feminine message rather 
than through fear. Immunisation messages could also be integrated into 
pre-existing public health schemes. For example, some local authorities 
had special film screenings for women, which included other “mother-
craft” messages such as disseminating techniques for teaching young 
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children how to walk.101 Patricia Hornby-Smith, the Minister for Health, 
gave a speech warning against apathy at press events organised at a new 
maternal welfare clinic.102 As for the press, The Star, a London-based, 
populist newspaper, ran a number of stories during 1955 in favour of 
the immunisation scheme.103 It was far more explicit about the role of 
women than the official national propaganda. And far more judgemen-
tal. An editorial written by the paper’s own ‘Harley-st Doctor’ put the 
blame for low immunisation rates on ‘Silly Mothers’ who ‘after all the 
proofs of its value … raise silly objections’.104 Even those with less 
judgemental tones highlighted the example of the ignorant mother. The 
Bristol MOH was quoted in a Bristol Evening World article recounting 
a conversation with ‘a young mother at a Bristol clinic’ after seeing a 
‘Diphtheria Still Kills’ poster: ‘ “But,” she said to the Sister, “I thought 
it meant only a few spots and Johnny would be over it in a few days. I 
didn’t know it was so dangerous.” ’105 If apathy was a problem with 
parents in general, it was clearly the responsibility of mothers to over-
come it.
The 1951 Social Survey indicated some class divide in the uptake of 
immunisation, as shown in Table 1.1. Sixty per cent of children (of all 
ages) whose mothers had left school before they turned fourteen were 
immunised, versus 85 per cent of those whose mothers had been edu-
cated beyond the age of fifteen. Similarly, 61 per cent were immunised 
in households where the main wage earner took home less than £5 per 
week, as compared to 80 per cent in households where the main weekly 
wage was more than £10. There was little variation among those outside 
of the poorest families. The core of the campaign, however, was focused 
on increasing the immunisation rate in children younger than one year 
– and here, rates were more even. Fifty-six per cent of children were 
immunised before twelve months in the lowest earnings bracket, with 
between 61 and 63 per cent for the higher incomes.106 Using the ‘unsat-
isfactory excuses’ noted earlier, apathy was measured at 36 per cent 
among least-educated parents, versus 28 per cent for the most-educated. 
There was a bigger divide across income brackets, ranging from 45 per 
cent among the poorest to 24 per cent among the better-off.107 As also 
shown earlier, in 1942 a greater number of higher-income parents had 
made a joint decision on whether their child would be immunised.108
The Ministry acted upon this information with its propaganda cam-
paign. Although this is not made explicit in the literature, advertising 
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Proportion of mothers’ 






Left school before 14 years 60% 60% 36% 28%
Left school when 14 years old 73% 59% 31% 37%
Left school when 15 or over 85% 64% 28% 61%
Weekly income of head of household
Up to £5 61% 56% 45% 39%
Over £5 to £7 10s 73% 61% 31% 39%
Over £7 10s to £10 80% 63% 27% 43%
Over £10 79% 63% 24% 55%
Not ascertained 70% 58% 21% 46%
Number of children in family
One 78% 68% 29% 50%
Two 79% 60% 30% 43%
Three 74% 56% 32% 40%
Four or more 55% 50% 35% 26%
All children aged 6 months to 
under 5
74% 60% 31% 42%
Source: Reproduced from Table 11: Family background and immunisation, in Gray and Cartwright, Diphtheria 
Immunisation in 1951, p. 16.
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space was bought in papers such as the Sunday Express, News of the 
World and People, but not in more middle-class papers such as the Mail 
on Sunday, Sunday Times or Observer.109 By 1951 the number of national 
titles targeted had contracted, but there were still two explicitly men-
tioned categories of publications: ‘the more widely read national Sunday 
and weekly papers and the most suitable women’s weekly magazines’.110 
There was a prima facie case for using these periodicals. The more “pop-
ulist” the titles, the larger the audience, and the more people who would 
see the advertisement. Local authorities also tried to promote immuni-
sation uptake in traditional “black spots”, often in more deprived areas. 
Manchester used a mobile immunisation van in the 1940s and gained 
press coverage in the Manchester Guardian for it.111 ‘Division 3’ in 
London (covering the boroughs of Finsbury, Holborn and Islington) 
used a similar vehicle that toured busy shopping centres, hoping to 
reach children who had not yet been immunised.112
Class was not as explicit in the national campaign as gender was. The 
government had targeted specific locations for increased advertising or 
epidemiological intervention, but these areas were identified based on 
their aggregate immunisation rates and not specifically the class com-
position of local authorities. Partially, this reflected the mass nature of 
propaganda campaigns. The national government’s concern was to 
tackle apathy by generally raising awareness of diphtheria and the asso-
ciated risks through a coordinated use of media that would reach the 
most number of people with the greatest impact. By definition, this 
would have to be broad and largely “populist”. It was the job of local 
authorities, with their knowledge of the peculiarities of their unique 
circumstances and demographics to further target the specific popula-
tions and families that were non-compliant.113
In the press and in the justification for national campaigns against 
diphtheria, apathy made sense as a central narrative. On the ground, 
medical authorities presented a different picture of the reasons for non-
immunisation and ways of tackling it. A more complex interaction 
between the public and the immunisation programme emerges, in 
which the government adapted to parents’ concerns. To begin with, the 
rhetoric of apathy did not necessarily make sense with the data coming 
back to public health authorities. This was evident even from the way 
in which the Ministry of Health targeted those local authorities with 
lower immunisation rates. The Ministry was limited in the direct action 
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it could take, as each authority ran its own public health schemes 
through its MOH. While the MOHs were empowered or compelled to 
act in certain ways, prioritisation was a local matter. One direct inter-
vention the Ministry could make was advertising. Originally the plan 
had been to treat all areas equally, but expenditure limits forced greater 
selectivity. Instead, the government paid for advertising only in the 
counties and county boroughs with the lowest immunisation rates.114 
The use of advertising as a public health measure relied on the assump-
tion that lower rates in those areas were due to a lack of knowledge or 
apathy (in comparison to the better-performing authorities) rather than 
to any other local peculiarities.115 Even so, the Manchester Guardian 
noted that the results of the 1945 Social Survey suggested that parents 
in the northern region knew more about the nature of diphtheria and 
facts about immunisation, and yet had a lower immunisation rate than 
the national average.116 Of the 26 areas targeted due to low immunisa-
tion rates in 1952, only 7 were outside the industrial Midlands or the 
North.117 Education did not appear to be the problem; the issue was 
persuasion. As with the ‘unsatisfactory excuses’, the Ministry’s concep-
tion of apathy appeared to conflate the issues of ignorance, indifference 
and disbelief. Despite this contradictory feedback, the government 
continued to centre its actions on parental apathy.
An outbreak in Coseley, in the Black Country, appeared to justify 
this approach and confirm judgements about apathy in mothers from 
certain areas and from certain backgrounds.118 At the same time, it 
exposed failures in the logic that education and fear of the disease 
would be enough to make parents comply with official advice. The town 
had gone through a diphtheria epidemic in 1951, with 66 cases. Despite 
an intensive immunisation campaign, there were a further 20 cases in 
1952 and 38 in 1953. In 1953, Coseley accounted for almost a third of 
all cases in England for the year.119 The intensified immunisation efforts 
by the local medical authorities succeeded in immunising 78.5 per cent 
of school children in the district. However, 60 per cent of pre-schoolers 
remained unimmunised, despite the clear evidence that diphtheria was 
endemic.120 According to the Chief Medical Officer’s report for 1953:
In Coseley, as elsewhere in the country, it was found in most instances 
the parents of unimmunised young children had no objection to the 
procedure. They were merely indolent and quite apathetic concerning 
the matter … Later, when the child could be immunised at school, 
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without any inconvenience, they readily consented. Nevertheless, there 
was the odd instance of the obdurate parent who could not be per-
suaded to have his children protected, even though other members of 
the household had contracted the disease. In several instances in recent 
years, in Coseley and elsewhere, this refusal has brought tragic conse-
quences – the child not only contracting the disease but succumbing  
to it.121
One of the striking things about this passage is how the Chief Medical 
Officer repeatedly draws parallels between Coseley and the rest of the 
country. What happened in Staffordshire could happen anywhere. The 
tone, however, is far less sympathetic than the content of the national 
propaganda campaigns. The parents in Coseley were wilfully choosing 
not to immunise their children. Parents knew that diphtheria was still 
a menace, yet they were unwilling to make the effort to present their 
children to medical authorities until the medical authorities came to 
them. Even then, it could be a struggle. An official from the Stafford-
shire Health Department despaired, ‘we send them forms and tell them 
of the dangers … but they don’t bother to return the forms’.122 This 
interpretation relied on a contradictory definition of apathy. Much like 
the ‘unsatisfactory excuses’ in the 1951 Social Survey, the unwillingness 
or inability to assimilate official advice and make the “correct” decision 
about immunisation could at once be attributed to wilful resistance and 
apathy. And yet, the education campaign continued. Local Alderman 
George Newham’s response to parents who had fears about immunisa-
tion was thus: ‘They haven’t been educated … We are still having to 
teach them.’123
Coseley further showed the way in which a number of phenomena 
could be attributed to apathy. It also highlighted the difficulty of effec-
tively monitoring and intervening in the lives of children without the 
full cooperation of parents, especially in pre-schoolers. Apathy could 
therefore also apply to parents who were unwilling to make sacrifices to 
the greater good. This could include: consent to the procedure in prin-
ciple; taking the child to the clinic; waiting for the doctor; and having to 
deal with any potential consequences of the procedure, from irritability 
to other more serious side-effects. With all these costs and risks, the gov-
ernment was asking a lot of mothers – and it was almost always mothers 
– with young children. For some, this was part of civic duty, echoing 
Bevan’s words about the ‘energetic cooperation of every citizen’.124 As 
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early as 1946, a coroner in Stoke-on-Trent accused the parents of a child 
who died of the disease of ‘grossly selfish humbug’ because ‘they had 
not bothered to have their child Theresa … immunised’.125
Most authorities, however, were much more restrained. For example, 
the MOH for Camberwell reacted to an outbreak of diphtheria in his 
borough in 1959 by imploring parents to ‘do the right thing’ by the 
country. ‘Public apathy and complacency have grown concomitantly 
with the diminution of a disease, the ravages of which are unknown to 
the young parents of today,’ Chalke wrote.126 The outbreak served ‘as a 
dramatic reminder … of the damage that can follow unbelief in the 
efficacy of immunisation’. Aside from the school absences and risks to 
the individuals, it was a drain on the time and resources of health 
workers and hospitals.127 Despite the moralising tone, there is no evi-
dence in his report that parents were being actively blamed for wanton 
ignorance or refusal to submit to reason. But there was a sense that 
some parents were ‘lacking a communal health consciousness’.128 Immu-
nisation was not simply an act for personal protection. It was part of a 
wider citizenship, both for protecting the “herd” against disease and 
ensuring that medical resources were not spent fighting a disease that 
should, but for apathy, be eliminated from British cities. Once again, 
health care was not only a right of the new, technocratic welfare state; 
it was the duty of citizens to help themselves and others by availing 
themselves of these facilities.129
Apathy could exist as a general narrative, but this did not have to 
dictate the specific courses of action taken by health authorities to 
improve immunisation rates in their local areas. As Jane Seymour and 
Luke Blaxill’s work on the London MOH reports shows, local officers 
had become less judgemental of citizens as the inter-war years pro-
gressed, instead focusing on service provision and understanding of 
local structural factors to improve health outcomes.130 London’s immu-
nisation rates for children under the age of five remained poor. Only 
55.4 per cent of children aged 0–4 had been immunised in 1950. That 
figure rose to 67 per cent when children under one year of age were 
discounted.131 Despite this, apathy was rarely blamed when the disease 
hit. An outbreak of diphtheria in West Ham had led to an intensified 
immunisation campaign.132 Fourteen cases were reported in 1955, and 
a further two in early 1956. This was the first time since 1948 that the 
borough had experienced more than five cases in a single year.133 From 
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1955 to 1956, the number of children of school age being fully immu-
nised rose from 52 per cent to 87 per cent. Yet the number of pre-school 
children being immunised remained lower – rising from 56 per cent to 
76 per cent.134 The West Ham MOH reports made no mention of 
apathy, nor any judgements on the behaviour of parents during this 
period. The only hint we can find is in the 1956 report, when the Officer 
makes reference to the number of parents who fail to keep their appoint-
ments for the new polio vaccination. He assumed that with this specific 
vaccine parents ‘still had doubts about [its] safety’.135 A similar picture 
was found in Finsbury. Blyth Brook, the borough’s MOH, mentioned 
nothing about the behaviour of parents and described a 1959 outbreak 
as having little more than ‘nuisance value’.136 This may well have been a 
case of public relations management, downplaying the significance of 
an infectious disease so as not to stir panic. It was the first time that 
there had been so many cases of the disease in the borough since 1941, 
and the first time since 1945 that more than six diphtheria notifications 
had been made. However, there is no evidence of resistance to this line 
of reasoning, and no major panic. Blyth Brook’s report focused instead 
on the specific steps that his inspectors and immunisers made in bring-
ing the disease under control. The blame lay in the diphtheria bacillus 
itself, and was dealt with like any other public health ‘nuisance’.
The national government had focused on a publicity campaign partly 
because this was an area of activity over which it had some control. 
Local authorities, however, had the advantage of being able to reflect 
on micro-level issues such as practical access to services. They could, 
and would, act independently of the Ministry in order to meet their 
own public health goals. The government acknowledged this in its cam-
paign materials, encouraging MOHs to use their local knowledge, social 
workers and voluntary organisations to help spread the message about 
immunisation and raise acceptance rates.137 Rather than solely blame 
parental apathy, MOHs did what they could to target black spots and 
bring immunisation services to parents, rather than waiting for children 
to come to them. The immunisation vans in Manchester and northern 
London show this most clearly.138 Education could also be better tar-
geted according to local custom. R. J. Donaldson (Rotherham’s MOH) 
wrote to the Ministry in 1955 asking for help with locating a film van 
that he could take around the town. ‘I do feel many people fail to read 
… advertisements,’ he lamented.139 On top of this, traditional services 
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were strengthened. New clinics were set up, and hours extended. Immu-
nisers went to day nurseries and infant welfare sessions to meet parents 
directly. In one borough, the medical authorities organised an exhibi-
tion in which the immunisation session was open to the public to see 
just how efficient and desirable protection against diphtheria could 
be.140 Health visitors were another key tool. These had been used first 
by voluntary and then by statutory organisations in the field of infant 
welfare since the late nineteenth century.141 Their role had become more 
formalised and professionalised over the twentieth century, and in the 
post-war years was more akin to that of the social worker as we now 
know it.142 From the beginning of the anti-apathy campaign, the direct 
contact that they enabled with families was considered vital.143 London 
County Council considered health visitors along with clinic staff and 
doctors as the reason why their immunisation programme had been a 
success.144 Midwives and health visitors were made aware of every birth 
in the county and, as part of their other tasks, would press upon parents 
the need for immunisation.145 It was always known, then, that propa-
ganda (in the form of posters, press advertisements and film) would not 
be enough on its own to combat apathy. The government, through its 
local administrative machinery, had to go to parents and ensure that 
immunisation fitted in with their lives. As the 1951 Social Survey had 
found, children in larger families and with poorer parents were less 
likely to be immunised (see Table 1.1). Better provision of services and 
direct communication were needed to make parents believe that immu-
nisation was a high-enough priority for them to seek it out. Apathy did 
not just require a change in parents’ attitude, it also needed compromise 
and cooperation from health authorities.
Indeed, there was an inherent acknowledgement in the 1950s cam-
paign, even in central government, that parents’ responses to declining 
diphtheria rates were rational. While the ‘false sense of security’ was 
worrisome,146 it was ‘understandable’.147 The immediate risk of diphthe-
ria was less obvious to parents, and therefore managing that risk at the 
individual level was less of a priority.148 Clearly, parents had concerns 
over other diseases that felt more immediately threatening – even 
MOHs themselves had to deal more with outbreaks of poliomyelitis 
and whooping cough.149 In another attempt to meet parents’ concerns 
and leverage these to increase diphtheria immunisation, local and 
national authorities began to use the newly available pertussis vaccine 
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as a way to entice parents to the immunisation clinic and, proverbially, 
kill two birds with one stone. The 1951 Social Survey had found that 
parents still found diphtheria to be the most dangerous child illness by 
some margin, followed by whooping cough.150 Yet MOHs continued to 
assert as the decade progressed that they found it easier to convince 
parents to present their children for pertussis immunisation.151 In 1953, 
the Ministry had feared that this would leave diphtheria under-
appreciated.152 But widespread use of the combined immunisation just 
a few years later meant that local MOHs could protect children against 
both diseases at the same time. Another positive for the Ministry was 
that whooping cough immunisation was recommended at an earlier age 
than diphtheria, meaning that there was more time to administer 
prophylaxis against diphtheria before children turned one year old.153 
In London, protection against diphtheria in children from one to five 
years old rose from 63.1 per cent in 1953 to 74.1 per cent in 1960 and 
94.7 in 1964.154 The vast majority of these injections came from the 
combined prophylactic.155 There were other ways to overcome apathy 
than education and persuasion. Restructuring of services and response 
to local circumstance were perhaps more effective in some ways than 
national propaganda.
Conclusions
The campaign appeared to be a success. As the combined vaccine and 
other localised public health measures continued, the overall immuni-
sation rate across the country did improve. Immunisation among chil-
dren under the age of one grew from 28 per cent in 1951 to 44 per cent 
in 1956.156 Perhaps more importantly, diphtheria did not make a resur-
gence. Morbidity and mortality continued to decline, and in 1959 
nobody died of the disease (Table 1.2).157 In the later 1950s, talk of 
apathy continued in the national press, but at a much lower level than 
at the beginning of the campaign. This made the occasional outbreak 
newsworthy rather than a routine occurrence. One major example of 
this happened in September 1960, when a girl died in Derby. V. N. 
Leyshon, the city’s MOH, sent details of the case to the national press 
and it gained widespread coverage. It was seen as a warning that parents 
could not give into complacency – or apathy – and that immunisation 
against the disease was still necessary. Leyshon reported some days later 
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that the publicity had achieved its objective. His clinics had been inun-
dated with requests, and the city’s immunisation rate improved dra-
matically.158 Even after the relative successes of the 1950s campaign– and 
despite the experiences of MOHs on the ground over the decade – 
apathy could still be invoked as a criticism of and warning to parents 
across the nation.


























Note: Figures for 1938–43 are not corrected in the same way as those for 
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60 The development of the vaccination programme
The anti-apathy campaign had started from the premise that the 
main issue stopping parents from presenting their children for immu-
nisation was declining fear of diphtheria. In the British public health 
tradition, the Ministry of Health trusted the power of propaganda, edu-
cation and persuasion to convince rational citizens to make the right 
decision for their own and the nation’s benefit. In practice, “apathy” 
served other purposes. It was a convenient scapegoat for local and 
national authorities attempting to explain their inability to maintain 
high levels of protection among the public. Local MOHs had to justify 
their progress (or lack thereof) in their annual reports. The govern-
ment, too, had clearly assumed responsibility for the health of its sub-
jects and needed to explain how and why outbreaks of a preventable 
disease had been allowed to happen. Apathy allowed the medical estab-
lishment to outline the need for personal responsibility and good health 
citizenship. It was also clearly a concept that could incorporate a number 
of different public behaviours and still maintain enough coherence to 
persuade the Ministry, local authorities and the press that it was a clear 
danger to public health. Ignorance, indifference, disbelief and unwill-
ingness to perform civic duties were all used in various ways to justify 
the central narrative of the campaign.
Apathy was also an appealing explanation because the Ministry 
already had multiple tools and administrative structures with which to 
combat it. It was a manageable risk. If indeed the issue was one of edu-
cation and persuasion, the Ministry was in a position to utilise the COI 
and could build upon a long history of local public health campaigning 
with voluntary organisations, press cooperation and medical clinics. 
Citizens could be reminded of their obligations and the Ministry could 
appeal to parents’ self-interest. While this was the main thrust of the 
campaign, however, in practice national and local authorities realised 
that “propaganda” alone would not tackle root problems. The govern-
ment adapted its own tactics in response to the various ways in which 
parents’ apathy spoke to the medical establishment. Through the Social 
Survey, statistical analyses and contact with parents on a number of 
levels, health authorities were able to modify their administrative and 
medical arrangements so that they were better attuned to the public’s 
needs and concerns. It allowed MOHs to see both what was attractive 
and unappealing about diphtheria immunisation. Longer clinic hours, 
health visitors, mobile immunisation vans and the use of combined 
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prophylactics were combined with existing propaganda arrangements 
to make immunisation against diphtheria a more attractive proposition. 
In other words, to rectify a national public health problem, local service 
provision had to be improved.
Apathy was a construct, then, that was created by local and national 
public health bodies as a form of communication: a translation of the 
diffuse behaviours of the public into a language which administrators 
and policy makers could understand. It was a framing device that could 
incorporate elements of public behaviour that were not precisely quan-
tifiable or identifiable. As such, it kept many of the paternalistic ele-
ments of 1950s society and attitudes toward women and “the masses”. 
It could simultaneously see resistance, disbelief and indifference as part 
of the same phenomenon, because all indicated that the public had not 
yet realised the “facts” on immunisation. But it was not an entirely one-
sided conversation. The public could be seen to react and respond to 
changes in policy through the myriad administrative surveillance tools 
developed over previous years. In the end, apathy was the overall 
concept employed by government to justify its propaganda campaign; 
it was the more nuanced local interactions with the public, though, that 
made it a qualified success.
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2
Smallpox
The supposed apathy shown towards diphtheria by certain sections 
of the British public was largely overcome by the 1960s – or, at least, 
immunisation rates had improved to such an extent that the Ministry of 
Health was no longer concerned about widespread diphtheria epidem-
ics. Yet it did not have the same successes with smallpox vaccination. 
The problem of low rates of infant vaccination and childhood revacci-
nation among the population remained a continual source of irritation 
for the Ministry. In the government’s favour, the success of international 
vaccination and public health campaigns was making smallpox an ever-
decreasing threat; but taking decisions about when the risk of disease 
had fallen below the risks posed by the vaccine itself proved to be a 
political and scientific minefield. Moreover, smallpox may have receded 
as a quotidian threat to British residents by the post-war period – but 
in the 1950s and 1960s a series of imported cases from abroad showed 
that the country was still at risk from foreign contagion.
Smallpox is a unique example of an infant vaccination programme 
that was shut down in Britain.1 This chapter explores the slow process 
of dismantling the British system of routine smallpox vaccination of 
infants. A procedure that had been made compulsory in England and 
Wales in 1853 was discontinued in 1971. The chief reason for the end 
of smallpox vaccination was fairly obvious. The disease had been all but 
eradicated, and had ceased to be endemic in the United Kingdom since 
the 1930s.2 But the timing of this decision was by no means inevitable. 
Full, worldwide eradication was not declared until 1980, and occasional 
outbreaks of the disease from foreign travel and laboratory accidents 
were a not-uncommon problem for post-war MOHs. The way in which 
these decisions were taken says much about the government’s approach 
Smallpox 73
to the relative medical, financial and political risks of vaccination and 
disease. It also showed that the modern British vaccination system was 
forged by decisions not just about which vaccines to include, but also 
about which ones should be taken away.
The recurring theme in debates and policy decisions about smallpox 
was the nation. The discursive relationship between the public and the 
nation is a long-standing one. This applied to the state’s – or the public 
sector’s – provision of public health.3 Britain was a nation to be pro-
tected from foreign diseases.4 Anxieties were raised whenever an out-
break occurred – a sign of how rare smallpox had become, but also of 
the dread which it still elicited in the general public. Smallpox repre-
sented Britain’s vulnerability to outside threats in a world of global mass 
transport by air and sea. And, as Roberta Bivins has shown, it came to 
be symbolic of Britain’s relationship with her empire as attention shifted 
away from colonial holdings to a new Commonwealth, post-Suez.5 The 
specific politics around smallpox policy help to show how these anxie-
ties manifested in the post-war era. So too do the regional, national and 
transnational sites of public health control. The state managed the risks 
to its citizens from smallpox at multiple levels. Local MOHs provided 
epidemic control on the ground, as well as being responsible for the 
administration of the routine childhood vaccination programme. The 
Ministry of Health provided the financial support and national policy 
impetus for these programmes. The medical civil service headed by the 
Ministry and the Scottish Office began to centralise immunisation 
policy further than it had done in previous decades. They did so within 
a global network of knowledge, coloured by the decline of the British 
Empire and the United Kingdom’s new role in the international com-
munity. Britain’s national interests therefore extended beyond the 
immediate medical and public health debates.
Through a series of examples, this chapter explores how concerns 
over the nation were expressed. First, two outbreaks in England in 1949 
and Scotland in 1950 showed how the British public reacted in the face 
of an epidemic. The effects of smallpox were local. When the disease 
came to a specific area, its population sought protection via emergency 
vaccination, even when they had not wholeheartedly embraced routine 
infant vaccination. While this control worked at a subnational level, it 
existed to deal with an international threat – and was coordinated by 
the national government. Smallpox was a foreign disease, particularly 
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prevalent in South Asia, but it was not one that was necessarily brought 
in by non-whites. Vaccination was therefore seen as a prophylactic that 
could be used in specific circumstances, such as protecting British 
people during an outbreak or as a disinfectant of bodies which had been 
contaminated by infected lands. This leads to the second section, which 
discusses the 1950s “propaganda” campaign for smallpox vaccination. 
As with diphtheria in the previous chapter, there was a sense that British 
parents were apathetic about smallpox, considering it a deadly but 
highly improbable disease. However, unlike with other forms of immu-
nisation, the Ministry of Health and the COI did not dedicate signifi-
cant resources to promoting the benefits of routine childhood 
vaccination. Moreover, deeper cultural and scientific misgivings about 
the benefits and dangers of smallpox vaccination loomed large. Instead, 
the Ministry relied on a limited number of materials and the coopera-
tion of enthusiastic voluntary organisations to gently encourage British 
parents to present their children for the procedure. Again, the material 
stressed the foreign nature of smallpox. Routine vaccination was pre-
sented as something that could protect against imported disease, and 
as a prophylactic giving children the freedom to visit a world that was 
being made smaller by the growing accessibility of air travel.
The 1960s brought an end to this general laissez-faire attitude 
towards routine vaccination. Five cases of importation in 1961 and 
1962 coincided with the Commonwealth Immigration Bill and a fierce 
public debate about Britain’s responsibilities towards its old colonies 
and immigration by “coloured” Commonwealth citizens. The press cov-
erage led to a re-examination of the science on vaccination, which in 
turn posed serious questions for public health officials on the relative 
risks of routine vaccination, mass vaccination in times of epidemic and 
the disease itself. The decision about whom to vaccinate and which 
groups were most at risk of harming themselves or the wider British 
population was made more difficult by the fact that vaccination had 
never undergone the same sorts of trials and generated the type of data 
that the medical civil service would have required even as early as the 
1950s to make acceptable, concrete policy recommendations. In the 
end, the World Health Organization’s (WHO) Smallpox Eradication 
Programme moved the prophylactic effort away from questions of 
national immunity and towards direct intervention in infected lands. 
Transnational networks of diseases surveillance, exchange of medical 
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knowledge and movement of people became increasingly important to 
British public health over the latter half of the twentieth century.6 As 
with other European countries, Britain’s position as a declining colonial 
power changed the dynamics of its relationship with other health min-
istries across the globe – as did the emergence of the WHO.7 Thus, 
while routine vaccination continued until 1971 and ports were moni-
tored for signs of importation, Britain’s national protection was to come 
from international cooperation and a battle fought well away from its 
own shores.
Before 1946
Smallpox was a deadly infectious disease which came in two forms. 
Variola major had a death rate of around 20 per cent, while the weaker 
variola minor had a death rate of around 1 per cent. All could lead to 
excessive scarring and complications in survivors.8 While public health 
measures (including vaccination) had rid economically developed 
nations of the disease by the end of the Second World War, it continued 
to afflict many parts of the world. Outbreaks in Britain were rare, but, 
due to increased travel by sea and air to, from and through endemic 
regions, they were not unheard of. Demobilisation of troops and dislo-
cation led to a number of cases of importation directly after the war, 
with some indigenous cases – that is, secondary infections caught by 
people in Britain from the imported case. Aside from the smallpox 
importations in England and Wales detailed in Table 2.1, there were 
outbreaks in Scotland in 1937, 1942 and 1950.9
Britain’s public health responses to smallpox were well established, 
and the medical profession was confident that it could deal with any 
infection that arrived.10 Vaccination had been used as a public health 
tool since the early nineteenth century in three distinct ways. First, 
routine vaccination of children was seen as the best way to prevent 
outbreaks from occurring. This led to compulsory childhood vaccina-
tion in 1853, causing well-publicised resistance from some quarters. 
Vaccination rates declined significantly after conscientious objection 
was permitted from 1907.11 Still, from 1948 until 1962 official policy 
was to vaccinate infants (children under the age of 12 months). Revac-
cination was then encouraged in school children and adults.12 Second, 
ring vaccination was used on people likely to have been exposed to the 
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Table 2.1 Importations of smallpox into England and Wales, 1936–70
Year Air/sea Country 
of origin
Imported cases Indigenous cases
Cases Deaths Cases Deaths
1936a ? ? ? 4
1936/37b Sea ? 10
1937a ? ? ? 1
1937 ? ? ? 1
1938 Sea India 1 1 5 1
1938 Sea Portugal 1 2 1
1938b Sea ? 8
1939 Sea ? 1
1940 Sea ? 1
1942 1 6
1944 Sea Gibraltar 1 15 3
1945 Sea Italy 1 3
1946 Air India 1 3
1946 Air India 1 2
1946c Sea India 1
1946c Sea India 2 5 1
1946c Sea India 4 1
1946c Sea India 1
1946c Sea India 2
1946c Sea India 1 1
1946c Sea India 1
1946c Sea India 1 1
1947 Air Pakistan 1 30 6
1947 Sea France 48 9
1949 Sea India 12 5 4
1950 Air Pakistan 1 28 10
1951 Sea India 1
1951/52a, d ? ? ? ? 138
1953b Sea ? ? ? 38 8
1957 Air Nigeria 1 6 3
1958 Sea India 1 5 1
1960 Air Malaysia 1
1961 Pakistan 1 1 2
1961 Pakistan 1 1
1961 Pakistan 1 1 13 6
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virus through contact with known cases. This was designed to stop the 
spread of disease by stopping the chain of transmission. Finally, mass 
vaccination was used across a large population during times of epidemic 
when other forms of public health control – such as routine and ring 
vaccination, quarantine and isolation – had failed.13 This was never 
considered necessary in the post-war outbreaks, although many people 
presented themselves for vaccination when smallpox was detected in 
their area.
Vaccination, as with other public health reforms in the nineteenth 
century, reflected the growing power of national government over what 
had traditionally been local matters, and the imposition of compulsion 
was resisted in many quarters.14 Conscientious objection was intro-
duced in 1898 and made easier to obtain in 1907.15 The Vaccination 
Year Air/sea Country 
of origin
Imported cases Indigenous cases
Cases Deaths Cases Deaths
1962 Pakistan 1
1962 Pakistan 1 46 19
1962 Sea India 3
1966e ? ? ?(1) ?(1)
1967 Air Pakistan 2
1968 Air Pakistan 1
Totals 51 11 518 78
Notes: 
a Supposed importation.
b Supposed infection from imported raw cotton.
c A further 33 cases (including 10 deaths) occurred in the Southend and 
Merseyside areas. It is possible that these infections were derived from these 
importations.
d Variola minor.
e  Suspected importation. Child’s mother developed modified smallpox.
Source: Adapted from TNA: MH 154/404, Importations of smallpox into 
England and Wales 1936–1970.
Table 2.1 Importations of smallpox into England and Wales, 1936–70 
(Continued)
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Acts were repealed completely by the National Health Service Acts 
of 1946 and 1947. In many ways, this was an administrative clean-up 
– conscientious objection had effectively ended compulsion anyway, 
and with many health services now being pulled together it made sense 
to unify the legislation. But it was also a response to the success of 
the diphtheria immunisation programme during the war. Programmes 
in Britain and elsewhere had deliberately chosen to make diphtheria 
immunisation optional, as it was felt that education and persuasion 
would work better with parents.16 Practice had shown this to work, 
and the British government hoped that it could rehabilitate the reputa-
tion of smallpox vaccination by promoting it alongside diphtheria and 
the soon-to-be-available whooping cough vaccine.17 The decision to 
end compulsion was largely ignored by the press and Parliament and, 
as this chapter will show, was rarely mentioned even when outbreaks 
occurred.
This legacy caused some issues for the British government after 1948. 
Smallpox vaccination was an old technology, a product of a bygone age 
rather than of the new era of bacteriology and virology. Scientific 
debates in the 1960s showed that there was no robust statistical evi-
dence that vaccination was the safest way of protecting the general 
population from smallpox importation. The medical profession and 
Ministry of Health remained supportive of routine infant vaccination, 
but had to concede that their main evidence base for this was experi-
ence and tradition rather than the modern, randomised-control trials 
and epidemiological analyses that they demanded for diphtheria immu-
nisation, whooping cough vaccine and BCG.18 Although still rare, the 
risk of vaccine injuries was higher for smallpox than for modern, 
laboratory-developed immunisations. Potential hazards ranged from 
excessive scarring at the vaccination site up to brain swelling (postvac-
cinal encephalitis) and death. Given that the annual cases of smallpox 
could often be counted on the fingers of one hand, the number of 
vaccine-related injuries often exceeded the number of smallpox cases.19 
Moreover, the smallpox vaccination procedure was less clean and 
sophisticated than modern vaccines. Instead of a simple hypodermic 
injection, smallpox vaccination was still performed by making small 
incisions in the arm. This made it unpleasant for the child and the 
onlooking parent, and resulted in scarring.20 Given the unlikelihood of 
encountering smallpox, the Ministry and local MOHs had difficulty 
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convincing parents to present their children for the procedure. Further-
more, while central government financed the infant vaccination scheme 
and compelled local authorities to provide the service, MOHs had 
jurisdiction over how the schemes were run. This meant that local areas 
had developed their own traditions about how much to prioritise 
routine childhood vaccination. Some, such as Leicester (where the 
local population had strongly resisted in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries) saw uptake for infants as low as 1 per cent in 1961.21 Others 
regularly outpaced the national average, such as Worcester, which in the 
same year had uptake of 71 per cent.22 Even more so than with diphthe-
ria immunisation, local rates varied considerably (Table 2.2).
There were two different types of vaccination: routine vaccination as 
a preventative measure; and vaccination as a form of epidemic control. 
The difference in public reactions to these two types showed that the 
Table 2.2 Select vaccination rates as at 31 December 1964
Pertussisa Diphtheriaa Polioa Smallpoxb
England and Wales 70 72 65 32
England 70 72 66 32
Wales 64 68 62 19
Bradford 55 58 49 10
Bristol 66 67 57 10
Cardiff 80 85 69 28
Glamorgan 62 67 60 8
Halifax 32 55 48 13
Huddersfield 63 65 58 25
Leeds 63 64 48 26
Merthyr 69 66 50 6
West Yorkshire 68 73 69 23
Worcester 79 81 74 61
Notes:
a  Percentage of children born in 1962 who were immunised at any time by 
31 December 1964.
b  Percentage of children under the age of two years vaccinated.
Source: Adapted from TNA: MH 154/61, Immunisation and Vaccination 
Statistics as at 31st December 1964.
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circumstances and administration of smallpox vaccination mattered. 
Uptake of routine vaccination was variable. In times of epidemic, 
however, the public were quick to present themselves for ring vaccina-
tion, whether or not they had been in contact with the disease. As the 
examples in this chapter show, there was a certain common-sense 
understanding that in times of epidemic the local authority was sup-
posed to vaccinate the people – a legacy from the days of mass vaccina-
tion, and a perception that caused great difficulties for national and 
local authorities.23 There was ample evidence to suggest that primary 
vaccination – that is, the first time one is vaccinated – was more danger-
ous in adults than it was in young children. One of the reasons for 
routine vaccination was not simply to develop individual and herd 
immunity, since the effects of vaccination were known to wear off in 
about ten years. A secondary function was to make it safer to regularly 
revaccinate older children and adults to maintain their immunity; and 
in case of need for travel documentation, joining an at-risk profession 
(such as the armed forces or nursing) or during a local outbreak.24 Mass 
vaccination therefore posed public health risks as much as it offered 
potential protection. The most vivid example of this was the experience 
of the 1942 epidemic in Scotland, where four people died as a result of 
vaccinations gone wrong.25 The examples given in this chapter show 
that this paradox – and the relative risks as understood by the lay public 
– were a continual source of anxiety for the Ministry of Health.
The 1950s
Two examples of importation in the 1950s showed that vaccination was 
seen mainly as a barrier against foreign infection. Since smallpox was a 
foreign contagion brought in by travellers to or residents of infected 
areas, the government and the public showed more concern about the 
vaccination of at-risk groups, rather than massively expanding routine 
childhood vaccination. The first example is of a case of smallpox on 
board the SS Mooltan, which arrived in the Port of London from Aus-
tralia in April 1949. Citizens, politicians and local authorities demanded 
stricter vaccination and quarantine controls on infected ships and for 
passengers from certain areas; but there was little discussion of improv-
ing Britons’ vaccination status. The second example concerns an out-
break in Glasgow in April 1950, brought in by an Indian seaman on 
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board the SS Chitral. Here, the majority of victims worked in the city’s 
fever hospital. Although authorities were more concerned with low 
routine vaccination rates among their population in the Scottish case 
than in the English case, more attention was paid in Scotland to the 
vaccination status of hospital staff. Here, anxieties were raised not just 
about the risk posed to nurses and doctors themselves, but also about 
the potential for the disease to spread beyond the fever hospital, should 
staff be inadequately protected.
The SS Mooltan
The secondary cases from the SS Mooltan exemplified this. Richard 
Allen and his wife boarded the SS Mooltan at Brisbane, Australia on 8 
February 1949. On 10 March the ship docked at Bombay. Mr and Mrs 
Allen went ashore for a few hours, although it is unclear what they did 
in the city. Neither one had ever been vaccinated. On 24 March, Mr 
Allen complained of stomach pains, and the on-board medical staff 
began to suspect he may have caught chicken-pox. On 25 March the 
ship docked in Marseilles, but Mr Allen was too sick to disembark. Due 
to fog, the SS Mooltan was delayed in the English Channel, and Mr 
Allen died at sea on 1 April. The MOH for the City of London asked 
the ship company’s surgeon to go aboard and check the body. He imme-
diately diagnosed the case as smallpox. By this point, Mrs Allen was also 
showing signs of infection. All the ship’s remaining passengers and crew 
were offered vaccination, but it was too late to stop the spread of the 
disease. As passengers disembarked and travelled to various parts of the 
country, the disease was found in London, North Lincolnshire, Ayles-
bury, Liverpool, Torquay and Cornwall. In all, there would be 16 cases 
and five deaths, including those of the Allens (see Table 2.1).26
Importations through seaports were not unknown. This was, 
however, the first epidemic in Britain since the formation of the NHS. 
Criticism of the decision to allow the passengers to travel across the 
country before the disease’s incubation period was over came from 
many quarters.27 However, the fact that potential carriers of a danger-
ous disease could slip through the ports and be thousands of miles 
away from the place where they had contracted the disease before they 
showed symptoms showed that port sanitation and quarantine regula-
tions, which had a long history in British public health, were begin-
ning to break down.28 Local authorities, voluntary organisations and 
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individual citizens wrote in protest to the Minister of Health, Aneurin 
Bevan, demanding that future cases be subject to quarantine. In Par-
liament, Jocelyn Lucas (Conservative, Portsmouth South) and Bessie 
Braddock (Labour, Liverpool Exchange) both spoke about the ‘wide-
spread anxiety’ and urged the Ministry of Health to tighten its regula-
tions.29 Braddock in particular called for action to be taken against 
contacts who refused vaccination.30 Ernest Bramall (Labour, Bexley) 
also enquired as to whether the decision to end compulsory vacci-
nation would be reversed.31 Bevan resisted increasing compulsion for 
either the general population or smallpox contacts, and argued that 
the Ministry and port authorities had enough powers to ensure the 
safety of the population.32 In response to individual correspondence, 
the Ministry provided details of the International Sanitary Conven-
tions that restricted its ability to forcibly detain passengers; and further 
noted that such measures probably would not have done much good.33 
There were only four cases in people who had not been aboard the SS 
Mooltan: all of them in one family living near the isolation hospital in 
Liskeard, Cornwall.34
There was not an extended debate in the national press about the 
cases arising from the SS Mooltan. As the Ministry noted, concerns 
were raised in local authorities where suspected cases had arisen and 
from some individuals, but there is little evidence of a great national 
panic.35 In the Port of London, the local MOH was relaxed. ‘The public 
have played up very well indeed and there has been very little nervous-
ness,’ he wrote in his annual report, ‘a fact which I think demonstrates 
confidence arising from the daily supervision of contact cases.’36 Dis-
cussions among health authorities focused on how to stop importation 
from outside rather than strengthening British immunity to the disease 
from within through more widespread vaccination. MOHs publicly 
demanded that Australian and New Zealand passengers be vaccinated 
if a ship was due to stop in the Indian sub-continent.37 The MOH for 
Lambeth, G. O. Teichmann, noted the double standard of expecting all 
Indian passengers to be vaccinated, but not requiring the same of ‘Aus-
tralasians’ who ‘were allowed to wander about the bazaars of Bombay 
etc. where smallpox is endemic’.38 The Ministry related these concerns 
to Peninsular & Oriental, the SS Mooltan’s operators, who agreed to 
actively discourage unvaccinated passengers from going ashore in 
‘Eastern Ports’.39
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Thus, foreigners and travellers to foreign lands were seen as a poten-
tial threat to British public health. This idea had grown in importance 
since the end of the First World War. In the nineteenth century, small-
pox in India and other parts of the Empire was treated much like it was 
at home. As the disease ceased to be a major problem in Europe and 
North America, however, smallpox became viewed as a “tropical” 
disease, and was treated as a foreign threat.40 But while some blame for 
the continued presence of smallpox in the sub-continent was put on the 
superstitions and habits of Indians, the rhetoric around infection was 
not necessarily restricted to non-whites: ‘Australasians’ could them-
selves become contaminated because of their route through infected 
places and their lack of vaccination. In the meantime, there was no 
extended demand for more widespread routine vaccination of infants 
at home. Other than queues in Liskeard, there was also no great clamour 
for emergency vaccination. Isolated incidents appeared to grab atten-
tion, especially in local areas directly or potentially affected, but this 
soon died down. Unlike with the outbreaks of 1961 and 1962, the SS 
Mooltan cases did not become a national emergency, nor did they sig-
nificantly alter attitudes towards smallpox in England and Wales. There 
was no major political crisis of national identity to refract the news of 
the outbreak.41 Instead, criticisms of policy were directed more to the 
ship being allowed to land than any disquiet over the epidemic controls 
or Britain’s vaccination status.42 This was despite the ship’s ability to 
remain in the news. A nine year old girl developed suspected smallpox 
on the Mooltan’s return trip to Australia; and later that same year, the 
ship was quarantined in the Thames due to typhoid.43
The SS Chitral
Given the racial element to the 1961/62 outbreak, the SS Chitral inci-
dent provides an interesting contrast. On 5 March 1950, Lascar seaman 
Mussa Ali landed at Tilbury on the SS Chitral before travelling to 
Glasgow.44 His country of origin was smallpox endemic, and he was 
non-white – unlike the Allens. As a Lascar seaman, it was also unlikely 
that he or his shipmates had been revaccinated to maintain his immu-
nity, unlike sailors in the Royal Navy.45 He was admitted to hospital with 
pneumonia and suspected chicken-pox. This was subsequently found 
to be smallpox. A doctor who had come into contact with Ali, Janet 
Fleming, died in the nearby town of Hamilton on 2 April. The outbreak 
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would infect 19 people and kill six.46 During the epidemic, thousands 
queued on the streets of Glasgow and Hamilton for vaccination. The 
incident highlighted some of the differences between the English and 
Scottish health services’ experience of smallpox, but the issue of impor-
tation remained central. Here was ‘Bombay smallpox’,47 brought in by 
an Indian seaman and with the potential to affect Scotland’s public and 
economic health. Yet the focus of discussion remained largely on the 
quality of preventative services at home rather than on concern about 
immigration.
The Scottish Office had already expressed its concerns with British 
smallpox policy in 1948. W. M. Ballantine, a Scottish civil servant, 
noted that ‘there is not the same tradition of vaccination in Scotland as 
in England and the number of vaccinated children is very low’.48 In an 
epidemic in 1942, mass vaccination was employed as a form of epi-
demic control in Edinburgh; but, due to the low rates of primary vac-
cinations, there were nine cases of encephalitis and four deaths.49 
Ballantine asked if the COI would consider a national (British) small-
pox vaccination education campaign. He felt that this would be particu-
larly welcome in Scotland, given that ‘the risk of importation of smallpox 
[was] high’ and ‘the likelihood of spread [was] greater in Scotland’.50 
The COI declined, as it was more concerned with promoting the new 
NHS; and when it did return to promoting immunisation, it was more 
interested in diphtheria and the soon-to-be-available pertussis vaccine. 
Instead, the COI recommended that local authorities should decide 
what was needed in their area, and the Central Council for Health 
Education would provide materials which could be ordered and used.51
When the disease broke out in Glasgow and Hamilton during late 
March and early April 1950, local MOHs offered vaccination to the 
public. At its peak, a special clinic in Glasgow was reportedly vaccinat-
ing 600 people per hour. By 15 April, two days before Glasgow was 
given the all clear, around 300,000 people had been vaccinated across 
Lanarkshire and Renfrewshire. The Glasgow MOH, Stuart Laidlaw, 
was ‘very pleased with the public response for vaccination’ and thanked 
the public for having ‘acted very wisely’.52 Indeed, other than demands 
from politicians on behalf of their constituents for public inquiries 
due to ‘great anxiety in the public mind’, the outbreak did not appear 
to create a massive scandal in the area or in the national press.53 The 
Daily Mail reported how Ali was cheered out of the hospital when 
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he recovered, and that there ‘was no grudge against the man whose 
illness had cost six lives’.54 Instead, attention turned to what the Glasgow 
outbreak said about Scotland’s – and Britain’s – ability to deal with 
smallpox and its economic consequences. In this specific incident, all 
the victims of the disease had been in direct contact with Ali in hos-
pital. However, while the disease had not spread into the wider com-
munity, the number of cases and deaths had caused significant harm to 
Scotland’s and Glasgow’s tourism industries during the Easter break. 
The MOHs of Edinburgh and of Corby in Northamptonshire, a town 
with a sizable Scottish diaspora, advised their residents not to travel to 
Glasgow, while New York City began to demand more extensive proof 
of vaccination before allowing travellers from Scotland to land.55 Due 
to the damage to the tourism industry, after the epidemic was over 
Scottish Office ministers called for an extensive advertising campaign 
to let the world know that ‘Scotland was normal again’.56 This high-
lighted the transnational character of the epidemic. Not only had it 
been imported from foreign shores, but its effects on Britain were also 
global.
There was also some discussion about the victims of the disease. 
Nine cases came from hospital staff, of whom four nurses and a laundry 
maid died. The sixth death was a baby; none of the six had been fully 
vaccinated. While importation of smallpox may have been impossible 
to prevent in practice, the poor vaccination records of the hospital staff 
caused disquiet among politicians north and south of the border. The 
government declined to make vaccination a condition of employment 
but reiterated ‘the need to ensure that vaccination is offered to all 
persons [working in] fever hospitals and re-vaccination is offered peri-
odically’.57 It argued that compulsion would be difficult to justify after 
the repeal of the Vaccination Acts, and would jeopardise recruitment in 
fever hospitals that were already finding it difficult to hire staff.58 This 
response drew criticism in Parliament from both major parties, although 
the opposition Conservative politicians were most vocal. Lord ( John) 
Llewellin (Conservative) noted that travellers from the United Kingdom 
were compelled to be vaccinated for their own protection, and so that 
they did not import smallpox on their return.59 David Gammans (Con-
servative, Hornsey) made a similar argument. Given the insistence of 
‘almost every country in the world’ that vaccination be a condition of 
entry, why were fever hospital staff – the most likely group to come into 
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contact with foreign travellers with the disease – allowed to work 
without being up to date? He asked the Secretary of State for Scotland, 
Hector McNeil, ‘have we to wait until three women die before we bring 
in a regulation which every other country in the world insists on?’60 In 
this sense, vaccination was a barrier against foreign infection, with fever 
hospitals acting as a buffer between the public and an infected outside 
world. Vaccination not only protected British medical staff, but stopped 
the spread of the disease out into the wider public. The government’s 
counter arguments, however, rested on the idea that staff were them-
selves members of the public with the same rights to forego vaccination. 
If vaccination drove even more employees away from fever hospitals, 
that buffer might not exist at all.
1950s propaganda and education campaign
The outbreaks in 1949 and 1950 did not substantially alter the Minis-
try’s approach to routine vaccination. The Ministry responded to indi-
vidual enquiries and stressed the need for health visitors to use a 
‘personal approach’ with parents to convince them of the benefits for 
their child.61 There was, however, no sustained propaganda campaign. 
The complications associated with mass vaccination and adult primary 
vaccination were well known. With growing travel by sea and, increas-
ingly, by air, there was also a potential for the disease to become more 
common. Experts continued to write to the Ministry expressing concern 
that vaccination rates were steadily falling among the general public and 
NHS staff.62 Yet the Ministry was mindful not to engage in debates with 
anti-vaccination groups. Although less prominent than in previous 
decades, the government did continue to receive correspondence from 
the Anti-Vaccination League and other individuals.63 In Parliament, 
Samuel Viant, a Labour MP in Willesden until 1959, asked regular ques-
tions about the safety and efficacy of vaccination and the effects of trials 
on animals.64 However, these occasional interactions appeared to be 
rare and sufficiently low level as not to concern the Ministry, highlight-
ing the declining influence of such groups since the end of compulsion 
and growing confidence in immunisation technologies during the inter-
war years. Instead, the Ministry preferred to reiterate the benefits of 
vaccination and argued that since diphtheria and whooping cough 
immunisation had been such a success parents could possibly be 
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persuaded at the same time to get their children vaccinated against 
smallpox.65
By the middle of the decade, the Ministry began to reassess its 
approach in light of its wider public health goals. While the government 
encouraged parents to immunise their children against other diseases 
– and appeared to be having success in these endeavours – correspond-
ence and vaccination statistics suggested that, regardless of the inten-
tion, parents had not been convinced to take up smallpox vaccination 
as well.66 An officer from Essex offered some evidence from their area. 
When asked why mothers might not be presenting their children, home 
visitors replied that the women they worked with were often told when 
they arrived that there was not enough vaccination material and they 
failed to make or complete follow-up appointments. Parents also 
objected to waiting in a doctor’s surgery with a healthy baby among sick 
patients. In his opinion, ‘there is not real apathy among parents but now 
that compulsion is no longer necessary, effective propaganda and stim-
ulus is essential’.67 The Chief Medical Officer, John Charles, wrote in his 
1954 Annual Report that it was becoming increasingly important that 
parents should present their children. The older generation, who had 
been children at the time of compulsory vaccination, were passing away. 
A new vaccination drive would restore immunity.68 A circular was sent 
to all local authorities in 1955 noting Charles’s concern ‘at the current 
neglect of vaccination except as an emergency measure during out-
breaks of smallpox, and […] the resulting lack of protection for the 
individual and for the community’.69 A new poster was designed, and 
local MOHs were encouraged to give smallpox vaccination greater pri-
ority, in the hope of raising infant uptake from a modest 36.4 per cent 
in 1955 to 75 per cent.70 The choice of message was revealing. The 
English and Welsh authorities were inspired by a long-running leaflet 
in Scotland which had used newspaper headlines from the 1950 out-
break to remind parents of just how dangerous the disease could be. It 
pulled no punches – the opening paragraph read: ‘do you want to take 
the risk of seeing your child’s face pitted by the ugly scars of smallpox?’ 
This type of message was similar to the one used in the diphtheria 
campaign at the same time, demonstrating a coherent message about 
vaccination (even if the volume of material and the response to it was 
not equal across all programmes). Although it did not go so far as to 
show pictures of diseased children, it used the threat of potential 
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damage through inaction to press home its message. It stressed that 
vaccination before an outbreak was safer than waiting for one to occur, 
and ended with the slightly dubious claim that ‘vaccination does not 
upset children, although in adults a first vaccination may be very painful. 
So have your child vaccinated now! Keep your baby safe!’71 The result-
ing English poster tried to emulate the visual impact of the Scottish one, 
with a bright yellow background and the words ‘vaccination’ and ‘small-
pox’ in bright red block capitals. The text was less outwardly emotive, 
simply quoting the Chief Medical Officer: ‘VACCINATION of all 
healthy babies must be our aim if we are to protect the community 
against a run of SMALLPOX.’72 The foregrounding of the benefits to 
the community was in contrast to previous campaign messages which 
had very deliberately focused on the individual benefits of vaccination 
to the child and parent.73 The diphtheria campaign, for example, had 
foregrounded healthy babies and the protection that parents could gift 
to their child.
Despite Charles’s pronouncement, this would be the extent of the 
Ministry of Health’s propaganda mission. Both the anti-diphtheria and 
anti-poliomyelitis publicity efforts got far more attention from the Min-
istry of Health and COI.74 No major incident in the 1950s forced the 
government to change tack. There was also evidence to suggest that 
even some doctors had inferred that the end of compulsion was an 
admission from the government that it no longer saw routine smallpox 
vaccination as a priority.75 As local MOHs and other organisations 
wrote to the government for advice, the only other promotional offer-
ing was a 1951 film called Surprise Attack. Film had been used to promote 
public health messages and inform the public about public health activ-
ities for decades.76 Bermondsey in South London, for example, had 
established its own film department in the 1920s.77 At this time, a 
growing documentary film movement began to be co-opted by govern-
ment departments that saw it as an effective communication tool, pro-
ducing a range of materials for the promotion of health and other 
government activities.78 Surprise Attack starred John le Mesurier as a 
general practitioner and showed the story of a family whose young girl 
caught smallpox from a rag doll brought back from ‘the east’ by her 
father. In the film’s tale of how the MOH tried to keep control of the 
outbreak, the girl survives with significant scarring. The final few 
moments have the MOH showing pictures of real smallpox cases to 
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show how gruesome the disease could be – and a call to action for 
parents to take their children to the clinic to be vaccinated. The film 
stressed that while parents might think that smallpox was now rare, ‘by 
the time your children are all grown up, air travel will be general’.79 The 
dangers of travel – from both foreigners coming to Britain and unpro-
tected Britons bringing disease back – were ever present.80 However, 
that Surprise Attack had not been updated or replaced by the early 1960s 
reflected a lack of sustained effort or resource commitment from the 
authorities.
While the government did not prioritise smallpox vaccination adver-
tising, the public appeared relatively apathetic too. Vaccination rates did 
recover slightly in the mid-1950s, but not by enough to reach the 75 per 
cent target set by Charles.81 However, the government was able to lean 
on publicity produced by outsiders with an interest in childhood vac-
cination. This was not a new development. Voluntary organisations had 
been involved in health care from before the war, from health education 
to the running of hospitals.82 The National Baby Welfare Council had 
expressed considerable concern when it had written to the Ministry 
asking for a smallpox poster for an exhibition on child health and had 
been told that there was not one in circulation.83 The Council sought 
to fill the gap itself, but when outside bodies created health propaganda 
they could cause embarrassment for the government. The War Office 
complained to the Ministry about one poster which presented a return-
ing soldier as a vector of disease and in a dishevelled uniform. Another 
leaflet contained inaccuracies on vaccination procedure and official 
government advice.84 Both pieces did, however, reinforce the “foreign 
threat” perception of smallpox. The returning soldier was a danger 
because of where he had been and how quickly he could return home. 
In the leaflet, a mother is urged to have her daughter ‘done’, despite the 
scarring from the vaccination, because ‘she may want to be an airhost-
ess’ someday. In both pieces, the pain of the adult vaccination was 
stressed to convince parents that it was best to act now rather than later 
– deliberately drawing on the experiences of many fathers and hus-
bands who would have been vaccinated for national service during and 
after the war.85 Despite the potential embarrassment, the Ministry 
became increasingly reliant upon these organisations to spread its 
message. When the Women’s Voluntary Service offered to help distrib-
ute material in July 1956, the Ministry asked it to contact local MOHs 
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instead.86 By September, however, it was responding to a national cam-
paign by the Women’s Institute by sending hundreds of copies of the 
yellow poster to branches across the country.87 Certain sections of the 
public clearly believed in the importance of routine childhood vaccina-
tion; but these were voluntary organisations of a middle-class bent 
concerned primarily with motherhood.88 Without central coordination 
and resources, the campaign never fully developed.
The 1960s – Commonwealth Immigration Bill
The campaign for improved routine smallpox vaccination rates in the 
1950s did not see an appreciable increase in uptake. But this did not 
cause undue anxiety among staff at the Ministry of Health. There were 
five importations of variola major between 1951 and 1960, and all were 
adequately contained, despite the deaths of twelve people (see Table 
2.1). There was also a variola minor outbreak in Rochdale in 1951/52, 
from infected raw cotton, which caused 138 cases but no deaths. It was 
generally accepted that routine childhood vaccination was desirable, 
but the Ministry had faith that its existing methods of port control, 
isolation and vaccination of contacts were enough to protect Britain 
from external threat.89 There was some concern about the level of cam-
paigning from the British Medical Association (BMA) at its conference 
in 1960. Following the conference, the Association wrote to the Minis-
try to find what publicity material it had available and to urge it to renew 
the vaccination campaign. The Ministry remarked that it had little of its 
own material, and that other organisations’ efforts were taken into 
account. More broadly, it had not produced much in recent years 
because local authorities had shown no demand for materials.90 This 
low-level critique from the BMA may not have required much response; 
however, a major outbreak of smallpox was about to be turned into a 
national scandal. This saw more attention drawn to smallpox policy, and 
forced the Ministry to reassess its position.
From 16 December 1961 to 11 January 1962, five separate importa-
tions of variola major occurred through Britain’s airports, all from Paki-
stani travellers.91 A smallpox epidemic was raging in Karachi, and planes 
were able to transport passengers to London in a matter of hours. The 
volume of passengers had also increased, as immigrants hoped to get to 
Britain to settle before the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 came 
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into force and restricted movement from Commonwealth countries. 
From these five, two cases resulted in local outbreaks: one in Bradford 
and another in Cardiff. A third outbreak then developed near to the 
isolation hospital in Penrhys, and spread into the Rhondda Valley, 
South Wales. For anti-immigration politicians, the outbreaks gave legit-
imacy to their claims for stricter border controls.92 For the medical 
profession, this new form of immigration by air raised questions about 
the ability of existing sanitary regulations to protect the nation from 
harm.93 Meanwhile, the British public expressed a range of opinions on 
smallpox, vaccination, race and government.94
Roberta Bivins’ work has explored in detail how British attitudes 
towards the new Commonwealth were manifested during the out-
break. Concerns about the social impact of immigration, particularly 
from South Asia, were expressed through demands for stricter health 
checks at ports and proof of vaccination. These were often presented as 
bureaucratic necessities to protect health, so as to avoid the accusation 
of direct racism, even though there was little epidemiological merit to 
the proposals.95 James Stewart has also collated a rich public history 
of the outbreak, including contemporary materials and oral histories 
with survivors.96 As these demonstrate, routine childhood vaccination 
was one talking point among many; and certainly not the most impor-
tant.97 The outbreak became a scandal because it touched a raw nerve 
in British politics with regard to Commonwealth immigration, rather 
than because it was a medical crisis per se. Control of immigration was 
the main concern. It was therefore as much about protecting Britain’s 
national character as much as its public health. As the public demanded 
tighter controls on foreigners entering the country, the government was 
forced to manage a number of risks. Any importation of smallpox at this 
time was even more politically sensitive than usual. Yet tighter port con-
trols, despite being the apparent “common sense” solution, were likely 
to be ineffective. There was also the risk that too many draconian regu-
lations could damage international trade, and thus the wider economy.
These issues, especially surrounding race and immigration, have 
been dealt with effectively by Bivins.98 However, the wider story of how 
the Ministry of Health dealt with the situation tells us more specifically 
about vaccination and the public. Three vaccination strategies emerged: 
mass vaccination of the indigenous public as a form of epidemic control; 
selective vaccination of at-risk individuals such as migrants and NHS 
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staff; and routine vaccination of British children as a policy outside of 
epidemic times or locations. In each, the public and the government 
had a role to play. The tensions within them were not fully resolved 
during or in the aftermath of the crisis. Nevertheless, they did lead to a 
re-evaluation of policy in the years following the end of the epidemic.
The most visible show of support for vaccination came in areas that 
had confirmed cases of smallpox. Demand for vaccination as protec-
tion against a potential epidemic was high, but it caused headaches for 
national and local health authorities. As there had been in Liskeard and 
Glasgow in 1949 and 1950, there were queues for vaccination in Brad-
ford, Cardiff and the Rhondda valley. One case had been taken to Uni-
versity College Hospital in the London borough of St Pancras, which 
also saw lines of concerned members of the public queueing around the 
block. These images were staples of press and television coverage, much 
to the chagrin of Chief Medical Officer George Godber. He argued that 
they reflected panic in epidemic areas, and also fuelled the idea that 
this was the correct way to behave when smallpox occurred.99 Mass 
vaccination was not considered an adequate form of epidemic control, 
and brought its own problems. Experience in the Scottish epidemic 
of 1942 had shown that it could lead to complications, aside from the 
practical undesirability of having thousands of people congregating in 
one spot in a city with an ongoing epidemic. Enoch Powell, the Min-
ister for Health, declared that ‘queues were the evidence of respon-
sibilities neglected’ by both the public, who had broken what ought 
to be ‘an almost universal and unquestioned code of behaviour’ (i.e. 
presenting for routine vaccination) and the health authorities, which 
had not been coordinated or effective enough to ensure that the public 
understood this.100
For Godber, a keen supporter of routine infant vaccination, these 
queues represented a paradox. As would also be seen with poliomyelitis 
scares in the 1950s (Chapter 3), mass vaccination enjoyed support in 
times of crisis that routine vaccination in normal circumstances did not. 
When reflecting on the 1962 epidemic, Godber remarked:
Vaccination, of course, played an important part in control … and in the 
circumstances of the Rhondda and Bradford the public demand is easily 
understood. But much vaccination was done as a matter of urgency, 
where no urgency existed. The population as a whole has, of course, 
obtained some advantage from this in increased immunity and assurance 
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of quicker enhancement of that immunity if required in the future. Yet 
mass demands when smallpox occurred reflect a state of public anxiety 
attributable in part to the neglect of routine vaccination.101
The Ministry was not helped in some areas by its regional lieutenants, 
who made demands that contradicted central government advice. High 
demand had led to shortages of vaccine lymph and strict control by 
central authorities, causing consternation among members of the public 
as well as MOHs.102 MOHs in Yorkshire districts near to Bradford 
demanded more vaccine, and complained when they were not given 
priority access to limited supplies of lymph. In Halifax especially, the 
local MOH made the case that because the town had a ‘large immigrant 
population’, it required more vaccine to protect its people.103 This 
underscored the idea that foreigners were vectors of disease, and foreign 
lands its source. Queues in other boroughs across the country (and the 
subsequent shortage of lymph) were also attributed to widespread pub-
licity about the outbreak, and fear of ‘coloured’ migrants bringing the 
disease into previously uninfected areas.104 For other contemporaries, 
however, the outbreak represented a key tension in public health policy: 
the fine line between acting to protect the public and being seen by the 
public to act. Even if mass vaccination was not considered medically 
justified, the MOH for Bradford and his deputy argued that it was a 
necessary evil to keep the general public calm.105 Allaying anxieties 
clearly mattered to local authorities, and, even if people were a little too 
keen to be vaccinated, MOHs made a point of praising citizens for their 
cooperation. They had come to expect this after experiences across the 
country during the post-war period.106
While Godber continued to promote the power of routine vaccina-
tion, many of the arguments around the 1962 outbreak focused on 
other forms of prophylaxis. In particular, tighter port controls, vaccina-
tion of immigrants and protection of key NHS staff were given far 
greater coverage in the press, Parliament and medical discourse. Some 
of this was politically convenient for anti-immigration politicians.107 For 
the Ministry, it was another example of common sense being at odds 
with wider economic and medical wisdom.108 Despite the panics caused 
by smallpox in the community, the disease burned out quickly and 
affected relatively few people. It was considered disproportionate, 
therefore, to instigate stricter border controls which would adversely 
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affect international travel and trade.109 Enforcing vaccination or revac-
cination of travellers from smallpox-endemic countries was resisted, as 
it might be considered racially motivated, would take up too much time 
and would have little material effect in preventing importation.110 Some 
dissented: one correspondent to the British Medical Journal bemoaned 
that in ‘East of Suez there is far too much graft and subterfuge’, so that 
even those with seemingly legitimate vaccination certificates must be 
considered suspect.111 However, the two infected individuals who 
caused the local outbreaks possessed certificates of vaccination and/or 
showed signs of having been successfully vaccinated in the past. As for 
the vaccination of at-risk groups – usually taken to mean front-line 
NHS staff – this was considered administratively impractical. Two-
thirds of the indigenous cases were contacted in hospital, affecting staff 
and patients (a similar pattern to Glasgow in 1950).112 Staff were priori-
tised during outbreaks and offered revaccination every three years, but, 
as in the SS Mooltan and SS Chitral incidents, it was reiterated that 
compulsion would have a negative effect on hiring and retention of 
hospital staff. The Ministry’s existing protocols had not been perfect. 
But it was notable that there were no tertiary outbreaks in Bradford.113 
The disease was promptly kept under control. And while the infectious 
disease hospitals in some areas were shown to be inadequate, there was 
never any need to invoke emergency mass vaccination measures.114 
Long-standing public health measures, in line with the International 
Sanitary Regulations on smallpox, appeared to have worked to keep 
Britain safe.115
However, the level of public disquiet over the 1962 outbreak forced 
the Ministry to seriously reconsider its routine vaccination policies. The 
public’s faith in vaccination and in their local health authorities during 
times of epidemic had been demonstrated clearly. But there was a sense 
in Parliament and the media that local areas had been let down by 
national government allowing the outbreaks to occur in the first place.116 
There were also criticisms about the lymph shortages and unsatisfac-
tory prioritisation of some areas over others – or, as one correspondent 
to the British Medical Journal put it, ‘bureaucratic bumbledom gone 
bonkers’.117 Appreciating the failures of vaccination policy, the Ministry 
of Health re-examined its approach and competing interpretations of 
the epidemiology. This would eventually lead to the end of routine vac-
cination in 1971.
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The 1960s to 1970s: withdrawal
The Ministry remained confident in its epidemic control policies, but 
routine vaccination continued to be problematic. The government had 
consistently fallen well short of its target of 75 per cent childhood vac-
cination. In analysing its policy, the Ministry collated vaccination sta-
tistics, and they made grim reading for proponents of vaccination 
(Table 2.2). In 1964, the national average for smallpox in England 
remained at 32 per cent of children under the age of two. Even the most 
successful local authority, the city of Worcester in the Midlands, 
achieved only 61 per cent. This was in stark contrast to the relative suc-
cesses of the pertussis, diphtheria and poliomyelitis immunisation cam-
paigns, which were approaching childhood vaccination rates of 75 per 
cent, even in areas where smallpox vaccination was unpopular. The 
figures also suggested that parents saw smallpox vaccination as an epi-
demic control tool rather than a necessary immunisation for their chil-
dren. In Bradford, Cardiff and Glamorgan (the epicentres of the 1962 
outbreaks), uptake remained below the national average for England 
and Wales. Indeed, Bradford’s rates were equal to the worst in England 
(Bristol), second only to Merthyr in Wales. The West Yorkshire bor-
oughs which had complained to the Ministry about a lack of lymph 
during the heat of the crisis also had relatively weak figures. In light of 
this apathy towards routine vaccination, then, what was to be done? 
Unlike with diphtheria in the 1950s, it was not sustainable to claim that 
smallpox was a quotidian threat or that it could ever return as endemic 
and widespread, regardless of the danger posed in the rare cases of 
importation. By the same token, it was clear that people were not against 
vaccination when they felt the threat of smallpox was strong enough. 
The Ministry embarked on a fact-finding mission to settle these ques-
tions of how to protect the nation.
The aftermath of the 1962 outbreak caused debate in the medical 
press. The dangers of mass vaccination were reiterated, but new con-
cerns were raised about the potential harm of routine vaccination.118 
Three doctors in particular made the argument that routine vaccination 
ought to be abandoned. The first, George Dick, was Professor of Micro-
biology at Queen’s University Belfast and had worked on oral polio 
vaccine trials in the early 1950s (see also Chapter 3). His work had 
shown the risks of cross-contamination, and this had made him very 
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alert to the risks as well as the benefits of vaccination across a large 
population.119 The second, Ronald W. Elliott, was the County Medical 
Officer for West Yorkshire.120 Both men publicly argued that even if the 
country could institute 100 per cent uptake of smallpox vaccination, 
the resulting level of herd immunity would not be enough to prevent 
occasional outbreaks of smallpox. Moreover, the risk of a smallpox out-
break was low, and getting lower as a result of WHO eradication 
efforts.121 By contrast, it was known that between ten and twenty infants 
died every year from vaccination.122 In weighing these relative risks and 
the potential benefits of vaccination, they borrowed from a third doctor, 
C. W. Dixon. He had calculated that herd immunity from childhood 
vaccination might not even exceed 10 per cent. Because the effective-
ness of the vaccine waned over time, people vaccinated as children 
would become vulnerable again in young adulthood. Without revacci-
nation, this left a large section of the population vulnerable to infection. 
This was doubly dangerous because these people might believe them-
selves to be safe because they had been vaccinated in earlier life and 
might therefore take risks without knowing it. Dixon concluded that a 
childhood vaccination programme without a robust adult revaccination 
programme was worse than useless.123
Dick raised his concerns at the BMA’s annual meeting in Belfast in 
July 1962.124 He was joined by William Edgar, Bradford’s Deputy MOH, 
making a speech to the Royal Society of Health in which he claimed 
that mass vaccination had not contributed to controlling the outbreak 
there.125 The resulting debate was picked up by the popular press, high-
lighting the strength of feeling on the matter and causing some anxiety 
on the part of the Ministry of Health. It had hoped to keep the matter 
relatively private, a discussion between experts in government meeting 
rooms rather than in a public forum.126 Correspondents to the British 
Medical Journal were also critical that such a sensitive matter was being 
aired in a press prone to ‘sensationalist’ headlines, as evinced by the 
‘panic’ that had followed reports of smallpox during the epidemic.127 
There was a sense, therefore, that the public did not have the knowledge 
to be able to debate this issue properly and would act emotionally rather 
than logically.128 However, the British Medical Journal also cautioned its 
readers that they too held deep emotional positions on smallpox. An 
editorial quoted the noted epidemiologist Major Greenwood when he 
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said that ‘no intelligent person supposes that logic determines practical 
issues’.129
To clarify Dick’s comments and the organisation’s position on small-
pox, the BMA wrote to the Ministry arguing that a new committee 
should be established to advise the government on vaccination and 
immunisation policy.130 That the government agreed to the request 
shows the power and close relationship that the BMA had with the 
Ministry at this time.131 However, when it had requested a more inten-
sive smallpox vaccination campaign some years earlier, this had been 
treated rather lukewarmly. The formation of a new committee was 
neither difficult nor out of line with the Ministry’s pre-existing plans. 
The Ministry and Scottish Office’s Joint Committee on Poliomyelitis 
Vaccine ( JCPV) which reported to the Standing Medical Advisory 
Committee (SMAC), was about to expire following the decision to 
move to oral poliomyelitis vaccine (see Chapter 3).132 The Ministry had 
already considered something similar to the BMA’s proposal, and there-
fore established the Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation 
( JCVI).133 To respond directly to ‘Dick’s bombshell’, a sub-committee 
was immediately created within the JCVI to explicitly deal with the 
questions raised by Dick, Dixon, Elliott and others.134 Chaired by R. E. 
Tunbridge, Professor of Medicine at the University of Leeds, the sub-
committee’s membership included MOHs, general practitioners, 
researchers and a paediatrician. Elliott himself was co-opted onto the 
sub-committee. It reported to the main JCVI which in turn reported to 
the Ministers responsible for health in England, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland.135 This reflected the growing influence of expert advice in 
British health matters in the post-war period.136
It also showed that immunisation policy was becoming increasingly 
standardised. Although the national campaign for diphtheria had begun 
in 1940, local MOHs were largely responsible for prioritising and 
administering it at the regional level. The 1950s campaigns had tried to 
raise uptake in areas of apathy. The JCVI, though, created a dedicated 
nook of the medical civil service for discussing the issues surrounding 
vaccination across all diseases and across all the constituent countries 
of the United Kingdom. Advancing immunisation technology required 
better planning. Conservative Minister of Health Enoch Powell prom-
ised ‘a comprehensive and planned programme of immunisation and 
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vaccination in every part of the country’.137 By focusing on smallpox 
vaccination, attention had also turned back to indigenous cases – the 
Ministry acknowledged that importation was impossible to prevent, so 
it was important to ensure that Britons were best placed to deal with it 
if or when it arrived.138 Building on the work of previous organisations 
such as SMAC and JCPV, this was a national attempt to protect public 
health. For ‘although each outbreak’ of infectious disease had ‘a focal 
point of starting … each focal point [was] of National concern’.139
The sub-committee broke down Dick’s main critique of vaccination 
into three areas. First, that ‘there is excessive mortality from vaccina-
tion’; second that ‘smallpox in infancy … is unlikely to make much 
contribution to herd immunity’; and third, that ‘routine public health 
control measures would adequately contain epidemic spread’.140 The 
first meeting, in April 1963, was a tense affair: the members had strong 
opinions on vaccination, and were frustrated at the lack of hard evi-
dence to form any concrete advice for the JCVI.141 A second meeting 
was called in July to go back over the extant evidence and give Dick, 
who had been unavailable in April, a chance to present his case more 
thoroughly.142 Members seemed to be acutely aware that there was a dif-
ference between, as Dick put it, ‘paper’ and ‘de facto’ policy.143 The idea 
that all members of the public would behave as they were advised – 100 
per cent being vaccinated in infancy and then revaccinated regularly 
throughout childhood and adulthood – was clearly a fantasy. In reality, 
primary vaccination rates in children were known to be around 40 to 
50 per cent (depending on the local authority), and revaccination rates 
were barely one in ten. C. Kaplan, a member of the sub-committee, 
wrote in the British Medical Journal that this could in fact be worse 
than nothing, since it might give people (or the country in general) a 
false sense of security when there was an outbreak.144 Dick laid down 
the challenge that the government should either abandon the policy 
as unworkable, or make genuine attempts to reach the ‘paper’ policy 
goal – something it had clearly failed to do during the 1950s.145 But this 
too would have de facto problems. Even Elliott, a proponent of ending 
routine childhood vaccination, argued that ‘a not very well-informed 
public’ would see the ending of vaccination as negligent.146 There had 
already been a backlash in some quarters when SMAC had shifted 
the recommendation to vaccinate in the first year of life to vaccina-
tion between the ages of one and two years (on the epidemiological 
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evidence that this reduced the risk of complications). H. Josephs, from 
the Smethwick Local Medical Committee, felt that this would reduce 
the number of vaccinations in his area, which was dangerous, given 
the number of ‘coloured’ immigrants in his borough; W. H. Crichton 
also argued that mothers preferred to vaccinate at around six months 
because the children were less mobile and therefore it was easier to 
deal with the scabs that developed on the arm.147 Besides, if revacci-
nation was safer than primary vaccination in adults, there were criti-
cisms that Dick’s preferred policy of vaccinating only contacts would 
be unacceptable to the wider public. As the 1962 outbreaks had shown, 
‘they will come in their hordes and demand protection: and no health 
authority will dare to them say nay’.148 Most importantly of all, the 
experts saw their role as one that required firm, unequivocal advice 
for a public considered unable to make such complex decisions for 
themselves. The possibility of laying out the risks for parents (and their 
family doctors) and allowing them to choose was considered absolutely 
‘unacceptable’.149
The paradox of public attitudes to vaccination was again exposed. 
The public clearly welcomed, even demanded, the protections offered 
by vaccination in times of epidemic. Doctors working alongside parents 
and the general public also believed that the removal of routine vaccina-
tion would cause considerable disquiet. And yet, primary vaccination 
rates remained low, with revaccination rates even lower. Even if it could 
be epidemiologically justified, the removal of what was seen as a neces-
sary protection was problematic. So too was the potential political 
fallout, should an outbreak occur in the absence of such protection 
(whether it was a causative factor or not). The hazard of a smallpox 
outbreak, even a single case, was too much to risk on the incomplete 
evidence so far accumulated. As the sub-committee noted, there was a 
general sense that current public health protection methods worked, 
but there was no reliable experimental evidence to suggest exactly how 
well they worked, as compared with routine vaccination. There was 
acceptance that vaccination probably did not prevent many cases, but 
there was no reliable epidemiological evidence on how few cases it 
prevented. There may have been little evidence to stop vaccination, but 
it was also the case that ‘smallpox vaccination [was] so much a part of 
ancient lore that it has not been subjected to the kind of scientific 
appraisal that other vaccination procedures [had] received’.150 In these 
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circumstances, the status quo won out, while the sub-committee went 
in search of the evidence that would allow the JCVI to recommend 
concrete policy proposals to ministers. Dick’s quotation of G. S. Wil-
son’s critique of BCG vaccine was apt: ‘It is much easier to introduce a 
given measure into the public health practice of this country than to 
remove it once it has become firmly established.’151
By the late 1960s, further analyses on the vaccination programme 
had provided answers to questions about vaccination safety and effi-
cacy. Expert opinion had begun to turn away from the procedure on 
scientific and practical grounds.152 More importantly, the smallpox 
landscape had changed dramatically. The intensification of the WHO 
Smallpox Eradication Programme from 1967 onwards significantly 
reduced the areas of the world in which smallpox was endemic.153 This 
further increased the risk of vaccine injury relative to the risk posed by 
the disease itself. While research had been proposed into finding a new, 
safer immunisation against smallpox, resistance in the WHO, a lack of 
suitable test populations to assess potency and risk, plus the declining 
need for it in economically developed nations meant that it never mate-
rialised.154 On the basis of this ‘balance of risks’, the Secretary of State, 
Sir Keith Joseph, announced on 28 July 1971 that routine vaccination 
would end.155 Both the Department of Health and Social Security 
(DHSS), which had replaced the Ministry of Health in 1968, and the 
Scottish Office accepted the JCVI’s recommendation that existing 
public health measures would be enough to control any potential 
importation. Instead, people in at-risk groups (such as NHS staff, 
people travelling to smallpox-endemic areas and those requiring vac-
cination certificates for travel abroad) would be offered vaccination, as 
would contacts of known smallpox cases.156
The decision provoked little debate in the general press. There had 
not been a confirmed indigenous case of the disease via importation 
since the 1962 outbreak (see Table 2.1), and there was general confi-
dence in the Eradication Programme. Where one finds isolated voices 
of dissent, racialised views of the disease were never far away. One 
concerned resident in Hayes End, Middlesex wrote to her MP that she 
felt very strongly that ‘in our area this is most unwise with considerable 
numbers of Indians and Pakistanis commuting daily and being 
employed in local bakeries etc, handling food’.157 Expert opinion, 
however, had moved on. Dick gave a summary of the arguments to the 
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British Medical Journal and was supported by a favourable editorial in 
the same issue.158 A few doctors expressed doubts, but it produced far 
fewer letters than the original ‘Dick’s bombshell’ in the summer of 
1962.159 Much like when compulsory vaccination ended in 1948, the 
lack of public disquiet showed that the British government had formal-
ised a paper decision that its people had already made de facto. Vaccina-
tion and revaccination rates continued to be low, even where uptake for 
immunisations against other diseases remained relatively robust. The 
decision also reflected Britain’s willingness to act semi-independently 
from the rest of the world. In the 1960s and 1970s, many other nations, 
including those in the European Economic Community, continued to 
make vaccination compulsory for children, or at least heavily promoted 
it.160 The United States and Canada had taken similar action to the 
British government, but these Anglophone countries were outliers. 
There was a certain privilege to this. Britain and North America had the 
luxury of weighing up relative risks in a way that, say, India or Somalia 
could not. The economic and medical maturity of their public health 
structures allowed their citizens to forego the risks of vaccination at 
precisely the time that the Eradication Programme was aggressively 
intervening in the lives of people living in poorer countries.161 The pro-
tection of the British people no longer required its citizens to present 
themselves for vaccination – indeed, it no longer even required greater 
controls in Britain’s ports. Instead, Britain was to be protected by fight-
ing the sources of smallpox on other continents, rather than by insisting 
on prophylaxis at home.
Conclusion
Vaccination continued for at-risk groups, and the government main-
tained stockpiles of freeze-dried and liquid vaccine in case of emer-
gency. This caused some logistical problems, notably the fact that these 
stores were held by a private company, Listers. Listers had financial 
troubles in the early 1970s and sold a million doses to Saudi Arabia. 
This led the government to reassess its storage policies, and highlighted 
that national British public health resources were not always in public 
hands.162 The threat of smallpox faded further during the 1970s, however, 
and the decision to end routine vaccination was never challenged. Two 
outbreaks of smallpox resulting from laboratory accidents at the London 
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School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and the University of Bir-
mingham caused scandals that led to the reappraisal of health and safety 
directives for infectious disease laboratories and the destruction of Brit-
ain’s remaining variola samples.163 Both incidents were quickly con-
tained to a very few people, and the Birmingham case would turn out 
to be the world’s last smallpox victim. Stores of vaccine thus became 
largely symbolic. There was a general fear of bioterrorism in the West 
during the Cold War, and later in the post-9/11 international climate.164 
Yet it was well known that it would be practically impossible to store 
enough vaccine and distribute it to the entire British population in the 
case of such an attack.165 Much like providing mass vaccination in Brad-
ford, calling for tighter port controls and maintaining routine child-
hood vaccination, being seen to prioritise public health was more 
important than the relative balance of epidemiological risks.
In the period after 1945, smallpox vaccination had been a tool to 
defend the British nation from foreign contagion. The nation – Britain 
– was imagined both as a body to be protected and as a member of 
an international community. Travellers and medical knowledge moved 
freely into and out of this nation, creating both opportunities and dif-
ficulties. The JCVI smallpox sub-committee noted that vaccination was 
a ‘medical/social/political issue with international aspects and must be 
resolved in light of all such factors’.166 Thus, protecting the British public 
health required a broad view of infectious disease: vaccination was just 
one tool to achieve this. The British people supported the premise of 
smallpox vaccination, but saw it as a prophylaxis and form of epidemic 
control to be used when the local area had become infected. Britain 
could become a smallpox area – but when it was not, it was difficult 
to press upon its citizens the need for routine primary vaccination 
and revaccination. Instead, the government was implored to protect its 
people by ensuring that ports were properly patrolled, foreign travel-
lers and countries were “disinfected” and, in the rare instances where 
this failed, to provide vaccination to any Briton who demanded it. The 
challenge for public health authorities was to placate these demands 
while stressing that epidemiological evidence might suggest a different 
weighting of priorities.
Indeed, demand for vaccination would put other stresses on the 
British government in the 1950s. The next chapter will show how these 
issues of national protection were stretched by periods of apathy and 
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demand with regard to the new poliomyelitis vaccine. Britain’s place 
within global public health and the international pharmaceutical indus-
try would play a major role in shaping, to borrow from George Dick, 
‘paper’ and ‘de facto’ policy towards the disease.167 Unlike with small-
pox, the government was able to encourage young adults and parents 
to have themselves and their children vaccinated – however, it was not 
an easy process.
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3
Poliomyelitis
Indigenous smallpox had been eliminated from Britain in the 1930s, 
reducing its threat to the day-to-day lives of British people. The public 
had, however, come to fear a new disease which first reached epidemic 
proportions in 1947 – poliomyelitis. From that year onwards, regular 
outbreaks occurred during the “polio season” each summer. No cure 
was ever found. The only thing authorities could do was provide treat-
ment for acute symptoms and continue research efforts into a preventa-
tive vaccine. By the end of the 1960s, the number of annual cases could 
be counted on one hand, but the vaccination programme that achieved 
this decline did not eliminate polio overnight; nor was it without sig-
nificant financial and logistical difficulties.
This chapter focuses on the theme of demand. This was not unique 
to polio. As has been seen in previous chapters, the British public had 
come to demand health and other welfare protections from the govern-
ment, particularly since the 1940s. There was active demand for emer-
gency vaccination during smallpox epidemics. What set polio apart is 
that we see clear evidence of public demand for a coordinated routine 
immunisation campaign. In part, this was because of higher levels of 
anxiety about polio than about other diseases, but it was significant that 
the specific solution to this problem would be vaccination. The anti-
diphtheria, pertussis and smallpox programmes offered a template; and 
new vaccine technology made this possible. Initially this involved the 
mass polio vaccination of all children and priority groups. Later it 
would evolve into a programme for all young children as they became 
old enough to be eligible, and specific campaigns to vaccinate young 
adults to protect them from the disease.
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It is clear from contemporary media coverage and internal govern-
ment files that the British people wanted protection from polio. As in 
many Western countries, large charities solicited donations to polio 
research and care and there was extensive interest in the massive field 
trials of a new vaccine being developed in the United States in 1954 
and 1955.1 Even when the vaccine became available, many of these 
charities continued to provide aftercare and support for affected chil-
dren and adults – and while the majority of publicity for vaccination 
would come from health authorities, the climate of concern around 
polio stimulated discussion and demand. Such was this demand that 
during the period from the introduction of the UK polio vaccine pro-
gramme in 1956 to the switch to oral poliomyelitis vaccine in 1962, 
the government faced significant criticism for being unable to provide 
vaccine to all who wanted it, due to acute and chronic supply shortages. 
And yet the Ministry of Health also worried that certain sections of 
the public were too apathetic towards the new technology and needed 
to be convinced of the benefit both to themselves and to the wider 
population.
Demand appears in two main contexts throughout this chapter. First, 
it could be a statistical artefact – a measurement of how many people 
had requested polio vaccine. Demand could be measured through the 
registration system established in 1956 as well as the various requests 
from local health authorities for vaccine supplies when there were 
surges of requests in any given area. In these cases, demand could 
be compared with expected or actual supply; and, indeed, demand 
could be predicted based on past trends, advertising campaigns and 
the demographics of priority groups under the scheme. Here, demand 
could be interpreted as an administrative issue. When demand was 
too high, supplies had to be augmented through more orders for the 
vaccine from pharmaceutical companies. When demand was too low, 
either relative to the programme’s goals or the amount of available 
vaccine, it was stimulated through local and national advertising efforts. 
This administrative balancing act occurred throughout the period, not 
always successfully, as this chapter will demonstrate. The second context 
of demand was more subjective. The public in general believed that the 
government ought to provide polio vaccination to its people. Universal 
polio vaccination was a symbol of a modern, rational state. Politically, 
therefore, the vaccination programme was created and expanded not 
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entirely due to administrative or epidemiological measurement, but 
on what various branches of government believed would be popular 
with the wider public. Similarly, there was nothing inevitable about 
the negative political, media and public attention directed towards the 
various supply crises across the 1950s. Delays in vaccination repre-
sented wider concerns, particularly among the public, with govern-
mental administration than simply the immediate benefits to direct 
beneficiaries.2
This chapter begins by outlining the development of the polio 
vaccine up to the mid-1950s. This was a result of international coopera-
tion and charitable donations, resulting in one of the iconic scientific 
discoveries of the early Cold War era. However, a high-profile labora-
tory accident severely dented the reputation of this new technology. 
Traditionally cautious, British health authorities created their own 
version of the vaccine. After outlining this British variant and the dif-
ficulties it caused, the chapter explores the development of the polio-
myelitis vaccine campaign. This was continually affected by supply 
problems. Partly, this was because of the demands placed on the system 
by the public. A greater problem was the inability to either produce or 
source enough vaccine, especially when there were surges in demand. 
Two incidents in particular are highlighted: an epidemic in Coventry 
in 1957; and the death of the professional footballer Jeff Hall in 1959. 
The chapter ends with the introduction of oral poliomyelitis vaccine 
and the end to these long-running supply issues.
As well as covering demand, the rhetoric around polio vaccine 
exposes other themes that we have already encountered in the 1950s 
and 1960s vaccination programmes. The general climate of demand was 
welcome, but the government was consistently worried about pockets 
of apathy shown by parents with regard to polio vaccine, and made 
significant attempts to convince the public to register themselves for 
the scheme. The public did not act in unison, much to the government’s 
chagrin. Similarly, the nation is an integral part of understanding why 
the British government chose to prioritise British-made vaccine, even 
though it was more expensive and difficult to produce than its Ameri-
can equivalent, and even when the resulting supply shortages caused the 
government significant embarrassment.3 With the polio vaccine pro-
gramme finally established, however, the modern post-war vaccination 
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schedule as we know it today had become firmly entrenched in British 
health care.
Poliomyelitis and the vaccine
While much has been written about polio, it is worth taking some time 
to explain the context for the new vaccine that became available in the 
1950s. In particular, this context explains why parents had come to fear 
the disease – a subject which has received significant attention from 
historians.4 Poliomyelitis is caused by poliovirus, of which there are 
three types.5 It is spread through the gut, most commonly through 
traces of faecal matter entering the mouth. It is asymptomatic in around 
70 per cent of infections, but can cause limb weakness or even paralysis 
in a minority.6 Despite the higher death rate among infected adult 
patients, the crippling effects it could have on children gave polio the 
reputation as a childhood disease. Indeed, it was often called infantile 
paralysis, although by the post-war period poliomyelitis – or simply 
polio – became the preferred nomenclature.7 Given how widespread 
natural poliovirus was in England and Wales, this led to an average 
annual case load of acute poliomyelitis of 524 for the five years to 1946, 
and 5,197 for the five years including and after the first widespread 
epidemic of 1947 (Figure 3.1). Although there is evidence to suggest 
that polio has infected humans for millennia, the first full-scale epidem-
ics of the disease were not seen until the late nineteenth century, in 
American and Scandinavian cities. For this reason, it has been described 
as a ‘virgin soil infection’ by J. N. Hayes – one that was shocking to the 
public because of its apparent novelty and a lack of medical or lay expe-
rience with regard to its spread and control.8 It appeared to affect rich 
and poor communities with the same force, unlike other infectious 
diseases such as tuberculosis. A cure has never been found, although a 
series of therapies were developed across the twentieth century to deal 
with the acute problems of paralysis and the chronic rehabilitation 
required to restore some function to affected parts of the body. The 
most iconic of these was the iron lung, both a symbol of modern medi-
cine’s ability to fight against death and a fearful reminder of the severity 
of the disease. The sight of crutches and callipers on survivors also 
represented the permanent impairment and disability left in the wake 
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of an outbreak.9 The only defence against polio would therefore be 
prevention of infection, which was, paradoxically, more difficult in 
more economically developed nations. The prevailing hygiene thesis is 
that most children in countries with poor sanitation are exposed to 
poliovirus at an early enough stage that they retain some immunity 
from their mothers; most therefore develop mild or asymptomatic 
polio and lifelong immunity. In communities with fully functioning 
sewerage systems and a culture of handwashing, children and young 
adults are exposed much more infrequently, and so are more likely to 
develop a more acute version of the disease later in life. This can explain 
in part why cases became widespread enough that polio became a noti-
fiable disease in the early twentieth century, although it does not fully 
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Figure 3.1 Poliomyelitis notifications, 1939–69. Paralytic cases separated 
from overall notifications from 1950 only.
Source: Public Health England, ‘Notifiable diseases: historic annual totals’, 
28 November 2016. www.gov.uk/government/publications/notifiable-
diseases-historic-annual-totals (accessed 5 May 2017).
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Across the Western world during the early twentieth century a 
number of organisations were established to raise funds for research 
into polio and a potential cure. The most high-profile of these was the 
National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis, also known as the March 
of Dimes. Established by Franklin Roosevelt in the United States in 
the 1930s, it received millions of dollars from the American public 
and helped to fund the research which would produce the first com-
mercially available vaccines. In the United Kingdom, where epidemic 
polio had begun much later than in the USA, the National Fund for 
Poliomyelitis Research was established in 1952.11 When the US team 
led by Jonas Salk announced at a press conference in 1955 that it had 
successfully developed an inactivated poliomyelitis vaccine (IPV), the 
world’s press and television attended. The US government licensed it 
for use within hours.12 It was an archetypical example of the new, coor-
dinated “big science” of the mid-twentieth century, reliant upon large 
budgets and teams of scientists and institutions focused on a single 
problem.13 The polio vaccine trials were among the biggest medical 
experiments ever conducted, becoming a model of randomised con-
trolled trials for researchers and pharmaceutical companies around 
the world.14
The Ministry of Health knew that the Salk announcement would 
stimulate interest in Parliament and in the media. Newspapers had 
covered the trials as they were being conducted, and regularly reported 
from international conferences on polio and immunisation.15 The 
National Fund for Poliomyelitis Research had contacted all the major 
news outlets to direct their attention to Salk’s results (and to publicise 
its own work), and the MRC was within a fortnight of being able to 
release its own data.16 In the House of Commons, Minister of Health 
Iain Macleod took a series of questions on the announcement and 
pledged to move as quickly as possible to bring IPV to the British 
public, subject to proper testing.17
British IPV
Despite this positive publicity, the American IPV programme suf-
fered a major setback almost as soon as it had begun. A batch of the 
vaccine from the Cutter Laboratories had not been inactivated prop-
erly, leading 120,000 children to be injected with live poliovirus. 
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Subsequently, 260 cases developed, of which ten were fatal.18 While 
this caused governments across the world to reassess their commit-
ment to IPV, the British were particularly cautious.19 Authorities in 
the United Kingdom had historically been risk averse toward new vac-
cines, often insisting on a higher burden of proof for their safety than 
other high-income nations did – most notably in the cases of BCG 
and anti-diphtheria immunisation.20 The MRC was keen to ensure that 
any vaccine used in Britain was as safe and effective as possible. Trials 
using the Salk vaccine were suspended, and the MRC sent a delegation 
to the United States to ascertain what had occurred.21 Through the 
course of its research and new trials, the MRC recommended that a 
British vaccine should replace the Mahoney type-I strain of poliovirus 
in the American vaccine with a less virulent strain; this not only would 
reduce the risk of another Cutter incident, but would also be more 
effective in conferring immunity.22 The MRC was confident that, when 
combined with the longer and more rigorous testing period demanded 
by British authorities, the United Kingdom’s IPV would be safer and 
more potent than the American Salk. It advised the government not 
to use Salk vaccine at all in Britain.23 The Ministry of Health and the 
Scottish Office established an advisory body, the Joint Committee on 
Poliomyelitis Vaccine ( JCPV), to guide British health departments 
on the medical and administrative issues surrounding vaccination.24 
After securing assurances that Glaxo and Burroughs Wellcome would 
produce the vaccine, on 19 January 1956 Robin Turton (the Minister 
of Health) announced to a large press conference that children under 
the age of ten would be eligible for polio vaccination. Parents would 
register their children, and local authorities would distribute the 
vaccine as supplies became available.25 Initially, children were to receive 
two doses of IPV by injection, but this was extended to three doses 
in 1958.26
The speed at which the scheme was initiated indicated that the Con-
servative government thought polio vaccination would be a popular 
move.
There is something peculiarly distressing about poliomyelitis … Not 
only does it kill especially the young, but of those who survive 10 per 
cent remain severely paralysed and a further 20 per cent retain through-
out their lives a degree of paralysis. [Turton] was confident that every 
father and mother would wish God’s speed [sic] to the new plan.27
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Yet the way in which the scheme was initiated caused a number of 
problems which had long-standing consequences that would not be 
fully resolved until the following decade. First, the use of local authori-
ties under Section 26 of the National Health Service Acts meant that 
administration of the scheme was carried out by councils and MOHs. 
This caused great variation in the registration and uptake rates for vacci-
nation across the country, as MOHs had different priorities and capaci-
ties within their local authorities (as was seen earlier with diphtheria 
and smallpox immunisation). In two cases, local scepticism even saw 
local authorities opt out of the scheme altogether. The health committee 
and MOH of Burton-on-Trent, Staffordshire believed that the national 
programme was in effect a giant experiment. They also objected to 
central government guidelines and control. Initially, therefore, the 
council refused IPV, arguing that more proof was needed that it was 
safe and effective.28 By April, Burton had reversed its decision under 
pressure from pro-vaccine parents. It was considered wrong to deny 
parents the opportunity to consent to vaccination if they were informed 
and wanted to take the risk. Moreover, as the Deputy Mayor asked, ‘has 
Burton the right to tell the rest of Britain they do not know what they are 
doing?’29 In Wakefield, West Yorkshire the council held out even longer, 
although by the end of 1957 it had agreed to administer the scheme. 
Here, the local MOH believed that natural immunity against polio was 
high in the town, owing to its poor levels of sanitation. Besides, even if 
polio vaccination could help Wakefield, the MOH argued that the gov-
ernment’s approach was inadequate. The council also remained criti-
cal, proposing that the scheme should not be implemented until every 
child could be guaranteed a third dose (as was the norm in the United 
States).30 In each of these cases, there was demand for protection from 
polio. Neither Burton nor Wakefield appeared to be anti-vaccine, or 
even anti-IPV, in principle. Rather, their concerns stemmed from the 
administrative arrangements and evidence base around the vaccination 
programme during the early months of its operation.
The second – and more politically sensitive issue – was that of supply. 
In changing the formula of the vaccine from American to British IPV, 
pharmaceutical companies were unable to produce large quantities of 
the vaccine in time for the beginning of the programme. Burroughs 
Wellcome had significant delays getting its plant online and so, for long 
periods of 1956 and 1957 Glaxo was the sole producer.31 Moreover, in 
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response to the Cutter incident and to maintain public confidence in 
the safety and potency of British IPV the government had mandated 
that each batch had to be analysed by the MRC before it could be used 
on the population. This procedure took around three months. Due to 
limited laboratory capacity, one batch had to complete the entire testing 
process before testing could begin on another. Thus, the British IPV 
supply was released to the public through a narrow “pipeline”, with 
several stages along the process limiting how quickly it could be made 
available.32 All this was complicated further by the suspension of vac-
cination during the polio season.33 The diphtheria immunisation cam-
paign had also been suspended in the summer months, as there was a 
suggestion that injections could exacerbate paralysis in the limbs of 
patients who were subsequently infected with poliovirus.34 The restric-
tion on vaccinating during summer months was subsequently lifted 
following re-examination of the medical evidence, but, even so, it was 
difficult for British firms to produce IPV promptly enough to meet 
demand.35
To manage these stresses, the Ministry initiated a registration scheme. 
Parents would sign their children onto a register with the local author-
ity, which would then distribute IPV as it became available. This started 
with two priority groups: children aged 12 months to 4 years; and those 
aged 5 to 9 years. Initially, the plan had been to vaccinate everyone in 
this cohort, but the supply problems meant that the government and 
MRC used this as an opportunity to compare the effectiveness of the 
vaccine in younger and older children by prioritising children born in 
specific months.36 This had been one of Burton’s objections – that 
central government would dictate who received the vaccine rather than 
allowing local authorities to exercise their discretion. The registration 
scheme was unlike for other vaccines, where parents could present their 
children to the clinic and have the procedure done. Nevertheless, it 
created a framework which could be extended to other cohorts as new 
vaccine became available and as the backlog of patients was cleared. 
Each year, children over the age of 6 months were added to the scheme. 
Further, children up to the age of 14 became eligible in 1957; young 
adults up to the age of 26 in 1958; and older adults up to the age of 40 
in 1960.37
The Ministry had warned local authorities that ‘disappointment may 
be inevitable’, and the registration system would provide for only a 
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proportion of the children whose parents demanded it in the first year.38 
Before the programme even began senior civil servant Dame Enid 
Russell-Smith warned that ‘there may be a considerable danger that 
parents may react adversely’ or become ‘intensely emotional’ to ‘a 
method smacking of the village raffle applied to something which might 
be so important for their children’.39 Even so, the degree and nature of 
supply shortages was an embarrassment. Glaxo continued to have pro-
duction difficulties, caused by the technical nature of vaccine produc-
tion and a shortage of available monkeys for testing.40 When a vial of 
vaccine changed colour in early 1957, possibly because of bacterial con-
tamination caused by improper storage during transit, the entire batch 
had to be withdrawn, causing significant delays.41 An editorial in The 
Times summed up the mood:
The frustrating series of official announcements can give rise to nothing 
but concern … What should be made abundantly clear is that these 
delays are in no way the fault of the MRC or [Glaxo]. … What seems to 
have happened is that the Minister took a gamble and announced the 
probable date on which vaccine might be ready, knowing full well that 
no one could give any guarantee.42
The British Medical Journal also admonished the Minister for his press 
conference in the “American” style, which seemed more about gaining 
political capital than good public health policy.43 The Ministry had been 
advised against the press conference because the media were ‘extremely 
sensitive on the subject of poliomyelitis and have been inclined to treat 
it sensationally’. The programme should have been ‘presented in a sen-
sible and unemotional manner’, lest it ‘evoke embarrassing reactions 
from the millions of parents who will be involved’.44
Many of these problems were of the government’s own making. The 
choice to use British IPV exclusively placed the programme in a vulner-
able position. Production was complex, reliant upon new technologies 
and expertise that were difficult to procure. Glaxo continued to negoti-
ate with the Ministry of Health on the price and quantity of vaccine 
which it could supply.45 Manufacturers were also well aware that the 
profit-making window for the technology was likely to be small. There 
was a large market in the short term, as the government planned to 
vaccinate every child and young adult in the country; but unless sup-
pliers were allowed to export their stock, the demand for vaccine in 
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Britain would eventually dwindle to the annual birth rate. Manufactur-
ers were therefore reluctant to invest massive amounts of capital into 
producing the vaccine unless the Treasury was willing to compensate 
them for inevitable future losses. Of the vaccine that they did produce, 
the government was also keen to allow British companies to export a 
proportion of it to other nations. It especially wanted British IPV to be 
used in the Commonwealth, as it would raise the profile of the pharma-
ceutical industry and ensure that the economy as a whole remained a 
global player in these new technologies of the Cold War (and, very 
shortly, post-Suez) world.46 If it did not, there was a danger that Ameri-
can companies would gain a monopoly.47 The British political classes 
were already anxious about Britain’s status as a fading power, with 
science and technology a potent symbol of this decline in the nuclear 
age. While the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, Britain had no space 
programme to speak of.48 The pharmaceutical industry was one area 
where Britain might be able to compete.
Not all of the limited British supplies therefore went to the “front 
line”, and because of the economic and political incentives to buy 
British, the government refused to import the American Salk vaccine 
at all for its programme in 1956, even when there were major short-
ages.49 While the insistence on British supplies was defensible on 
medical grounds, the government had committed to a programme that 
required far more vaccine than it could realistically produce. That the 
government would persist with the press conference and the introduc-
tion of the programme, despite the warnings from its medical civil 
service and other commentators, is indicative of the perceived demand 
from the electorate for vaccination. Polio vaccine was emblematic of 
modern, technical and scientific medicine. The potential conquest of 
polio was heralded by commentators and the public as one of the great 
achievements of the modern world.50 For any advanced nation that 
wanted to do so, the risk of polio could now be managed.51 Seeing itself 
as an advanced nation, Britain wanted the vaccine. The Conservative 
government had made pledges to fund polio research in its 1955 mani-
festo.52 The specific timing of the polio programme was born of pre-
emptive demand on the part of the party-political side of the government. 
But it also reflected years of research and preparation by staff within the 
Ministry of Health and co-opted advisory groups such as the MRC. 
Private industry in the form of Glaxo and Burroughs Wellcome was also 
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part of this process, to say nothing of the coverage afforded to the topic 
in the press. The issue was that in attempting to placate a potential or 
inferred demand for polio vaccination in the short term, the govern-
ment had committed itself to a course of action that it was not yet 
materially prepared for.
American IPV and the Coventry polio epidemic
These difficulties were exposed further in the summer of 1957 in the 
wake of a polio epidemic in Coventry, Warwickshire.53 The city’s MOH, 
Thomas Morris Clayton, had requested extra supplies of vaccine to help 
deal with the epidemic and clear the backlog of registrations that had 
built up in the city.54 The Ministry of Health refused. There was no 
stockpile of IPV (since there was still a waiting list), so IPV was distrib-
uted batch by batch as soon as it passed MRC testing. John Vaughan-
Morgan, the acting Minister of Health, explained that each local 
authority would continue to receive a percentage of new batches of 
vaccine, as they became available, relative to the number of people in 
each district who had registered for the programme. The decision to 
continue vaccination over the summer months from 1957 onwards 
meant that this would (theoretically) allow all authorities to provide for 
those still waiting to be vaccinated; for the Ministry, it was more impor-
tant to keep the national programme intact. The MRC was still in the 
process of collecting statistics to evaluate the potency of IPV, and the 
government was mindful of the political disaster that could follow the 
redirection of supplies from an area that subsequently developed an 
epidemic.55 For the people of Coventry, however, vaccination appeared 
to be a common-sense solution to an epidemic of infectious disease. 
Just as towns had seen queues outside doctors’ surgeries for smallpox 
vaccine during local outbreaks, it seemed logical that the newly discov-
ered IPV could provide a similar public health function. The cause was 
taken up by the media-savvy Member of Parliament for Coventry 
North, Maurice Edelman. He telephoned the Ministry to ask for more 
supplies of the vaccine, and told the press that the government was 
about to send more vaccine to Coventry, constituting a policy U-turn.56 
Internal documents suggest that Edelman was, at best, mistaken, pos-
sibly as the result of a miscommunication about the timing of the next 
batch of vaccine. (Coventry was about to receive a new delivery of 
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vaccine, but not over and above what it would ordinarily have received 
as part of its quota.)57 When the Ministry clarified its position the fol-
lowing Monday morning, it appeared as if government policy was 
muddled and inconsistent. Over the following weeks, Vaughan-Morgan 
and Clayton both explained to the people of Coventry and the rest of 
the country that IPV was not a useful prophylactic in a mass vaccination 
campaign. It took six weeks to confer immunity, meaning it could 
provide lasting protection for individuals and communities only as part 
of a routine vaccination programme, established before epidemic polio 
reached a particular location.58 The local press continued to ask for 
more help, arguing that even with a six-week delay it could help the city 
by the end of the summer if supplies were available immediately; 
however, the national press appeared to broadly accept the Ministry’s 
arguments with regard to domestic IPV supplies.59
Public demand for the vaccine in Coventry may not have been 
entirely compatible with epidemiological knowledge or public health 
professionals’ experience with IPV, but it was entirely consistent with 
the process for immunisations against other diseases. As seen in the 
previous two chapters, clinics were opened when there were local out-
breaks of smallpox and diphtheria, as those vaccines worked relatively 
quickly and could act both as a long-term preventative and as a short-
term prophylactic. In Coventry, the local and national media stopped 
demanding IPV to help end the current epidemic. Public responses 
through the newspapers appeared to show that the general population 
also bowed to medical expertise, demonstrating an understanding that 
IPV was a technology unlike smallpox or diphtheria immunisation.60 
What the public found less explicable or excusable was why, eighteen 
months after Turton’s announcement, British IPV manufacturing 
capacity continued to lag behind demand. Coventry’s registration rate 
was reasonably high – around 40 per cent as compared to the national 
average for England and Wales of 29 per cent. Scotland’s registration 
rate was slightly higher, at 42 per cent, but even so this represented a 
fraction of the eligible population that were entitled to vaccination.61 
Coventronians’ other major demand was therefore much more difficult 
to rebuff: why did the government not import extra supplies from other 
countries to clear its backlog and provide a more comprehensive 
service?62 Two years had passed since the Cutter incident. The cause of 
that disaster had been found, and millions of doses of the Salk vaccine 
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had been administered across the world without incident. When Cov-
entry was presented with offers from Denmark, France and the United 
States to use foreign-made vaccine, these were rejected in no uncertain 
terms by the Ministry of Health.63 Nevertheless, chronic shortages were 
beginning to take their toll, and the government became concerned that 
the entire programme was at risk of losing public confidence if it could 
not deal with the demands being placed upon it.
Up to this point, MRC guidance had forbidden imports of Salk-
formula vaccine, protecting British IPV and the pharmaceutical com-
panies that supplied it. The relationship between the pharmaceutical 
companies and the public sector had been a key part of the vaccination 
programme. Burroughs Wellcome had supplied many of the diphtheria 
and pertussis vaccines during the 1940s and 1950s, for example.64 
Stuart Blume argues that these relationships were mutually beneficial, 
key to ensuring innovation and supply.65 The British government was 
still keen to maintain the good will and financial stability of a useful 
resource, but circumstances had overtaken it. Given that British capac-
ity had not improved as quickly as had originally been hoped, the Min-
istry of Health went back to the JCPV and MRC to ask them to 
re-examine the question of importation.66 The MRC continued to 
favour British IPV where at all possible, since it was still the safest and 
most potent version available. Yet it was unwilling to make political 
decisions on behalf of the government. Concerned that the Ministry 
was simply passing responsibility onto its shoulders, the MRC carefully 
worded its advice so that it would be ministers that made the final deci-
sion on how to proceed. The scientific evidence still favoured the British 
vaccine; but the MRC changed its guidance so that it no longer objected 
to American imports, provided that these were used only to augment 
supplies. It would be up to ministers to decide how much to buy, when, 
and how to use it. This protected the interests of British manufacturers, 
as their vaccine would form the backbone of the programme and con-
tinuing contracts from central government would be guaranteed; but it 
also meant that if there were problems in the supply chain the stock 
could be supplemented by foreign imports. As a caveat, the MRC also 
recommended that parents be informed if they were to be offered the 
Salk vaccine.67 Although both types of vaccine were considered to be 
potent and safe enough for use on the British public, the MRC contin-
ued to assert that the British one was still the superior product. 
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Provided that parents were informed and willing to take the risk, their 
children could either be vaccinated immediately or remain on the 
waiting list until British IPV became available.
As in 1956, the government’s immediate problem was that demand 
had outstripped supply. In that instance, overall registration rates had 
been higher than the amount of IPV that could be produced, leading 
to delays of service. The summer of 1957 presented a new challenge: 
how to deal with the surges in demand created by the immediate fear 
of polio infection. A vaccination programme based on registration and 
a gradual rollout was unable to coexist with a public who responded to 
epidemics by presenting themselves to health authorities to be immu-
nised, following established precedent. Similarly, registration gave the 
government a more concrete measure of how much IPV it was likely to 
need. And on this basis, the demand for polio vaccine was actually too 
low. The Manchester Guardian noted that the public needed to take 
some responsibility for the acute shortages, given how reluctant they 
had been to register for the scheme during the previous year. Only with 
a localised epidemic and the subsequent criticism in the national press 
did parents appear to present their children for the procedure. The 
Manchester Guardian used the metaphor of blowing ‘hot and cold’ on 
the subject.68 Meanwhile the British Medical Journal believed that the 
health authorities and the medical profession had not done enough to 
explain the benefits of vaccination to the public, resulting in extremes 
of reaction that had little basis in epidemiology.69 It was thus the swings 
in demand that had created political embarrassment and medical anxi-
eties during 1957. The government’s attempt to equalise demand across 
the financial year to prevent surges, through the use of the registration 
system, had been upset by events out of its control.
Giving parents the choice of whether to take British IPV or the 
American Salk vaccine had the result of complicating demand. From an 
administrative point of view, the general demand could still be meas-
ured, and there is little evidence that many parents in practice opted en 
masse to boycott the Salk vaccine. The more subjective side of demand 
is more difficult to analyse. Clearly, the disquiet over the supply short-
age showed that people were upset that they were not able to access the 
vaccine. But were they demanding British IPV, or simply any form of 
polio vaccine? Did the surges in demand perhaps suggest that the public 
looked to the government to protection from a threatening disease and 
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were willing to accept anything that they believed would help? The 
speed at which the demand for IPV as a form of epidemic control dis-
sipated in the wake of medical evidence supports the view that the 
public were broadly willing to accept expert opinion and that their 
demands were driven by other understandings of disease. In any case, 
it seems that, as with diphtheria and smallpox, the British public broadly 
accepted that vaccinations were a useful form of disease control. 
However, the government was unable to control the outside events that 
triggered people to apply this understanding to a concrete action of 
registering and presenting their children for vaccination.
Young adults and IPV: the death of Jeff Hall
The ability to import vaccine from the USA took some stress out of the 
system, but supply problems continued to occur. Registration rates 
across 1957 increased more quickly than the Ministry had anticipated. 
In February, the Cabinet Home Affairs Committee discussed suspend-
ing the national advertising campaign. Any more increases in registra-
tions would be pointless, given that there would not be enough vaccine 
to meet the demand.70 The Ministry, on the advice of the JCPV, had 
expected 50 per cent uptake, but 60 per cent had registered, leaving a 
shortfall of around 2.5 million doses of IPV. Further production prob-
lems with the British manufacturers meant that a new batch of Salk 
vaccine needed to be ordered immediately so that it could be brought 
into circulation before the end of the summer. The new Minister, Derek 
Walker-Smith, was acutely aware that ‘such a situation will greatly inten-
sify the already considerable volume of criticism about the slowness of 
progress in the vaccination programme’, and so it proved.71 The Times 
ran an editorial accusing the Minister of misleading the public by con-
sistently making announcements on IPV based on best-case scenarios 
with regard to British manufacturing. Since this had been a recurring 
problem, why was the government not more honest? ‘To have raised 
the hopes of parents … is unpardonable’, The Times argued, ‘and in view 
of the fiasco last year – which only a low incidence of poliomyelitis 
prevented from becoming a tragedy – the country is entitled to a clear 
statement from the Minister.’72 At least one member of the MRC found 
it ‘difficult to be sympathetic at this stage’.73 The Council had advised 
the government consistently to ensure that there was a stockpile of 
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British vaccine and that there should be a proper contingency plan in 
place against the relatively high likelihood of lost batches.74
Orders of American Salk vaccine allowed the programme to muddle 
through, and even though there were some issues with a batch of 
vaccine from the US firm Parke-Davis and continued problems with the 
British manufacturers, the general situation improved.75 Indeed, sup-
plies were considered robust enough that in September 1958 the Min-
istry made the decision to extend the scheme to young adults under the 
age of 26; and offered a third dose of the vaccine to everyone else in 
order to secure greater immunity among the population.76 At the same 
time, the government became concerned at the low overall registration 
rate and the variable uptake among local authorities. Only 54 per cent 
of Scottish under-15s had been fully vaccinated up to the end of August 
1958, while rates in England and Wales varied from as high as 87 per 
cent to as low as 20 per cent. Plans were therefore put in place for a 
publicity campaign, under the belief that the most of the major supply 
problems were at an end.77 Ironically, by early 1959 it seemed that there 
would be too much IPV in circulation. Pfizer’s UK branch had begun 
production of British-style IPV and was planning, in the words of the 
Ministry of Health, to ‘flood the market’ in an attempt to convince the 
British and foreign governments to buy their stock. The Ministry was 
in a bind, since if it did not purchase the IPV in bulk and use it as part 
of the vaccination programme, Pfizer would market the drug on pre-
scription to individuals outside the scope of the existing scheme. The 
NHS would cover most of the cost of the prescriptions, potentially 
costing the Treasury three times more than the public health scheme.78 
The Ministry therefore considered extending the scheme even further 
to encompass all people under the age of 40. However, events beyond 
the Ministry’s control would cause the government to reassess this 
position.
Demand for vaccination among young adults spiked dramatically 
following the well-publicised death of England and Birmingham City 
footballer Jeff Hall. The 28-year-old had been taken ill after a game with 
Portsmouth on 21 March 1959. He died in hospital sixteen days later, 
on 4 April.79 That a young, healthy man could be struck down so quickly 
shocked the British public. Now that adults under the age of 26 were 
eligible for the scheme, the case served as a ‘fortuitous’ advertisement 
to raise acceptance rates. Walker-Smith recorded messages to be played 
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at all Football League matches to take advantage of the situation.80 
However, the sheer volume of demand overwhelmed local health 
authorities, and in turn put impossible demands on the Ministry to 
supply the vaccine.81 It appeared that the government would be embar-
rassed again: having tried so hard to promote the scheme to young 
adults and been frustrated at low uptake, it now faced the prospect of 
the system again having to delay vaccinations due to a shortage of IPV. 
MOHs in England and Wales were reminded of the importance of 
registration rather than providing IPV on demand, while Scottish 
authorities attempted to vaccinate as many as possible before the tradi-
tional holiday month of July.82
Once again, the unpredictability of demand hampered the govern-
ment’s ability to plan its polio vaccination programme. The Ministry 
had felt that young adults had been too apathetic during the initial regis-
tration process, leading to under-estimation of how much IPV would be 
needed for the coming financial year. In the wake of a high-profile case, 
demand had then surged to the point that local and national authorities 
were unable to cope. The government’s frustrations at its inability to 
control and spread vaccination evenly across the year were expressed by 
Walker-Smith following criticism in the House of Commons:
There has been no maldistribution on the part of my Department at all. 
I have already pointed out that both the original requests and the sup-
plementary requests have been met. As for any delays in delivering 
vaccine, these have been very slight, and those who have had to wait at 
all for vaccine could have been vaccinated months ago if they had regis-
tered when I asked them.83
The public had, as in 1957, blown hot and cold on polio vaccination. 
The reaction to the Jeff Hall case had again shown the reliance of the 
system on registration and keeping demand even. The demand follow-
ing this case was slightly different, however, due to the different demo-
graphics involved. The 1957 spike in demand in Coventry had been 
caused by a local increase in cases that brought home to parents the 
threat to their children. By contrast, Jeff Hall’s was an individual tragic 
story which resonated with young adults who were making their own 
decisions about the risks to their own health. To be sure, many young 
adults would also have been parents, and so a clear distinction between 
these groups cannot be drawn. This level of demand, though, was both 
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administrative and subjective. In the short term, football clubs got their 
players vaccinated in front of the press and television cameras. In the 
slightly longer term, the Ministry tried to push forward its plans to 
extend the programme to everyone under the age of 40. Part of the 
Ministry’s argument was that Hall, aged 29 at the time of his death, 
would not have been eligible for the existing scheme. The Treasury was 
unconvinced that supply problems had been adequately addressed, and 
initially refused to fund extension of the programme.84 Regardless, the 
Conservative Party pledged to provide IPV for under 40s in its 1959 
general election manifesto, and confirmed the extension in February 
1960.85
Oral polio vaccine
The year 1960 passed without any major crises. By 30 June 1960, 77 
per cent of children had been fully vaccinated with IPV, as also had been 
half of young adults in the 16–26 age category.86 While the registration 
rate remained less than ideal among older groups, the fact that such a 
backlog of cases had been cleared meant that the Ministry scaled back 
its orders of IPV for 1960/61, causing Pfizer to gradually withdraw from 
the British market.87 The long-term future of the programme appeared 
to rest not on securing IPV supplies, but on whether the time was now 
right to switch to a new technology being trialled in the Soviet Union 
– Albert Sabin’s live vaccine (or oral poliomyelitis vaccine; OPV).
OPV used attenuated forms of the poliovirus to confer immunity 
through a similar transmission form as the naturally occurring virus. 
Taken by mouth, the vaccine entered the gut like the natural infection 
and could confer immunity much more quickly than IPV. Salk had 
managed to produce a safe version of IPV quicker than his competitors. 
The speed and extent to which this was adopted in the American popu-
lation meant that Sabin and others were forced to test their vaccines in 
virgin populations abroad. Although based in the US, Sabin had been 
born in the Russian Empire (in latter-day Poland) and his relationships 
with Soviet scientists helped him convince the Soviet Union to allow 
trials of his OPV. These were a success and, despite initial Western 
scepticism, by the early 1960s the potential advantages of OPV were 
recognised by the United States and its allies88 As with IPV, the British 
medical establishment was initially cautious.89 Experiments with Hilary 
Poliomyelitis 133
Koprowski’s OPV in Belfast in 1956 had been ‘disastrous’, as Lindner 
and Blume have described.90 The trials, overseen by Professor George 
Dick, showed that the virus could revert back to an infectious form, and 
this dented the reputation of OPV considerably in the United 
Kingdom.91 But by the early 1960s attitudes had softened significantly. 
Sabin’s vaccine held a number of advantages for mass and routine vac-
cination programmes. First, it was much cheaper and easier to manu-
facture, promising an end to the supply issues that had plagued the 
British programme thus far. Second, parents found the use of an oral 
vaccine, requiring only a drop of vaccine on a sugar cube, more attrac-
tive, since it caused less distress for their children and eliminated the 
need for injections.92 Third, it was fast acting. Because it produced 
immunity much more quickly than IPV, it could be used on a mass scale 
as a form of epidemic control. And fourth, although controversially, 
OPV could theoretically vaccinate other members of the community 
passively, since it could be spread to people in the same way as poliovi-
rus.93 This led to a number of ethical questions about whether this 
amounted to vaccination without consent, but by the early 1960s the 
medical community was largely agreed that OPV offered the best 
opportunity to truly eradicate polio.94 IPV had worked well in many 
Western nations, but only up to a point. Infection rates in the United 
States and Canada were beginning to stagnate, after significant falls 
since the mid-1950s.95 Questions about OPV’s safety – since if the virus 
returned to virulence, it could potentially spread live polio throughout 
a community – were answered at a number of international confer-
ences, most notably the Fifth International Congress on Poliomyelitis 
in Copenhagen in July 1960.96 The United States Surgeon General 
began to recommend the use of OPV, which influenced the British 
authorities to purchase some vaccine, initially to control epidemics, but 
later as part of the routine vaccination programme.97
While international scientific networks may have influenced the 
advice given by the MRC and JCPV on the use of OPV in Britain, the 
Ministry was motivated to adopt it for more pragmatic reasons. It was 
clear that a number of pharmaceutical companies were moving towards 
OPV production, with Wellcome lobbying the government hard for 
a contract to begin trials in the United Kingdom.98 Within the IPV 
programme, a relatively quiet 1960 was followed by a more difficult 
1961. Demand for vaccination increased significantly after high-profile 
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epidemics in Ipswich, West Bromwich and Liverpool.99 Infection rates 
had risen after successive years of decline (see Figure 3.1), remind-
ing the public that polio had not yet been defeated. Demand had also 
been boosted by a large-scale campaign from the incoming Minister for 
Health, Enoch Powell. While he was aware that it was impossible to say 
to what extent the campaign had made an impact on vaccination rates, 
Powell noted that it was politically difficult for the government to be 
in yet another supply crisis, after having spent so much effort trying to 
engender support among the population.100 Even though gross demand 
for the vaccine was now lower, due to the clearing of the backlog of 
cases from the 1950s, it was still much higher than the Ministry had 
been expecting. A number of supply problems then hit the Ministry at 
once. First, a batch of Pfizer’s British IPV failed; then a batch of Cana-
dian IPV from Connaught also failed to pass MRC safety tests. This 
coincided with a shortage in the United States which led the US govern-
ment to ban exports of Salk vaccine. The spike in demand created by 
the epidemics left Britain in a situation where it did not have enough 
stockpiles to meet demand, nor was it able to import enough in the 
short term to tide it over.101
The Ministry received a number of complaints via Members of Par-
liament and local councils.102 The BMA also forwarded concerns from 
general practitioners who were angry that they were the ones who faced 
criticism from the public when there were shortages.103 The only way 
to help this situation was to purchase more IPV once supplies from 
the USA became accessible again, but the Ministry knew that it would 
face pushback from the Treasury, which had become increasingly con-
cerned at the lack of accuracy in the Ministry’s predictions for vaccine 
demand. While it understood that demand was elastic and impossible 
to judge with exactitude, the consistent requests for more money were 
trying its patience.104 The Ministry had already been asked to set out 
the scientific case for IPV, and evidence that it had actually worked 
in Britain, during the negotiations over extending the programme to 
the under-40s.105 More importantly, the Ministry believed that any 
request for large amounts of cash to purchase IPV would inevitably 
lead to questions from both the Treasury and the press about why so 
much was being spent on the older technology when OPV appeared 
to be the way forward in terms of both the epidemiology and public 
acceptability.106
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In this situation, the demand for OPV was driven by a number of 
administrative and subjective factors. Western opinion on OPV had 
shifted dramatically and quickly over the course of 1960 and 1961. This 
was further helped when OPV was used to help to deal with an epi-
demic in Kingston upon Hull, East Yorkshire, in late summer 1961. 
Hundreds of thousands of people were immunised during the out-
break, and the vaccine’s apparent success in containing the spread 
cemented its reputation.107 The subjective demand for the state to 
provide protection against poliomyelitis was evident. Even in the 
absence of an oral alternative, people were still demanding IPV during 
the summer epidemics. Nevertheless, administrative pressure, driven 
by public opinion, appeared to be pushing toward OPV in the long 
term. Despite variations in the exact administrative demand within the 
programme over time, the issue was not over whether polio immunisa-
tion should be provided but over the form that it should take.
Conclusion
In September 1961 a civil servant noted: ‘obviously we have miscalcu-
lated [demand for vaccination] … The question is whether the miscal-
culation is defensible.’108 It seems to be difficult to defend the Ministry 
of Health’s long-term policy on IPV. From the outset it promised to 
vaccinate many more people than were within its capacity. It began the 
programme before its major manufacturers were able either to build a 
stockpile of vaccine or to produce enough en masse to meet even the 
more limited demand of the first registration wave. It tied its own hands 
by simultaneously demanding the use of British IPV and either banning 
or severely limiting the use of American Salk vaccine. When it did allow 
importation, it waited until supplies were almost gone before ordering 
more Salk vaccine, rather than anticipating growing demand. There were 
some mitigating circumstances. The Ministry may have been criticised 
by the Treasury for under-estimating the amount of vaccine required 
in any given year, but the political cost of overspending during a period 
of financial retrenchment was considered even riskier. In late 1958, 
some local authorities had supplies of American IPV that was about to 
expire, writing off thousands of pounds’ worth of stock.109 Moreover, 
the field of immunisation was in a constant state of flux – planning from 
year to year was difficult, and if the government over-ordered one type 
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of vaccine and suddenly found the next year that it would require a 
different formula, even more money could be wasted.110 In effect, this 
had already happened with the last-minute switch from American to 
British vaccine in late 1955, and the Ministry was mindful of having to 
do this again.
Demand was thus a very difficult beast to tame. Its negative effects 
could be exacerbated by events outside the government’s control. 
Administratively, consistent and predictable levels of registration were 
the easiest to provide for, but in reality they were seldom the case. 
Either specific scares caused spikes in registration, or a lack of immedi-
ate danger led to under-registration (and with it, under-ordering of IPV 
from suppliers). From a subjective point of view, it was also never 
entirely clear what, specifically, the public were demanding. Low levels 
of general registration suggested that the public were not particularly 
excited by polio vaccination as an abstract concept; yet the surges in 
demand during epidemics or high-profile cases also suggested that the 
public expected to have the option of polio vaccine whenever they 
wanted it. Media coverage of the Salk vaccine trials and the consistent 
criticisms of government mismanagement of the scheme pointed to a 
nation that expected a properly functioning service; yet general apathy 
meant that the public did not register when asked to do so in order to 
ensure that the service ran as smoothly as possible. These paradoxes 
may not have been unique to polio, but they became much more evident 
than they had been with smallpox and diphtheria, due to: the novelty 
of the technology; the scope of the programme in encompassing young 
adults as well as children; and the high-profile problems with manufac-
ture and supply.
Regardless, OPV was introduced for those awaiting their first dose 
of polio vaccine. By 1962, the programme was fully operational, having 
vaccinated the majority of people under the age of 26 and continuing 
to provide for new-borns and older citizens.111 This was emblematic of 
the new status quo in public health. Despite the problems outlined in 
Part I of this book, as of 31 December 1969, uptake among children 
born in 1967 was 80 per cent or more in England and Wales for vaccines 
against pertussis, diphtheria and poliomyelitis.112 This continued to vary 
by region: several authorities reached 95 per cent for pertussis vaccine, 
while Halifax achieved only 52 per cent.113 For the most part, however, 
the system appeared to be working. Parents presented their children for 
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the various injections and sugar cubes that protected their children, and 
epidemics of these infectious diseases had become much rarer.
By the early 1970s, the childhood vaccination programme had 
expanded to include immunisations against diphtheria, tetanus, per-
tussis, poliomyelitis, measles, rubella and tuberculosis – and it had 
phased out smallpox vaccination. What Jacob Heller describes as the 
‘vaccine narrative’ in the United States can be said to apply to Britain 
by this point. He argues that the public broadly believed that vaccina-
tions are safe, effective and a sign of a modern functioning state. This 
was cemented through the poliomyelitis programme, which could work 
only through vaccination, rather than other curative or preventative 
measures.114 In the United Kingdom, similar successes with polio had 
led the public, broadly, to support and avail themselves of vaccination 
services.
Present-day research suggests that such attitudes remain in most 
nations around the globe. However, confidence in individual vaccina-
tions may be dented by local political factors, faith in medical authori-
ties, attitudes towards specific diseases and the reputation of the 
vaccine.115 Part II explores two incidents which exemplified this in the 
British context: the pertussis crisis and the MMR crisis. In both cases, 
disagreements within the medical community about vaccine safety 
were seized upon by the press and caused confusion for the general 
public and government alike. The debates that followed were embed-
ded in the contemporary political climate, and so were manifested in 
different ways.
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Part II of this book signifies a shift in emphasis for the British vaccina-
tion programme. Some of this was due to maturity. By the 1970s, many 
of the fundamental questions about which vaccines to include and 
whether the state had a role in protecting the British public had been 
answered. Citizens had come to accept vaccination for themselves and 
demand it of others. Other changes were due to political and historical 
circumstances. Whereas MOHs had played a key role in the admin-
istration of immunisation from the 1940s to the 1960s, these func-
tions were subsumed by the Department of Health and Social Security 
(DHSS) in the 1974 reorganisation of the NHS. The DHSS and its pre-
decessor, the Ministry of Health, had attempted to exert more central 
control over and unification of the vaccination programme. This was 
seen in the surveillance of local authority uptake statistics; a growing 
role for the medical civil service through bodies such as the JCVI; and 
national control over the provision and funding of vaccine supplies to 
the regions.
These issues of localism did not disappear. General practitioners 
took ever greater responsibility for ensuring that their areas met cen-
trally determined targets for vaccination rates. However, with a mature 
programme and a tried and tested vaccination bureaucracy, the major 
concerns were different. No longer were there regular surges in demand 
to cause supply issues. Nor was apathy so acute in a system that could 
better monitor and follow up with parents who did not vaccinate their 
children. Rather, the key crises for the national vaccination programme 
came when the new status quo was challenged. This was exemplified in 
two key incidents in which faith in specific vaccines was damaged. 
Chapter 5 will examine the MMR vaccine crisis and the subsequent 
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sociological debates about vaccine confidence and health education at 
the turn of the millennium. This chapter deals with pertussis.
In the mid-1970s, some doctors questioned the safety of the pertus-
sis (or whooping cough) vaccine, claiming that it could cause brain 
damage in young children. Despite protestations from the majority of 
the medical community, public confidence in the vaccine dropped sig-
nificantly. Pertussis vaccination rates fell from 78.5 per cent of children 
born in England and Wales in 1971 to 37 per cent in 1974.1 As a result, 
the whooping cough outbreak in the winter of 1978–79 was worse than 
any since the 1950s. It was not until the mid-1980s that vaccination 
rates recovered and infection rates returned to pre-crisis levels.2 To 
counter negative publicity, the government commissioned a report into 
the science behind the vaccine and embarked on an advertising cam-
paign to encourage parents to vaccinate their children. But science and 
medicine formed only part of the debate. As they had been from the 
first vaccination programmes, questions about the boundaries and 
responsibilities of the state were central. In the case of pertussis, public 
health policy was considered alongside social security and the wider 
welfare state. If the hazard of brain damage was real, regardless of how 
small the risk, did the government not have a duty to provide support 
for the families adversely affected by vaccines? Similarly, if herd immu-
nity was a crucial part of a functioning public health programme, did 
the health authorities not have a duty to ensure that uptake was as high 
as possible? Citizens demanded that the state should provide protec-
tions, but also that citizens should be protected against state actions.
This chapter, therefore, is about risk. We have already seen how sta-
tistical computations of risk were used in the vaccination programme. 
The decision to ban imports of Salk vaccine from North America had 
been taken because it was felt that the British vaccine was less likely to 
cause damage. Routine infant smallpox vaccination ended when the 
risk of damage from the vaccine was considered higher than the risk of 
an unvaccinated population actually catching the disease. Diphtheria 
immunisation was hailed as a success because immunised children were 
less likely to contract the disease, and if they did they were much less 
likely to get a serious form of it. Such statistical calculations had become 
the foundation of epidemiology and chronic disease management by 
the 1970s, building on the research that had established the link between 
tobacco smoking and lung cancer.3 Although elements of these can be 
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seen in the chapters in Part II, this chapter focuses more on the socio-
logical concept and how it manifested in debates around the pertussis 
crisis. Studies of risk usually take three forms.4 First, they explore how 
societies have come to create, identify and manage new risks as they 
become more technologically advanced. Modern societies have created 
new hazards – things that can go wrong – with ever greater destructive 
power (e.g. the potential meltdown of a nuclear power plant). Regula-
tory frameworks manage the risk – the statistical likelihood that the 
hazard will actually occur – so that the benefits of these modern tech-
nologies outweigh the dangers.5 Second, risk studies look at the social 
and cultural conditions that make certain individuals or organisations 
prioritise certain risks over others. These approaches tend to focus on 
the meaning and social construction of risk, with a focus on decision-
making processes and politics.6 Third, risk can be viewed through a 
Foucauldian lens. We can analyse how power identifies and manages 
risks through governance. Risks are managed by the state as well as 
being internalised by citizens.7 Together, these analyses stress the cen-
trality of risk to modern states, especially since the early twentieth 
century. Thus, we can analyse not just what risks were identified but 
also how different societies focused on specific risks and how those 
were integrated into systems of governance.
This chapter does not seek to explain why parents chose to eschew 
whooping cough vaccination during the crisis. Instead, it puts the per-
tussis debate in context by showing how it was inherently tied up in 
wider public concerns over risk. These risks were partly to do with the 
vaccine. The medical deliberations over the relative risks of vaccine 
damage and infectious disease were clearly the catalyst for the crisis. 
More importantly, however, these debates were rooted in anxieties 
about the role of the welfare state. The most prominent discussions 
were over the provision of financial compensation to the victims of 
vaccine damage. This was a product of renewed political interest in 
groups whose risks of poverty had not been successfully managed by 
the 1948 welfare state.8 The public demanded protection from the risks 
of vaccine damage – that is to say, they wanted to prevent damage from 
happening and to have an adequate safety net for those who became 
disabled. But they also demanded protection from infectious disease, 
as evidenced by the queues outside clinics for vaccination when the 
epidemic broke out. Moreover, the levels of risk and the importance 
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attached to them varied by constituency. This was a policy debate in 
which there were multiple actors, including parliamentarians, voluntary 
organisations, the medical profession, the DHSS, the Treasury and the 
press.
These concerns were an extension of a classic problem in decision 
making around vaccination: omission versus commission.9 A child who 
catches a disease when they have not been vaccinated can be said to be 
a victim of an ‘error of omission’. An act was not taken (whether delib-
erately or not), leading to an unwanted event. A child who suffers an 
allergic reaction to a vaccine may be a victim of an ‘error of commission’. 
This is the opposite of ‘omission’, since an action was deliberately 
taken.10 Parents and individuals tend to be better at rationalising acts of 
omission, where a negative event can be attributed more to chance than 
to an active, harmful decision on the part of the individual. As this 
chapter will show, this dilemma was present throughout the pertussis 
crisis. The potential negative outcomes (or hazards) to individual fami-
lies of either brain damage or whooping cough were catastrophic. While 
medical experts debated the acceptable odds of these events happening 
(risk), the lay public found it difficult to find a clear answer.11 This 
debate was fuelled and reflected by the ample press coverage which the 
crisis received.12 But it was not just parents caught in this bind. As risks 
became both visible and manageable through technological change, 
certain obligations were placed upon individuals and organisations to 
manage them.13 For supporters of vaccination, parents were expected 
to vaccinate their children as part of their duty towards themselves and 
their fellow citizens (as seen in Chapter 1).14 For critics, the govern-
ment’s slow response meant that it had failed to manage the risks of 
either vaccine damage or infectious disease adequately. Neither omis-
sion nor commission alone would give the DHSS an easy policy option. 
The risks of continuing to use a vaccine that might prove to be danger-
ous were obvious. At the same time, doing nothing about the impend-
ing epidemic was also unacceptable.
This chapter explores these themes by outlining the key events of the 
pertussis crisis. It then focuses on the two main areas of debate. First, 
the passage of the Vaccine Damage Payments Act 1979 was predicated 
on the idea that individuals who were vaccinated for the good of society 
should be compensated for taking that risk if things went wrong. This 
argument was generally accepted by the major policy actors from an 
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early stage. The second debate came over how likely vaccine damage 
was, especially in relation to the benefits of the pertussis vaccine. As 
doubts about the safety of the vaccine declined, new concerns arose 
over the likelihood of widespread whooping cough in a now under-
vaccinated population. In both cases, the government came under sus-
tained criticism for not taking decisive action to reduce doubt over the 
vaccine, thus increasing uncertainty and making it more difficult for 
parents to make the – by public health standards – correct decision. To 
conclude, the chapter explores another vaccination debate rooted in 
both the omission/commission dilemma and contemporary concerns 
over disability. Voluntary organisations had become concerned that the 
DHSS had not done enough to vaccinate against rubella, and thus 
prevent Congenital Rubella Syndrome. Although this was not as high 
profile as the pertussis crisis, it shows that the debates over risk were 
widespread in 1970s public health policy.
The pertussis crisis
Pertussis is an infectious disease that can lead to violent coughing, 
especially in children. Complications can include pneumonia and 
encephalitis. While only around 1 per cent of cases in the 1940s were 
fatal in Britain, the unpleasantness of the disease and its disproportion-
ately damaging effect on children under the age of 2 years meant that 
parents had long feared it.15 It affected communities in epidemic cycles, 
meaning that national notifications tended to spike every two to three 
years.16 A vaccine against pertussis had been developed before the 
Second World War, but it was not until the 1950s that it became part 
of the routine childhood vaccination schedule in Britain. Despite this, 
many local authorities chose to administer it alongside diphtheria 
immunisation to take advantage of parents’ concerns about the disease 
before its national introduction in 1957.17 A large-scale MRC trial had 
confirmed both the effectiveness and the safety of the vaccine in 36,000 
children.18 By the 1970s, the trivalent diphtheria-tetanus-whole-cell-
pertussis vaccine (DTwP) was used routinely throughout the country, 
although separate diphtheria-tetanus (DT) and whole-cell pertussis 
vaccines were available.19 The whooping cough vaccine was successful. 
Pertussis morbidity dropped significantly over the 1960s, from an 
average of 122,000 cases (and 374 deaths) per year in the ten years 
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ending 1956, to just 20,400 cases (and 24 deaths) per year for the ten 
years ending 1970 (Figure 4.1).20
In 1974, doctors from Great Ormond Street Hospital published a 
paper claiming that there might be a link between the pertussis vaccine 
and brain damage.21 The resultant media attention and public debate 
saw a rapid reduction in the number of parents presenting their children 
for DTwP vaccination. Jeffrey Baker has described this crisis and its 
significance for public health as beginning around 1974 and ending in 
the mid-1980s, after the final court cases against the government 
brought by parents of children with brain injuries collapsed.22 He rightly 
argues that the crisis needs to be put into historical rather than simply 






























































Figure 4.1 Pertussis notifications, England and Wales, 1940–2005. After 
2005, improvements in laboratory testing and notifications mean that data 
are not comparable.
Source: Public Health England, ‘Table 6: Pertussis notifications and  
deaths, England and Wales: 1940–2014’ (5 May 2016). www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/521438/
Table_6_Pertussis_notifications_and_deaths__E_W__1940_-_2015.pdf 
(accessed 5 August 2017).
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the event which must be remembered and studied – is the drop in vac-
cination rates and subsequent rise in infections. It has become a lesson 
from history, and was referenced regularly during the later MMR 
crisis.23 Studies have therefore tended to focus on public attitudes 
towards the pertussis vaccine. While these were clearly important, we 
can learn more from extending our view of the crisis and putting it into 
the wider context of debates around the welfare state and the role of the 
government.
The risks of this brewing crisis can be separated into three broad 
issues. The first was the government’s duty to protect the public from 
pertussis. Since it was now possible to manage the risk of infectious 
diseases through vaccination, public health authorities were obliged to 
do so.24 The second issue was protection from damage. If, as the Great 
Ormond Street doctors implied, there was a risk of damage from vac-
cines, then the government was failing in its obligation to provide a safe 
vaccine against pertussis. But it was a third issue that drove the majority 
of press coverage and public debate around pertussis vaccine: the gov-
ernment’s responsibility to provide welfare support for those affected 
by failures in the first two policy areas. The 1960s and 1970s had seen 
extensive debate about and attention drawn to the increased risk of 
poverty associated with impairment and disability.25 The thalidomide 
scandal (in which a number of children were born with significant 
injuries due to the ingestion of the thalidomide drug by their mothers 
while they were pregnant) had recently resurfaced when it was shown 
that the British distributors had not paid adequate compensation to the 
victims.26 In the wake of this, the Conservative government of Edward 
Heath established the Family Fund to provide social security payments 
to families with ‘congenitally disabled children’, and the subject of 
medical negligence had been added to the remit of the Royal Commis-
sion on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury.27 In this 
environment, vaccine damage became a potential special case for addi-
tional compensation, especially if the health authorities could be shown 
to be at fault.28
For the government, then, these three issues required three different 
approaches. Its goal was to restore confidence in the pertussis vaccine 
and in the vaccination programme. First, it needed to establish that the 
vaccine was effective. Second, it needed to show that the vaccine was 
safe. And third, it needed to provide assurances that if any children were 
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adversely affected they would receive adequate support. Each of these 
approaches became relatively more important than the others at differ-
ent points of the crisis. At first, arguments about compensation domi-
nated the popular press coverage and were the subject of much 
discussion in the medical press, Parliament and government depart-
ments. Once this principle had been accepted, the debate moved into 
a second phase, driven by fears that the anticipated 1978/79 epidemic 
would lead to unnecessary deaths because the government had allowed 
the vaccination rate to drop too far.
Compensation
The basic principle of vaccine damage payments was accepted, with 
little opposition from a number of constituencies.29 The debates began 
to gain political traction in 1973. Two mothers, Rosemary Fox and 
Rene Lennon, were featured in the Birmingham Post. Their children, 
Helen and Joanne, had become disabled after vaccinations, and they 
called for parents with similar experiences to join a campaign for com-
pensation for vaccine damage. The organisation that grew from this was 
the Association of Parents of Vaccine Damaged Children (APVDC).30 
Fox and Lennon received letters from hundreds of parents, around 
two-thirds of whom blamed their children’s impairment on pertussis 
vaccine. Despite their own children becoming disabled after the polio-
myelitis vaccine, Fox chose to focus attention on this emerging poten-
tial scandal, amplifying it through interviews and media appearances.31 
The APVDC drew on the sort of campaigning that had characterised 
the small but respected groups of the “poverty lobby” that had success-
fully convinced the Heath government to institute the first disability 
benefits.32 These organisations articulated the lived experience of their 
members through the growing mass media, allying it with sociological 
research and professional organisational structures to influence govern-
ment policy. During the 1970s, at least, governments of both parties 
were receptive to such overtures, given that they both spoke the lan-
guage of policy makers and exerted enough pressure on public opinion 
to make elected representatives take notice.33 APVDC in particular 
made allies with key parliamentary advocates such as the disability 
campaigner Jack Ashley, and quickly asserted its position. The two core 
aims were to ‘establish the reality of vaccine damage’ and to demand 
compensation for those affected.34 It argued that since the government 
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recommended vaccination for the public good, the state should also 
provide for the individuals whose health was damaged in the pursuit of 
personal and herd immunity to infectious disease. Because the govern-
ment’s position was so dominant and even doctors (let alone parents) 
were often not fully informed of the potential risks of vaccination, there 
was a moral imperative for a compensation scheme within the public 
health or social security system.35 By basing these arguments on the 
existence rather than the extent of vaccine damage, the APVDC was 
in an advantageous position. It did not have to necessarily prove that 
vaccine damage was widespread, nor to concern itself with relative 
weightings of the risks of vaccination versus the disease itself. All that 
was required was proof that the hazard of vaccine damage was real, 
and that the number of cases in the country was above zero. The Royal 
Commission, Family Fund and general attitude towards the welfare 
state meant that the case for compensation was readily accepted. As the 
British Medical Journal argued soon after the APVDC was established:
The moral justification for compensation … is based on the social con-
tract. National immunization programmes not only aim to protect the 
individual but also to protect society. … If individuals are asked to 
accept a risk (even a very small one) partly for the benefit of society then 
it seems equitable that society should compensate the victims of occa-
sional unlucky mishaps.36
Enough stories had emerged in the media and medical press at this 
time to guide the APVDC’s campaign and highlight both the risk and 
existence of vaccine injury. Although the mere existence of vaccine 
injury was enough for the moral argument, showing that there were a 
number of cases helped to turn this into a scandal which the press could 
parse as a news story.37 Drs J. V. T. Gosling and J. H. Moseley wrote to 
the Guardian weeks after the APVDC had been created, claiming that 
DTwP was not effective enough to be worth continuing and could cause 
brain damage.38 George Dick, the member of the JCVI who had been 
cautious over oral polio and smallpox vaccines, also alleged that up to 
eighty cases of brain damage could be caused by pertussis vaccine each 
year.39 Then, more forcefully, the Great Ormond Street doctors M. 
Kulenkampff, J. S. Schwartzman and J. Wilson published their case 
studies in Archives of Disease in Childhood.40 After this point, concerns 
with DTwP appeared credible, even if they were not completely 
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provable or supported by medical consensus. Parliament became inter-
ested in the story, and backbenchers from both major parties tabled a 
number of questions and Early Day Motions calling for inquiries into 
the vaccine and support for the potential victims.41 Doctors were, 
according to Fox, worried that they might have another ‘thalidomide 
episode’ on their hands.42
The APVDC may have borrowed from the disability poverty lobby 
in its demands for compensation, but its arguments also resonated with 
the growing consumer rights movement around health in the 1970s.43 
It was telling that the Consumers’ Association lent its support to com-
pensation while still recommending that vaccines were a safe and effect-
ive choice for parents wishing to protect their children. The issue 
surrounded informed consent, with the implication both from support-
ers and critics of the vaccination programme that parents were capable 
of making the right choices.44 When select cases were presented to the 
Parliamentary Commissioner Sir Idwal Pugh, the final report did not 
make judgements on the statistical risk or causation of vaccine damage. 
Instead, it found that the British health departments had ‘failed to make 
available to parents all the information that they should have taken into 
account’ and that doctors appeared to have been poorly advised about 
the contra-indications that meant children should not be immunised 
against pertussis.45 Advice was sent out to doctors to re-emphasise the 
need to check for contra-indications – a direct way of managing the risk 
of vaccine damage by further decreasing the likelihood that a suscepti-
ble person would be vaccinated.46
The DHSS accepted the argument that financial payments to vaccine-
damaged children should happen, and began to make preparations. The 
only questions were about how to make the scheme affordable, how to 
make it acceptable to the Treasury and how to try to head off potential 
claims from other special-case groups that could potentially unbalance 
the social security system.47 The government slowed down the process 
by referring the issue to the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and 
Compensation for Personal Injury. Yet the DHSS also knew that it 
had to be seen to be doing something, and repeatedly promised that 
vaccine-damage payments would be enacted as soon as practically pos-
sible. ‘Political considerations favour an early announcement’, Labour 
Secretary of State for Social Services David Ennals told the Cabinet, lest 
the administration undermine its reputation ‘as a caring government’.48 
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It was not just a moral exercise, however. Restoring confidence in the 
vaccination programme by providing a safety net for the few affected 
by vaccine damage was ‘vital … especially because of an outbreak of 
poliomyelitis this summer – an event for which many people would lay 
responsibility at the Government’s door’.49 To show that they accepted 
the principle of compensation, an exchange of correspondence was 
engineered between Prime Minister James Callaghan and the chair 
of the Commission, Lord (Colin) Pearson, confirming that it would 
consider vaccine injury and was very likely to recommend a payment 
scheme.50 When the report was published in March 1978 it concluded 
that ‘there is a special case for paying compensation for vaccine damage 
where vaccination is … undertaken to protect the community’.51 
Legislation to enact Vaccine Damage Payments went through Parlia-
ment quickly, with no opposition, weeks before the vote of no confi-
dence in Prime Minister Callaghan and the subsequent 1979 General 
Election.52
Despite expansions of pension and disability provision under the 
previous Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, and Secretary of State for 
Social Services Barbara Castle (both in office 1974–76), Callaghan’s 
premiership was marked by restrictions in spending following the 1973 
oil crisis and subsequent loan from the International Monetary Fund 
in 1976.53 That the Vaccine Damage Payments Bill 1979 could be passed 
so quickly said much both about attitudes towards compensation for 
supposed victims and about the low number of potential claimants. It 
also demonstrated how seriously the government considered the con-
sequences of a critical lack of confidence in the vaccination programme. 
The legislation was passed not because vaccine damage was a common 
occurrence but because the hazard of vaccine damage had become 
politically unacceptable to multiple constituencies. On the population 
level, the financial and political benefits of protecting the population 
from pertussis vastly outweighed the risk of damage in a limited number 
of children.54 From a clinical and administrative point of view, then, the 
advantages and moral imperative to provide support could be justified 
on the relatively low financial cost of such a scheme – one that was 
additionally kept low by strict qualification criteria and payment levels 
that were generally considered to be somewhat parsimonious.55 For the 
public, considerations about the real or statistical risk were not so 
important. The question was a moral one, based on the way that debates 
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about the role of the welfare state had emphasised and prioritised 
certain risks over others.
Safety
In 1977, the general principle of and preparations for a damage payment 
scheme had been established. This was aided by the general acceptance 
of the argument that vaccination worked – that is to say, that it was safe 
for the vast majority of people and was clearly a technology that pro-
tected children and the wider public from deadly diseases. This vaccina-
tion narrative had never truly been broken, and while the negative 
publicity around pertussis vaccination had seen a dramatic fall in the 
uptake of DTwP vaccination, the uptake of immunisation against diph-
theria and tetanus remained relatively robust. This suggested that many 
parents and doctors had decided to make alternative arrangements to 
ensure that children were otherwise fully immunised.56 Once the prin-
ciple of vaccine payments had been accepted, attention turned towards 
the danger posed by pertussis itself.
The publicity surrounding the compensation debate had clearly 
affected parents’ confidence in the vaccine (as would also be seen with 
MMR – Chapter 5). This was reflected most notably in the decline in 
the pertussis vaccination rate. Criticism of the government’s slow pro-
gress on compensation payments was largely replaced by concerns that 
the DHSS was working too slowly to re-establish the vaccination pro-
gramme.57 It had commissioned the JCVI and Committee on the Safety 
of Medicines (CSM) to investigate the science surrounding DTwP, but 
scheduled arrival of the final results was too late to stop a potential 
epidemic in the winter of 1978/79.58 Fox and Ashley regularly had to 
defend their campaign against accusations of scaremongering and “anti-
vaccine” sentiment. While they protested this point, they became useful 
targets in a new narrative that was being built around the pertussis 
story.59 Too much anxiety had been caused by talk of damage, and now 
there would be a new group of victims – those who would otherwise 
have been immunised.
Majority medical opinion had consistently extolled the virtues of 
DTwP and the safety of the pertussis component.60 However, while 
publicity about the possibility of brain damage remained, the govern-
ment felt that it had to be cautious. Thalidomide and other medical 
tragedies had shown that medical opinion could be wrong. Despite the 
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much more robust and long-term testing on pertussis vaccine than on 
thalidomide before its widespread use, the potential political fall-out 
could be catastrophic if the government was mistaken. Thus, much as 
the hazard of vaccine damage was central to the APVDC’s argument, 
the risk that safety-testing procedures might have failed loomed over 
the DTwP programme. This reflected the traditional caution showed by 
the British government and medical establishment with regard to 
immunisation technology. Like BCG, the whole-cell pertussis vaccine 
had been developed in the 1920s, but it was not used on a national scale 
in Britain until the 1950s.61 In the 1970s, the concern was that if pertus-
sis vaccine was shown to be unsafe, the lack of faith shown in it would 
spread to other parts of what, up to that point, had been a successful 
vaccination programme.62 Gordon Stewart, Professor of Public Health 
at Glasgow University, made these points repeatedly during the 1970s 
and 1980s and was a key ally in the case being made by the APVDC 
against the government in Parliament, in the European Court of Human 
Rights and in subsequent lawsuits during the 1980s.63 As a professor 
with an air of authority and an ability to give the press a good quotation, 
he maintained an air of doubt in the public mind throughout the 
1970s.64 Over-publicising pertussis vaccination during a time of crisis 
was therefore thought to be unwise, as it might draw attention to the 
debate; but without a publicity programme, reinforcing messages about 
the need for and safety of the vaccine would leave many children unpro-
tected. The Secretary of State, David Ennals, eventually chose to run a 
national campaign, but ran into problems in doing so.
The DHSS asked medical advisers from the JCVI and the CSM to 
produce a report on the safety and efficacy of pertussis vaccine. This, it 
was hoped, would re-establish the vaccine’s legitimacy by means of 
concrete medical statistics and expertise; it also allowed the DHSS to 
delay making a firm decision on DTwP, as it could argue that it was 
awaiting scientific confirmation. An interim report came from the JCVI 
in 1977, while the full details of the investigation were released in 1981.65 
However, the advice to the Secretary of State was not unanimous, and 
made it difficult to begin a campaign in 1977. The JCVI, whose respon-
sibility was to advise on vaccination policy, firmly believed that the 
evidence of harm was slight and the evidence in favour of the efficacy 
of the vaccine was indisputable. The JCVI’s data also suggested that an 
epidemic would occur in 1978/79, and that many more children would 
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be infected due to years of under-immunisation.66 The CSM, whose 
responsibility was to ensure that drugs were safe and used in an appro-
priate manner, wanted to wait until the full results of safety testing were 
available. While the causation relationship between pertussis vaccine 
and brain damage was very difficult to prove, it was also impossible to 
disprove (or at least show that there was no evidence for it) until a full 
investigation had been completed.67 Once the Vaccine Damage Pay-
ments Bill had been used to ‘mollify’ the APVDC’s campaign, however, 
the government as a whole became more willing to promote DTwP in 
the light of growing evidence that the vaccine was indeed safe and 
effective.68 The risk of the anticipated epidemic and possible damage to 
other areas of the vaccination programme far outweighed the likeli-
hood that the campaign would face a negative reaction from anxious 
parents. Adverts were placed in major daily newspapers outlining the 
risks and benefits of vaccination. The emphasis was on choice, but with 
a clear message that the most logical choice was to have one’s child 
vaccinated. ‘Vaccination protects’, explained the headline. ‘These facts 
will help you make your decision – but your doctor is there to advise 
you.’ While no exact figure was given for vaccination injuries (either as 
a percentage of all vaccines or as an absolute), the full-page advertise-
ment quoted the decrease in morbidity of pertussis and diphtheria 
since the vaccination programmes against the diseases began.69 It 
marked a distinct change in tone from the diphtheria and smallpox 
campaigns described in Chapters 1 and 2. Rather than focusing on the 
potential catastrophic consequences of failing to follow government 
advice, the adverts were presented as more sober reflections on the 
benefits of vaccination over the risk of catching the diseases against 
which they protected.
With the campaign running and the Vaccine Damage Payments Bill 
going through Parliament, the bulk of negative media coverage was now 
over. Some areas saw a large increase in demand, causing supply short-
ages of the pertussis vaccine reminiscent of the strains put on poliomy-
elitis vaccine supplies during the Jeff Hall incident and the outbreak in 
Liverpool.70 Doubts about whole-cell pertussis vaccine did not disap-
pear entirely. Court cases against the DHSS with regard to pertussis 
vaccine damage occasionally surfaced in the 1980s, although negligence 
was never proved and vaccination rates recovered.71 Outbreaks in 1982 
and 1986 showed that pertussis was still a threat, but 1990 was the last 
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year in which there were over 10,000 cases.72 What this entire episode 
had exposed was that the government’s protection role was complex, 
and public attitudes towards vaccination were not straightforward. 
Both the government and parents juggled multiple risks, weighing up 
their relative importance based on a range of factors. Parents appeared 
to avoid DTwP, but were able and willing to have their children immu-
nised with DT. The press shifted its focus from the risks of damage 
without compensation to the risks to a population without adequate 
immunisation coverage. Medical advisers produced conflicting advice 
depending on their remit and specialisation – from the JCVI, which 
became most concerned with the risk of an infectious disease outbreak 
to the CSM, which was preoccupied with the risk of vaccine damage. 
The medical profession focused on statistics regarding safety and effi-
cacy, advocating widespread use of DTwP to stave off pertussis out-
breaks, yet paying close attention to contra-indications so as to manage 
the risk of vaccine damage. Voluntary organisations concerned them-
selves with the financial and social risks to all vaccine-damaged chil-
dren, regardless of how many or few there were.
Rubella “crisis”
At the same time as this public debate surrounding vaccine damage, a 
lower-profile argument was brewing between the DHSS and voluntary 
organisations. The APVDC’s compensation campaign had gained polit-
ical traction by emphasising the problems associated with uncompen-
sated disability and the government’s inability to recognise the specific 
needs of children damaged as a direct result of government policy. 
Another disease also carried with it the potential for disability. In this 
case the issue was not that the government could cause disability by 
commission; rather, while a vaccine existed but was not widely admin-
istered to at-risk groups, the government could allow disability to occur 
through omission.
In 1978 there was a rubella epidemic across Britain. In itself, this was 
not considered to be a great problem. Rubella (or German measles) is 
a mostly harmless childhood disease. It causes a rash, mild fever and 
swollen glands. Although in rare cases it can cause complications, 
symptoms can be so mild that many people catch it and do not realise 
that they have been infected. However, rubella can be dangerous in 
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pregnant women. It can lead to Congenital Rubella Syndrome (CRS), 
which can cause blindness, deafness and problems in the functioning 
of key organs such as the brain and the heart in new-borns.73 Such were 
the risks that it was standard practice to recommend termination to 
women who contracted rubella in early pregnancy. To combat CRS, the 
government began the routine vaccination of teenage girls in schools in 
1970, so that gradually the cohort of child-bearing women would be 
fully protected from rubella.74 Women were also offered the vaccine, but 
they had to undergo blood tests to determine whether or not they were 
immune to the disease beforehand. Since there was a risk of damage to 
the foetus if a woman became pregnant within three months of being 
vaccinated, authorities did not want to risk vaccinating women who 
would not directly benefit. Because of the inconvenience of this testing 
system, it was less common for non-school-age girls to be vaccinated.75 
The 1978 epidemic therefore came too soon for the programme to 
achieve a high degree of coverage. The first group of girls to be vacci-
nated would have been around 21 years old in 1978, leaving the majority 
of fertile women unprotected and therefore potentially at risk of their 
babies developing CRS. It would be an exaggeration to call this debate 
a crisis, since it gained nowhere near the public attention of damage 
payments and pertussis. Yet it was significant, and worrying enough to 
force the DHSS into action.
The Spastics Society and the National Association for Deaf/Blind 
and Rubella Children (NADBRC) both had an interest in preventing 
CRS. Both were charities established in the 1950s to provide services 
for disabled people. The latter submitted evidence to the Royal Com-
mission’s chapter on ante-natal injury in 1975, arguing for a compensa-
tion scheme similar to that for the thalidomide children and (later) 
vaccine-damaged children.76 Along with the children’s committee of the 
Central Health Services Council, they urged the government to embark 
on a campaign of mass immunisation of young women to improve 
protection against the disease. On the current policy of focusing on 
vaccinating only in schools, it would take until the end of the century 
to fully immunise all females who might go on to bear children.77 The 
DHSS also wanted to increase the population of immune women, but 
there were barriers to mass immunisation. First, the goal of the pro-
gramme was not to eliminate rubella, as was the case with other dis-
eases; it was to prevent pregnant women from becoming infected. Thus, 
Pertussis 165
the target population was only teenage girls and women of child-bearing 
age rather than the entire public. Second, the mass vaccination of all 
females in the target population could exacerbate the problem. Women 
were advised not to get pregnant within three months of receiving the 
vaccine. A mass programme would, of course, vaccinate more women 
– meaning that there was an increased chance of vaccinating pregnant 
or soon-to-be-pregnant women. This would lead to an increase in abor-
tions and/or children born with CRS. Such a risk would have been 
politically damaging both to the reputation of vaccination programmes 
in general and to the government’s electoral chances, given the sensitiv-
ity around the subject of abortion. This was closely related to a third 
problem, the pertussis vaccine crisis. Any attempts to run a mass adver-
tising campaign while doubts had been expressed about other parts of 
the programme and while the DHSS was still uncertain about its pub-
licity efforts was politically challenging.78
As with pertussis, the DHSS took the JCVI’s advice that it should 
intensify the anti-CRS campaign, but that it should do so by getting 
local Area Health Authorities to work with women, rather than through 
a ‘crash’ national campaign.79 Implementation was delayed by the 
general election, but the plans were carried through by the new Thatcher 
administration in June 1979.80 As an interim measure, the government 
tried to ensure that immunisation rates remained as high as possible 
among school girls by distributing information leaflets through the 
Health Education Council in November 1978.81 The DHSS also made 
a concerted effort to target immigrant communities where the rates of 
rubella were known to be higher and potential mothers were much less 
likely to have come through the school system or to have been in contact 
with health services before and during the early stages of pregnancy. 
Advertisements were placed in Urdu, Hindi and Punjabi newspapers 
read by the South Asian diaspora in Britain, urging women to visit their 
local health centre and ask about rubella vaccination.82
These developments came too late for the Spastics Society led by 
General Secretary James Loring. Frustrated at the slow progress made 
by the JCVI and the DHSS, in November 1978 the Society ran its own 
campaign to increase the number of women presenting for vaccination. 
It had been approached by parents worried by recent media coverage 
about the rubella epidemic and increased risk of CRS, and wrote to the 
Minister of State (Health) Roland Moyle to tell him that it would 
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launch a campaign if the DHSS did not already have one planned to 
start soon. It accused the government of ‘gross neglect’.83 Its newspaper 
advert led with the headline ‘Urgent Warning – German Measles can 
damage your unborn baby’, before encouraging women to present for 
testing and possible vaccination.84 Backed by prominent London 
Labour politician Peggy Jay, this form of activism caused frustration for 
the Chief Medical Officer, Sir Henry Yellowlees.
Any campaign by the Spastics Society would be premature and embar-
rassing. … Overworked staff in the Department are trying their best to 
prepare for the extension [to rubella vaccination] … At present, this 
work is being held up while the staff deal with approaches from Mrs 
Peggy Jay and from the Spastics Society to several different parts of the 
Department and now to Ministers.85
Neither the DHSS nor the BMA was concerned about a lack of 
vaccine supply (unless there was an unprecedented surge in demand). 
They were worried about the blood testing service’s ability to cope with 
the screening required before giving women the vaccine.86 Since the 
government planned to begin its own publicity programme over the 
coming months, the Spastics Society’s approach could create a large-
scale advertising campaign that the JCVI had been keen to avoid.87 
There was also a high risk of misinformation. The Society reported a 
positive response to its campaign from family planning centres, with 
requests for reprints of its press advertisements and other material. Yet 
it also received complaints from women who were told by their general 
practitioners that the vaccine was not necessary or were given conflict-
ing advice about how long after vaccination they should avoid preg-
nancy. As with pertussis, the argument was that a lack of education on 
the part of doctors, rather than the public, was an impediment to good 
protection. Loring wrote to the Secretary of State:
It appears that the public when given the facts is willing to act responsi-
bly to protect their health, but this action cannot be successful if doctors 
are not fully aware of the correct procedures and the advice that they 
should be giving.88
The annotations made by a DHSS civil servant on a copy of Loring’s 
letter suggest that some of these criticisms appeared to be out of context. 
Nonetheless, the lack of a harmonised government campaign, including 
education for the public and for medical professionals, appeared to bear 
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out the BMA’s and Yellowlees’ concerns. The risks of CRS needed to 
be managed through central coordination, as the vaccination pro-
gramme included more than simply the availability of vaccine. Organ-
ised public activism of the type being pushed by the Spastics Society 
could, as far as the DHSS was concerned, cause a different set of issues 
around public confidence in the system. It may well have been that the 
only material difference between the Society and the Department was 
over timing;89 but, as the Minister was advised to answer on the radio 
in the event of being asked why the campaign was not launched sooner:
You know, I am beginning to think we are wrong whatever we do. It is, 
for example, the case that, towards the end of last year, the Faculty of 
Community Medicine warned the Department against having a rubella 
vaccination campaign because of the attitude of the public which, at the 
time, was against vaccination generally.90
The epidemic appeared to have brought attention to CRS and 
increased demand for rubella vaccination – but from and for whom? 
The campaign being led by the Spastics Society touched on an area that 
the DHSS was acting upon following advice from the Central Health 
Services Council and the JCVI. For the most part, debate in the medical 
community appears to have focused on how best to improve uptake and 
efficiency of vaccination in women, although some argued that univer-
sal routine childhood vaccination would help to eliminate the disease 
entirely, rather than simply immunising individuals to prevent CRS.91 
NADBRC and the Spastics Society were both what the disability rights 
movement would call traditional charities, often staffed and run by 
middle-class people concerned with the medical aspects of impairment 
rather than with tackling structural inequalities that made discrimina-
tion against disabled people worse.92 Class had shown itself to be a 
factor in rubella immunisation before. Girls in private schools, for 
instance, had been shown to be far less likely to get the vaccine than 
those from state schools.93 Now, one DHSS civil servant wondered, 
were the women writing to the Spastics Society becoming concerned 
because of reports in the Sunday Times? If so, ‘it will be interesting to 
see the response of the “Mail” and “Express” readership’.94
As with vaccine damage, it is striking how relatively few people were 
potentially at risk of disability. In 1975, NADBRC claimed a member-
ship of 424, representing some 196 deaf/blind people.95 Similarly, the 
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APVDC told Lord Pearson that it had amassed 356 cases of serious 
vaccine damage.96 This was not a problem on the scale of poliomyelitis 
in the 1950s or diphtheria in the 1940s. It was about a smaller number 
of people in serious need, made visible by campaigning for expanded 
welfare state provision, and the relative importance of these cases now 
that other serious infectious diseases had been reduced to negligible 
levels. As the state’s duty to protect and care for serious disability 
increased, the need to reduce the risk of the onset of serious impair-
ment also rose. Long-term health problems were becoming the main 
focus of health systems during this period of the twentieth century, and 
the Labour government had given much thought to how preventative 
medicine could reduce the burden on welfare services.97 Vaccination 
had a role to play in this epidemiological transition. Even though the 
DHSS could not provide the Treasury with an exact cost-to-benefit 
figure, from 1971 to 1974 there were, on average, forty-two cases of CRS 
per year and 801 terminations.98 The expanded anti-rubella programme 
was therefore ‘highly desirable … both in terms of the avoidance of 
human suffering and of savings to the health and social services’.99
The rubella vaccination debate might not have become a public crisis 
on the level of pertussis, but it did reflect certain sections of the public 
demanding protection from the government in the form of increased 
vaccination coverage. For financial and moral reasons, the government 
broadly accepted its obligation to manage this risk, although there were 
disagreements about how quickly and to what extent such protection 
should be offered. We must be cautious about arguing that the Spastics 
Society and NADBRC were representative of the general public. They 
did, however, show wider concerns about the role of the government 
and the welfare state in protecting people against the risks of disability 
that were seen in other areas of policy. When we look at the drop in the 
number of CRS cases and terminations, attempts to improve coverage 
did broadly work. In the four years up to the introduction MMR in 
1988, there were an average of twenty-two cases a year and seventy-
three terminations.100
Conclusions
In 1978, Michael Church of the Health Education Council wrote to the 
British Medical Journal calling for ‘an index of health risks, meaningfully 
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related and straightforwardly stated’. Quoting the recent lecture by 
Lord Rothschild on broadcast on BBC1, he proclaimed that ‘there is 
no such thing as a risk-free society’. ‘What we need’ is ‘some guidance 
as to when to flap and when not’.101 Both pertussis and rubella vaccina-
tion policy, however, showed that “flapping” depended on the constitu-
ency and the information available. The risk of vaccine damage to any 
one person in the population may have been slight, but the conse-
quences for the family that became affected were total.102 CRS and 
vaccine damage were small-scale problems in terms of the gross numbers 
affected, but the difficulties faced by those affected compelled the gov-
ernment to demonstrate that it was able to offer protection for these 
groups.
To say that the pertussis vaccine crisis constituted a crisis of faith in 
vaccination is too simplistic. The contemporary campaigns for rubella 
immunisation, as well as the shift in tone of the press towards providing 
adequate levels of whooping cough vaccination demonstrate that the 
vaccination narrative was alive and well. Rather, for a brief period, seg-
ments of the public lost faith in the government’s ability to manage risk. 
Once the safety of the vaccine had been re-asserted and a damage pay-
ments scheme had been promised, immunisation rates began to recover 
and the overall programme was kept intact. The crisis must therefore 
be understood within the wider context of anxieties over the role of the 
welfare state in the late 1970s. The financial crisis had led to political 
debates about what financial protections the state could offer through 
social security, a fully funded health service and so on. Public health 
was not isolated from such matters. Both pertussis and rubella vaccina-
tion were part of the state’s role as protector of the nation’s health both 
from infectious disease and from medical neglect. The DHSS had to 
address the concerns of parents over vaccine damage while providing a 
comprehensive vaccination programme backed by high immunisation 
rates. Collective risks of infectious disease were weighed against the 
individual risks of disability. Throughout, it received conflicting mes-
sages from parliamentarians, different expert groups, medical advisers 
and the public (whose voice was refracted through the press and vol-
untary organisations).
The pertussis crisis is now used as a “lesson from history” by public 
health professionals. It is seen as a good example of how a mature vac-
cination programme in a high-income setting can undergo a loss in 
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public confidence. Similar incidents in Japan, the United States and 
elsewhere have shown how individual vaccines can be doubted at times, 
while national vaccination systems remain largely robust.103 Global 
public health research now monitors and theorises vaccine confidence 
and vaccine hesitancy to try to anticipate and avoid such problems.104 
In the United Kingdom context, the pertussis vaccine crisis became a 
guiding example in the management of a crisis which was not ade-
quately anticipated – MMR.
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As the pertussis crisis faded into memory, it appeared that Britain had 
once again bought into the vaccine narrative. Immunisation rates 
increased over the 1980s, and new vaccines offered the British public 
even greater protection from infectious disease. Parents were well aware 
of the vaccines on offer, and broadly considered these to be safe and 
effective.1 The iconic new public health threat, HIV, did not yet have a 
vaccine; but there was great optimism that one would eventually be 
found.2 Then, in the late 1990s, another crisis threatened to dent con-
fidence yet again. This time, the culprit was another trivalent vaccine 
– MMR. In 1998, Andrew Wakefield and colleagues published a paper 
in the medical journal The Lancet which alleged a possible link between 
MMR and a rare form of autism. While the journal itself took the 
unusual step of printing a repudiation alongside the paper, Wakefield 
used the press conference to launch the edition to claim that MMR was 
dangerous and parents should immediately seek separate measles, 
mumps and rubella vaccines until further safety testing had been com-
pleted. Medical consensus was always against Wakefield and his small 
group of allies – but the controversy made for a great media story. Over 
the following years, uptake of MMR dropped. Multiple studies showed 
that there was no evidence for a link between MMR and autism, and in 
2004 ethical violations and poor research practices were exposed in 
Wakefield’s work. After that point, vaccination rates recovered once 
more. But the crisis has become infamous as an example of how public 
health authorities can struggle in the modern, digital world to over-
come misinformation.
MMR led to a reappraisal of public health researchers’ and practi-
tioners’ approaches to parents who refused vaccination for their 
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children. It had been traditional to reassert the facts, relying on scien-
tific authority and health statistics to prove the worth of vaccination 
and the errors of its opponents. This approach did not die in the early 
years of the twenty-first century, but there was a more concerted effort 
to borrow from the research of those engaging with sociological con-
ceptions of risk and health. Just as new technologies, such as the inter-
net and twenty-four-hour news networks, changed the way that 
members of the public received, consumed and interpreted information 
about health risks, the authorities began to make use of those same 
media to communicate with the public in different ways. By the 2010s, 
the memory of the MMR crisis and similar concerns about the progress 
of vaccination schemes in other countries led researchers not just to 
focus on parents who refused vaccines, but to begin to investigate the 
various trends in society that affected decision making, either pro- or 
anti-vaccine.
This chapter is about the concept of hesitancy within the MMR 
crisis. The concept of hesitancy used by the WHO in the 2010s argues 
that parents’ choices are affected by confidence, convenience and com-
placency.3 As the British experience shows, confidence was rocked by 
reports that MMR might have caused autism in some children. Yet 
major reforms in public health over the 1980s and early 1990s meant 
that vaccination was more convenient than ever for both parents and 
administrators. Similarly, while there had been some complacency 
about whether measles, mumps or rubella were serious diseases, the 
immunisation rates against all three dropped nowhere near as signifi-
cantly as pertussis had done in the 1970s.4 Instead, British parents 
appeared to be unsure about what to do for their children at the turn 
of the millennium. Despite the popular conception of British parents 
during the MMR crisis, they were not, for the most part, anti-vaccine.5 
Average uptake of MMR in England fell from 91.8 per cent in 1996 to 
79.9 per cent in 2004; but it dropped below 80 per cent in only three 
English regions, and rates remained robust elsewhere in the United 
Kingdom (Figure 5.1).6 There was instead a public debate about whether 
MMR was specifically the right vaccine to be giving to children. Poten-
tial alternatives such as separate measles, mumps and rubella vaccines 
offered compromise solutions that were shut down by the government, 
leading to disquiet. To follow the WHO model, parents were hesitant 
primarily because confidence in MMR had been substantially 
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weakened. This chapter examines why that was the case by looking at 
the crisis in the wider historical context of the events discussed else-
where in this book. British public health authorities had engendered 
broad support for vaccination, overcoming apathy, protecting the 
nation from outside threats, sating demand for protection from infec-
tious disease and managing the risks to individuals and the nation as a 
whole. The MMR crisis was significant not because of how widely con-
fidence was dented, but in the depth of the damage done to those who 
were unsure of the best way to protect their children.
First, this chapter explains how MMR came to be used in Britain. 
The trivalent vaccine was part of a number of reforms to health care in 
Britain in the late 1980s. The DHSS was split into two separate depart-
ments, and greater emphasis was placed on preventative health. Better 
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Figure 5.1 Percentage of children receiving first dose of MMR before 24 
months in London, rest of England and Scotland, 1999–2000, 2015–16.
Source: England 1999–2000 to 2004–5: Health and Social Care 
Information Centre, ‘NHS Immunisation Statistics: England, 2004–05’ 
http://content.digital.nhs.uk/catalogue/PUB00176 (accessed 23 August 
2017); England 2006–16: NHS Digital, ‘NHS Immunisation Statistics: 
England, 2015–16’ (London, September 2016). Scotland: Information 
Services Division Scotland, ‘Trends in immunisation uptake by quarter, 
calendar and financial year – Scotland’ (Edinburgh, June 2016).
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practitioners meant that vaccination rates improved significantly over 
this period, giving a greater degree of protection than hitherto enjoyed 
by the British population. Parents were placed under more extensive 
surveillance by local health authorities, allowing better follow-up, more 
convenient appointments and more successful vaccinations. Yet the 
nature of those reforms stored up potential political dilemmas that 
came to the fore during the MMR crisis. The chapter then goes on to 
describe the chronology of the crisis and explain the role of the major 
players. Focusing primarily on the years 1998 to 2004, it shows how 
and why the case against MMR was made by its opponents. This leads 
to a discussion of the main issues of the crisis and just how the MMR–
autism link took hold. In short, it was believable. Faith in medical and 
political authorities in Britain had been rocked by a succession of crises, 
most notable the bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) and variant 
Creutzfeldt-Jackob (vCJD) scare and subsequent investigation into 
what the government knew before the people. There was little concrete 
research into autism’s causes and aetiology, and doubts about vaccine 
safety had been raised in other parts of the world. The government 
responded through traditional educational campaigns, but these did 
little to persuade parents. The chapter details how the government 
launched new websites to speak to the public through “risk communica-
tion”. By outlining various choices and the potential impacts of those 
decisions, the government hoped that it could restore confidence. 
Finally, the chapter shows how public health researchers have used the 
memory of MMR as part of their analyses of how members of the 
public make decisions about vaccination. Rather than focusing solely 
on events where parents show hesitancy, there has been more focus on 
both a lack of and an adequate supply of confidence. It is just as instruc-
tive to ask why, as a nation, we usually do vaccinate our children as why 
we might not.
Vaccination policy in the 1980s
The late 1980s saw a shift in emphasis in vaccination policy, reflecting 
other trends in health care and public health.7 The problems of low 
pertussis vaccine uptake faded over the course of the Thatcher admin-
istration.8 As the decade wore on, the Conservative government looked 
to preventative health care as a way of managing the demands on the 
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health services, the financial costs of health care and lost productivity 
and to emphasise moral values surrounding personal and parental 
responsibility. For public health, the 1987 White Paper Promoting Better 
Health included government plans for how this might be achieved 
UK-wide, bolstered by the publication of the Acheson Report on the 
state of English public health a year later.9 Personal responsibility and 
vaccination featured prominently in the White Paper. Among a list of 
key statistics to show the extent to which public health interventions 
might reduce the burden on other health services, it noted that there 
were 90,000 measles cases in 1986 and over 1,000 hospital admissions. 
Parents who did not present their children for measles vaccination were 
placed implicitly in the same category as people making poor dietary 
choices (‘obesity: a quarter of young people are overweight’), smokers 
(‘100,000 deaths a year … 50 million working days lost … £400 million 
in [NHS] treatment costs’) and drug users (‘the number of addicts 
newly notified in 1986 exceeded 5,000’).10 But while this responsibility 
rhetoric was a key part of managing the risk of measles and its attendant 
economic impacts, the report also recognised the government’s obliga-
tion to make services available for individuals and to promote them 
properly so that people were able to make the “right choices”. Vaccina-
tion was therefore also in the same category as cancer screening – citi-
zens were expected to present themselves for medical surveillance so 
that symptoms could be caught early and treatment outcomes would 
be both more successful and cheaper in the long run.11 These problems 
could be overcome by reforming primary care:
The Government intends positively to encourage family doctors and 
primary health care teams to increase their contribution to the promo-
tion of good health. These professional workers as well as dentists and 
pharmacists are in daily contact with large numbers of the public and 
represent the front line of health care; they are therefore very well placed 
to persuade individuals of the importance of protecting their health; of 
the simple steps needed to do so; and of accepting that prevention is 
indeed better than cure.12
In promoting health, the UK was not acting alone. Increased moni-
toring of health statistics from the 1970s, including the rise of health 
economics and related disciplines, had led to a greater understanding 
of Britain’s place relative to other nations. Global public health was 
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firmly on the political agenda, as reflected in the Alma Ata conference 
and subsequent regional and worldwide programmes run by the WHO 
to achieve ‘Health For All’ by the year 2000.13 International compari-
sons were nothing new. The British government had gathered informa-
tion on the use of smallpox vaccine in other countries when deliberating 
over whether to cease routine vaccination. Similarly, the entry into the 
European Economic Community in the 1970s had led to the use of 
regular comparisons with other member states when considering policy 
on vaccination, vaccine compensation and other areas of DHSS activ-
ity. WHO goals and targets did, however, place a new political impera-
tive to improve certain metrics and increased the overlaps between 
public health and foreign policy.14
The WHO’s goal of 90 per cent immunisation in Europe against 
common childhood diseases was considered to be a challenge, but not 
an impossible one for the British programme.15 Many Area Health 
Authorities had already achieved this by the late 1980s. Yet the national 
average still lagged some way behind, and rates varied between vaccine 
types.16 To incentivise higher uptake, the Department of Health 
announced that it would begin to pay general practitioners a bonus if 
they achieved high vaccination rates in their area. This performance-
related pay was part of a number of changes designed to shift the focus 
of general practice towards preventative medicine and to make primary 
health care run more efficiently, while also reflecting the increased mar-
ketisation within the NHS.17 The new general practitioner contract 
faced significant opposition from the BMA, but Health Secretary 
Kenneth Clarke forced it through in 1990.18 This was linked to the 
economic and social imperatives of what might broadly be called the 
New Right or Thatcherism during the 1980s and early 1990s.19 Mana-
gerialism and the internal market in the NHS were designed to deliver 
efficiency savings and improve quality and choice.20 Similarly, individu-
als partaking in healthy and responsible behaviours would decrease the 
demand on the system, aided by properly incentivised primary health 
care professionals to make those “correct” decisions. Vaccination was 
an ideal public health measure in this context. As Jennifer Stanton has 
argued, vaccines themselves are ‘high-demand, low-cost’ technologies, 
especially for common childhood diseases such as poliomyelitis or 
whooping cough.21 During the late twentieth century they were also 
technologies that could be developed by private pharmaceutical 
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companies with public sector support, creating both supply from profit-
making bodies and demand from public health programmes looking to 
reduce the financial burden of infectious disease.22 But there were limits 
to what health departments would fund, based on the perceived gains 
relative to cost. Stanton shows that in the case of hepatitis B – a rela-
tively rare disease associated with stigmatised groups and behaviours 
such as homosexual men and intravenous drug-taking communities – 
the government was not willing to fund and implement a routine child-
hood vaccination programme in the 1980s.23
Structural reforms to the general practitioner contract could go only 
so far. The other major innovation of the 1980s was the introduction of 
MMR. Measles vaccination had remained low in comparison to other 
countries, including some in the developing world. WHO targets, com-
bined with a sense of embarrassment, led to a change of approach.24 As 
with multivalent vaccines in previous decades – like DTwP – the hope 
was that the vaccine would be easier to administer for health authorities 
and more acceptable to parents because it reduced the number of injec-
tions their children had to endure and the number of trips needed to 
be made to the clinic.25 Experiences in other countries appeared to bear 
this out. Indeed, in the trials in the United Kingdom, uptake had been 
much better than for the single measles vaccine even though partici-
pants had been inconvenienced by asking them to fill out a diary of any 
possible side-effects for three weeks afterwards.26 The vaccine was given 
in two doses, one before the second birthday and the second before the 
child started school. Since around 90 per cent of MMR vaccinations 
confer immunity, two doses gave a 99 per cent chance of success.27
Authorities had reasons to be concerned by all three diseases. 
Measles was explicitly cited in Promoting Better Health because of its 
high morbidity and the number of hospital visits it necessitated. A 
vaccine had been recommended in Britain since 1968.28 However, 
uptake had remained stubbornly low; and while the number of cases 
had dropped from 236,000 in 1968 to 86,000 in 1988, the Department 
of Health wished to go further. This was problematic, as measles is an 
unusually infectious disease. Herd immunity requires a vaccination rate 
upwards of 95 per cent. The disease itself can be relatively mild, result-
ing in a rash and a fever. In some cases symptoms can be much more 
severe, leading to swelling of the inner ear (1 in 11–14 cases) convul-
sions (1 in 200) and even death (1 in 5,000).29 Because there were so 
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many cases of measles per year, even this small percentage led to a high 
number of complications. As discussed in the previous chapter, rubella 
vaccine was used to prevent CRS. Although CRS rates had declined, it 
remained a concern for the Department of Health, which hoped that 
MMR would increase the vaccination rate in females as well as inter-
rupting disease transmission by creating a cohort of immune males.30 
Like measles, CRS was part of the WHO’s immunisation targets.31
The final component, mumps, was not a specific WHO target but 
was still thought to be serious enough to be included in the overall 
programme.32 Mumps could also be a mild disease – many who contract 
it do not realise they have done so – but when it presents it commonly 
results in hospitalisation, accompanied by painful swelling of the glands 
and, in boys, the potential for infertility. Deafness is another possible 
side-effect.33 Uptake of mumps vaccine before MMR was poor, com-
pounded by the perception that mumps was a boys’ disease.34 The tri-
valent vaccine was therefore not simply about reducing the number of 
visits and injections needed to make vaccination more convenient for 
parents. It was designed to increase the immunisation rates against the 
three diseases by protecting boys against rubella, girls against mumps 
and everyone against measles, despite the fact that parents might have 
previously expressed less enthusiasm for one vaccine over another.35
One final element of the changes during the Thatcher and Major 
governments concerns the measurement of vaccination levels. In order 
to remunerate general practitioners properly, authorities needed reli-
able and comparable measures of uptake. Moreover, the Department 
of Health had tried to learn lessons from the pertussis crisis. In 1987, 
Public Health Laboratory Services established Cover of Vaccination 
Evaluated Rapidly (COVER) to produce nation-wide statistics on a 
quarterly basis.36 This replaced other forms of local reporting of vac-
cination numbers which had evolved since before the 1940s (see Part 
I). COVER was supplemented in 1991 by the creation of six-monthly 
surveys of parental knowledge and attitudes towards vaccination.37 
These tools were designed to be able to monitor if vaccination rates were 
dropping and/or if parents were expressing doubts about a particular 
vaccine at any given time. With the pertussis crisis, one of the major 
issues that the vaccine’s opponents had been able to draw upon was the 
relative scarcity of hard evidence that there was no link between brain 
damage and the vaccine at the population level.38 Therefore, research 
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had also begun on new, active monitoring systems for adverse events. 
The existing passive reporting system required general practitioners 
to submit information on possible reactions to vaccines on “yellow 
cards” to the health authorities. These could be unreliable, and tended 
towards under-reporting of incidents and damage to the credibility 
of drug safety administration.39 Increasing computerisation during the 
1980s and 1990s offered the possibility of monitoring indicators such 
as hospital admissions for certain conditions in children of specific ages 
and mapping these onto vaccination coverage in a particular area.40
Despite these top-down reforms in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
the government did not simply impose vaccination on the population 
from above. As in the 1970s, it was clear that the vaccine narrative was 
broadly accepted and uptake was relatively high as compared to previ-
ous decades, albeit with the same problems of local variation as before. 
Vaccination had proved its worth. It had eradicated smallpox world-
wide, and once-common childhood diseases had been virtually elimi-
nated in high-income countries. All of these issues reflected the topics 
covered in previous chapters of this book. If apathy was a product of 
low engagement, the inconvenience for parents and lack of access to 
vaccines, then incentive payments and combination vaccines were 
designed to prompt local doctors to solve these issues.41 The protection 
of the nation was to come not simply through vaccinating the popula-
tion, but from regional cooperation with other European countries 
through the WHO.42 The popularity of the MMR vaccine in the trial 
areas appeared to show demand for this new technology from some 
constituencies – in any event, increased surveillance and monitoring of 
parents would ensure compliance. All of this, however, was refracted 
through the lens of risk: the risk to the state of the costs and burdens 
of infectious disease, and the outlining of personal responsibility for 
ensuring that risky behaviours did not put the nation’s health or finances 
at risk. Official and public confidence in the vaccine rested on whether 
it would be convenient for parents, protect children from disease and 
be more cost-effective than the public health measures that had pre-
ceded it.
The MMR crisis
These developments improved vaccination rates. It was now easier for 
local authorities to monitor and follow up on parents of unvaccinated 
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children, and doctors had a direct financial incentive to do so. The single 
vaccine, given in two doses, was also much more convenient. However, 
this system still required parents to choose to vaccinate. This caused 
problems during the MMR crisis itself. For while there was little counter 
information or other options available to parents, there was only one 
obvious choice. When the MMR–autism link became more widely 
talked about and an alternative action was considered possible – sepa-
rate vaccinations – choice became a major issue. The rise of the rhetoric 
around choice and growing health consumerism meant that citizens 
were more likely to seek out and demand alternative forms of care.43 
This was compounded by the fact that the political context of the late 
1990s and early 2000s made the claims of anti-government voices 
sound credible. It was because of this that confidence could be damaged 
and parents could become more hesitant.
For public health professionals and researchers, the MMR crisis 
refers to the period in which significant doubt was expressed over 
MMR’s safety, leading to a drop in immunisation rates. While this 
decline was not as striking as it had been over the pertussis scandal in 
the 1970s, the level of coverage devoted to MMR in popular media, 
coupled with the circulation of vaccine-sceptic information through 
growing internet usage meant that convincing the public of the vac-
cine’s safety was a much more difficult task. Most accounts of the crisis 
place its beginnings in the Lancet paper published by Wakefield and 
colleagues in 1998. This acts as a useful starting point for tracing the 
public debate about MMR, particularly in the popular and medical 
press. The most intense period of press activity began around 2001 
(Figure 5.2).44 By late 2004, the main crisis was over. Brian Deer’s 
exposés were published in this year, and ten of the twelve co-authors of 
the Wakefield Lancet paper retracted their conclusions.45 However, as 
with all historical periodisations, we should be aware that concerns with 
MMR permeate these clean boundaries. Immunisation rates had been 
falling for a couple of years before 1998, and Wakefield’s research (as 
detailed below) exposed a number of concerns in a minority of parents, 
rather than simply appearing ex nihilo. Similarly, quoting an end date 
for the crisis is complicated by the fact that many of the debates of that 
time continued to be felt among some communities in the United 
Kingdom and elsewhere in the world.46
It is therefore worth briefly exploring this timeline. Wakefield was 
the key figure for MMR sceptics. A clinical researcher working at the 
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Royal Free Hospital, University College London, he and his team had 
studied a particular form of autism which was associated with problems 
in the gut. The 1998 paper described this syndrome in twelve children, 
but also claimed a temporal link with the onset of their symptoms and 
MMR. While the article itself made it clear that the authors ‘did not 
prove an association between measles, mumps, and rubella vaccine and 
the syndrome described’, Wakefield himself was far less reserved.47 At a 
press conference organised by The Lancet at the Royal Free Hospital to 
explain the paper and its wider context, Wakefield declared MMR to be 
dangerous and asserted that it would be safer to give separate vaccines 
until more was known about its effects. The media covered this as a 
potential medical scandal, but there were clear reservations.48 The 
authors had failed to prove an association, as the critical commentary 
printed alongside the paper in The Lancet had argued.49 And while the 
volume of newspaper stories on MMR for 1998 compared to subse-


















































Figure 5.2 Mentions of MMR in major daily newspapers, 1996–2016.
Source: Search for string ‘MMR’ in ProQuest European Newsstream on 
selected newspapers. Newspapers chosen were major dailies in the database 
with full text searchable from 1 January 1996 onwards: The Times, Daily 
Mirror, Independent, Guardian and Sun (accessed via Senate House Library, 
University of London, 28 June 2017).
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significant in itself (Figure 5.2), it provided the basis for debate in the 
medical and popular press. The tabloid press was more sensationalist 
than the broadsheets, as might be expected. In particular, the Sun, Daily 
Mail and Daily Express gave the matter significant coverage – in the case 
of the latter two even after most had accepted that the MMR–autism 
link was unfounded.50
While co-authors John Walker-Smith and Simon Murch both con-
tinued to claim that MMR was still safe and recommended parents to 
vaccinate their children, Wakefield was more strident in his opposi-
tion.51 In December 2000 he and Scott Montgomery published a cri-
tique of the testing procedures for the vaccine during its initial licensing 
stage.52 The national media gave this new paper a new round of atten-
tion. To assuage doubts and combat declining vaccination rates, the 
Department of Health began a publicity campaign for MMR in January 
2001.53 In the meantime, epidemiological and public health studies 
continued to find no evidence of a link between MMR and autism.54 
It was in early 2002 that the crisis reached its peak, however. Over 
Christmas 2001 and the New Year, Prime Minister Tony Blair refused 
to answer questions from Members of Parliament or journalists about 
whether his young son Leo had received the vaccine.55 The BBC’s Pano-
rama documentary series publicised the work of MMR-sceptic John 
O'Leary on 3 February 2002.56 While it too did not prove an autism 
link, the media seized upon the story. Vaccination rates continued to 
drop, and measles cases were on the rise, including an outbreak in 
London.57 The drip of newspaper articles questioning MMR became 
a flood, with the bulk of the torrent coming in February 2002. The 
government was again forced into a defensive campaign to restore faith 
in MMR.58
While the crisis rumbled on over 2003, newspaper mentions of 
MMR declined. Parents of autistic children had begun legal proceed-
ings against the Department of Health, claiming that MMR had caused 
their children’s conditions. Initially it had secured legal aid, but in Sep-
tember 2003 the Legal Services Commission withdrew its support. The 
weight of evidence suggested very little chance of success.59 For the 
most part, the mainstream debate ended in 2004 following the work of 
investigative reporter Brian Deer. He had returned to the original 1998 
Lancet paper to reassess Wakefield and colleagues’ claims about the 
twelve children. He uncovered a number of issues which called into 
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question the integrity of the researchers and the scientific validity of 
their findings. The claims included: that ethics approval had not been 
given for some procedures (such as lumbar punctures and colonosco-
pies); that ethics approval had been sought for a different project to the 
one eventually carried out; that there was bias in the selection of cases 
for the study (including accusation that Wakefield had paid children for 
blood samples at a birthday party); that legal aid funding had been used 
for supposedly independent research; and that findings were used for 
legal cases prior to peer review and publication.60 When these claims 
were aired in a Channel 4 Dispatches documentary and printed as a 
series of exposés in the Sunday Times, Wakefield’s credibility was 
destroyed. Ten of the paper’s twelve co-authors retracted their conclu-
sions, stating:
We wish to make it clear that in this paper no causal link was estab-
lished between MMR vaccine and autism as the data were insufficient. 
However, the possibility of such a link was raised and consequent 
events have had major implications for public health. In view of this, 
we consider now is the appropriate time that we should together for-
mally retract the interpretation placed upon these findings in the paper, 
according to precedent.61
Declining confidence
It is overly simplistic to attribute the MMR crisis solely to the Lancet 
paper. However, the debate it sparked raised a number of issues about 
the vaccine and vaccination that were difficult for the government to 
counter effectively. It was the interplay between these that chipped 
away at the public’s confidence. It is worth highlighting five of these 
issues. First, autism rates had been increasing for some years with no 
definitive explanation. Second, Japan had banned MMR on safety 
grounds, leading to questions about the reliability of the UK’s safety 
testing procedures. Third, the quality of the government’s medical 
advice and the role of the medical profession were complicated further 
by other scandals reported at the same time as MMR, such as “mad cow 
disease” (BSE). Fourth, the changes to the general practitioner contract 
led to a debate over whether doctors were recommending MMR for the 
money or because they genuinely believed that it was in their patients’ 
best interests. Fifth, and finally, the apparent compromise position of 
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administering separate measles, mumps and rubella vaccinations was 
attractive to parents but was denied out of hand by the government. 
These interrelated debates meant that the British public had every 
reason to be sceptical about MMR.
The first major issue, and the one with the longest life beyond the 
crisis, was the alleged link between MMR and autism. Autism, like 
brain damage in the pertussis crisis, was seen as the main potential 
hazard of MMR. Wakefield’s work centred on establishing a connection 
between the two, while the majority of scientific evidence presented in 
favour of MMR mobilised to show that there was no provable statistical 
correlation.62 One of the reasons why this debate was so potent was 
because so little was known about autism around the turn of the mil-
lennium. Even if there was no evidence of a link between MMR and the 
syndrome, there were also no clear answers about what did cause it. It 
was common knowledge that autism diagnoses had increased signifi-
cantly over the previous twenty years. For concerned members of the 
public, any explanation was worth exploring. The Daily Mail was par-
ticularly interested in these questions.63 ‘It would be a gross insult to the 
intelligence of … parents’, wrote David Goldberg, a doctor and the 
father of an autistic son, ‘if their collective view was explained as an 
emotional response to media hyperbole.’64 Parents of autistic children 
were a key part of Wakefield’s campaign against the vaccine, just as 
parents of children damaged by the pertussis vaccine had been key to 
the 1970s campaign. The mother of an autistic child, Jackie Fletcher, 
had founded the group Justice Awareness and Basic Support ( JABS) in 
the mid-1990s.65 Fletcher eventually won vaccine damage payments for 
her son, albeit for severe epilepsy rather than autism.66 The group was 
much more overtly anti-vaccine than the APVDC, and made use of the 
visibility afforded by the internet to spread their message directly 
(through their website) and indirectly (through responses in the 
press).67 It and the Society for the Autistically Handicapped were 
involved in litigation against the Department of Health, and success-
fully secured legal aid to help them with the case.68 For parents weighing 
up the risks of vaccination, the publicity given to the possibility of 
autism had an impact on their decision.
Although the weight of scientific evidence of MMR’s safety eventu-
ally resulted in the withdrawal of legal aid funding in 2003, the existence 
of the case contributed to the debate’s credibility.69 Other evidence 
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further complicated this picture. Concerns had been raised about 
MMR’s safety before. In Japan, MMR was withdrawn completely 
because the mumps component produced a higher-than-acceptable 
risk of meningitis. Britain responded to concerns about the Urabe strain 
of mumps vaccine by replacing it entirely with the more expensive but 
safer Jeryll-Lynn strain. Most other nations did likewise. In Japan, 
however, legislation meant that its public health system could use only 
Japanese-made vaccine. The vaccine had been withdrawn not because 
it was dangerous per se, but because no Japanese manufacturer was yet 
able to produce it.70 To supporters of vaccination, this proved how 
robust testing systems were. It had caught a potential problem early, and 
the increased rate of measles in Japan following the withdrawal showed 
that the vaccine was effective.71 To critics, it showed that even in a 
modern advanced nation potentially dangerous medications could slip 
through the cracks. Wakefield was keen to emphasise this point.72 
Again, however, medical consensus supported the testing procedure. 
Adverse Drug Reactions and Toxicological Reviews took the unusual step 
of publishing Wakefield and Montgomery’s article alongside the peer 
review reports, emphasising the journal’s support for freedom of scien-
tific expression, but also its reservations about the legitimacy of Wake-
field and Montgomery’s conclusions.73 Still, given the lack of information 
on autism and the Japanese withdrawal of the vaccine, the possibility 
of MMR being dangerous remained plausible. The British government 
said that it wanted to protect the nation from infectious disease – but 
was it capable of doing so?
For the public this was not the first time in recent memory that 
medical professionals had been wrong, had withheld information or 
had actively attempted to deceive. Just as the pertussis crisis occurred 
in the shadow of thalidomide, the BSE and vCJD scandal loomed 
heavily over discussions of MMR. As Tammy Speers and Justin Lewis 
have argued, it also served as a narrative framing for press coverage and 
public understanding of the crisis.74 Even in the medical press, it was 
acknowledged that the fall-out of the BSE crisis meant that medical 
experts could not be seen to dismiss criticism of MMR out of hand.75 
Nevertheless, this was not the only example of government and medical 
establishment incompetence. In a 2003 study of the role of the media 
in attitudes towards science, 24 per cent said that their ‘trust in science’ 
had decreased as a result of BSE, the most-quoted single reason.76 As 
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the autism lawsuit was building up, the victims of contaminated blood 
transfusions won their case against the Department of Health, using 
legal aid.77 The reports of the inquiries into the Bristol heart scandal (in 
which a number of children had died unnecessarily due to a poorly 
staffed hospital department) and the Alder Hey scandal (where dead 
children’s organs had been retained without parental consent) were also 
published at this time.78 Trust was dented both in whether doctors 
could be believed in and whether, even if they were not trying to 
deceive, they were capable of finding the truth. In an article in the 
British Medical Journal radio journalist Sharon Alcock described a pro-
gramme she had made with the Warburton family in 2002. The War-
burtons were chosen as a “typical” family who were unsure about 
whether or not to vaccinate their children. The parents debated the 
issues surrounding MMR throughout the week with selected “experts”, 
before declaring their decision on the Friday. The BSE issue had left the 
family feeling especially sceptical.79
While there were clearly reasons to distrust the official government 
line, confidence in general practitioners had also been shaken. It was 
well established that patients and parents were more predisposed to 
trust medical advice from general practitioners than from government 
advertising or other sources of information.80 As we saw with the cam-
paigns of the 1940s and 1950s, the government had long emphasised 
the role of face-to-face contact with medical professionals in convinc-
ing parents to have their children vaccinated. Changes to the NHS 
contract, however, meant that GPs now had a direct financial incentive 
to convince parents to accept MMR. The Warburtons found the rela-
tionship between GPs, money and the government problematic. ‘They 
couldn’t really decide where to draw the lines between government and 
medical professionals’ advice,’ wrote Alcock. ‘They wanted to trust their 
doctor and health visitor, but felt they were being spun a political line.’ 
The government had made vaccination policy decisions based on cost-
benefit analyses before, notably over hepatitis B.81 One correspondent 
to the British Medical Journal argued that there was an inherent con-
flict between offering the patient choice and following government 
evidence and guidelines.82 Doctors insisted that they supported MMR 
regardless, and that the financial payments were simply to formalise 
actions that ought to be taken anyway.83 Such was the strength of feeling 
on this point that the BMA recommended that performance-related 
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pay on vaccination should be abandoned.84 By the time the new general 
practitioner contract was rolled out in 2004, other priorities had arisen 
and worries over MMR had faded.85 The concern was not that doctors 
would favour cash over patient safety; indeed, since vaccination was an 
epidemiologically proven preventative health measure, it was clearly in 
both the doctor’s and child’s best interests. Rather, it was that physi-
cians could be perceived to be compromised in their decision making. 
Certain sections of the public health profession, therefore, understood 
that building trust was also an exercise in presentation as well as hard 
numbers.
When taken together, there were clear reasons for parents to be cau-
tious about MMR. For those worried both about the vaccine and about 
infectious disease, however, Wakefield had offered a solution. At the 
press conference to announce the 1998 Lancet paper, he had urged 
parents to seek out separate measles, mumps and rubella vaccines so as 
to reduce the risks to the child. As with the pertussis crisis and com-
pensation, this appeared to be a compromise position between two 
entrenched viewpoints. It was known from a study in the United States 
that parents were more willing to take risks with errors of omission (i.e. 
the risks associated with not vaccinating) than with errors of commis-
sion (i.e. the risk that something could go wrong with their active deci-
sion to vaccinate).86 Helen Bedford, a researcher into child health, 
lamented that ‘natural infection is somehow thought of as being out of 
our control, but immunisation is something that parents have to decide 
to take up, so they feel more responsible’. One of the more-strident 
critics of Wakefield, a London GP and the father of an autistic son, 
Michael Fitzpatrick, also placed this debate in political context. The 
New Labour government had championed choice in public services, 
including health care.87 While this was designed to begin to equalise the 
doctor–patient relationship, improve satisfaction and improve out-
comes, vaccination was, paradoxically, an area in which the government 
offered very little choice.88 It could not countenance separate vaccines. 
No individual immunisations were licensed for use in the United 
Kingdom – and, as the government repeatedly stated, no country which 
used MMR offered separate vaccines.89 There was no evidence that the 
individual immunisations were safer. Indeed, pre-MMR experience in 
Britain suggested the opposite. Since child vaccination rates against the 
three diseases were lower before the trivalent vaccine became available, 
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separate vaccines (on the population level at least) placed the public at 
greater risk of infection.90
Again, while this was epidemiologically justifiable, it appeared to 
some to be too draconian. Private clinics began to offer separate vac-
cinations to concerned parents, drawing the ire of the Department of 
Health.91 Separate vaccines were strictly forbidden on the NHS, and 
individual doses were technically not licensed for use in the United 
Kingdom. General practitioner Peter Mansfield offered this service to 
his patients through his private practice, leading the Director of Public 
Health in Worcestershire to refer him to the General Medical Council.92 
The case was eventually dropped, but the apparent lack of flexibility on 
the part of the government made some parents suspicious. The Daily 
Mail, a notable critic of the government throughout the crisis, pub-
lished a series of letters about the decision. One nurse ‘fully support[ed]’ 
the ‘right to choose’ of the parents of her grandchildren. Another ques-
tioned whether this was a matter for the General Medical Council, 
which was surely ‘supposed to be saving us from the Dr Shipmans93 of 
this world not stopping us having the treatment that’s right for us’. Many 
emphasised the choice element, concluding that it was better for chil-
dren to get some protection through unconventional practice than 
receive no vaccination at all.94 Back at Alcock’s radio programme, the 
Warburtons were especially puzzled on this point. Having spoken to 
the “experts” in the BBC programme – including Wakefield and Mans-
field – they opted for the separate vaccines. The head of the Public 
Health Laboratory Service, Elizabeth Miller, and Scope (previously 
called the Spastics Society) had convinced them that measles, mumps 
and rubella were dangerous and that vaccination would protect their 
child. But they still questioned whether MMR was the right solution. 
They told the BBC that their decision to vaccinate would have been 
much easier if separate injections were available on the NHS.95
Risk communication
As vaccination rates continued to decline and press interest remained, 
the government made attempts to re-establish confidence in MMR. 
The scientific position was much clearer than it had been with the per-
tussis crisis, and so the Department was quicker to begin a new public-
ity campaign. While some funds were directed into increased research 
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in autism to build a body of evidence for other causes for the syndrome, 
£3 million was set aside in 2001 to educate parents.96 At the launch, 
Chief Medical Officer Liam Donaldson declared that ‘on each occasion 
that these scares have been raised they have been thoroughly examined 
and on each occasion MMR has been given a clean bill of health’.97 Yet 
it appeared to have little impact. The government was forced to re-
launch the campaign in 2002 in the wake of yet more negative publicity, 
mostly stemming from the BBC Panorama documentary and Tony 
Blair’s refusal to confirm his son Leo’s vaccination status.98 This was 
mainly an attempt to draw media attention to the campaign rather than 
a major change in tack, although it is clear that risk communication 
took a more central role from this point forward. Authorities had been 
accused of taking a ‘patronising, high-handed and arrogant’ approach 
to parents.99 The medical press also criticised public health authorities’ 
responses.100 While organisations from the BMA to the Scottish Gov-
ernment produced guidance and reports on MMR and its safety, 
nothing appeared to be working.101 The approach of giving information 
and answering questions was not enough on its own, as Richard Horton, 
editor of The Lancet later noted:
Wider public trust is best fostered neither by referring to abstract evi-
dence alone nor by official pronouncements of reassurance, but by 
explaining face-to-face in transparent, human, even anecdotal terms with 
personal stories, why a particular course of action is being advocated.
Persuading the public to support vaccination is not only a matter of 
winning an argument. It is also about understanding the reasons why 
parents are and are not inclined to take their children for immunisation. 
The complexity of this decision demands a more nuanced response from 
the public-health community than it has so far received.102
In searching for alternative approaches, social science work on deci-
sion making and risk began to gain traction with public health profes-
sionals. This built on the growing professionalisation of health 
education, beginning in the 1980s.103 The Medical Research and Eco-
nomic and Social Research Councils funded a study into how the recent 
body of scholarly work on risk could help in public health. As the lead 
researchers noted, the education and persuasion approach:
assumes that the target audience is made up of individuals who rationally 
review evidence to identify and choose the best course of action – that 
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is, the one that will maximise health benefit. There is little evidence that 
these approaches have made a major impact, despite the investment 
in health promotion and public health targeted in particular ‘at risk’ 
groups.104
The authors identified five aspects that affected how publics receive 
public health messages. First, the extent to which the source of the 
information is trusted; second, ‘the relevance of the information to 
everyday life’; third, ‘the relation to other perceived risks’; fourth, ‘the 
fit with previous knowledge and experience’; and fifth ‘the difficulty and 
importance of the choices and decisions’. The authors were critical of 
medical authorities that had appeared slow to incorporate this approach 
into their attempts to change population behaviours.105 In some ways 
this was justified. The government publicity campaign had been a tra-
ditional advertising affair, with regular pronouncements about the 
safety of the vaccine, backed by epidemiological studies. As the Alcock 
documentary demonstrated, however, there was a perception that “the 
Lady doth protest too much”:
Halfway through their journey, Darren and Carol [Warburton] said that 
the more insistent the government became, the more they distrusted its 
advice. So when Professor Liam Donaldson called a press conference to 
endorse MMR, flanked by the great and the good of the medical world, 
it was the last straw. If more measles outbreaks are to be avoided, parents 
have to feel as though the medical profession isn’t pulling rank and dis-
missing their concerns.106
The Department of Health was acutely aware of criticisms. At the time 
of the 2002 relaunch, a spokesman explained that research had shown 
how anxious parents were, and so the government had continued to 
focus on facts and ‘the message’ of ‘individual choice’.107 But it could do 
more to communicate risk in the way advocated by contemporary 
researchers.
One way of doing this in a less ‘highhanded’ way was to make use of 
growing access to the internet. According to World Bank statistics, web 
usage among Britons increased dramatically in the early years of the 
twenty-first century. The United Kingdom had a number of internet 
users broadly comparable to the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development average, but significantly behind the 
United States, in the late 1990s. In 2001, 33.4 per cent of the UK 
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population was online, compared to 49.1 for the United States. By 2003, 
Britain had overtaken the United States.108 Public health professionals 
noted how the internet had changed their interactions with certain sec-
tions of the public. Patients appeared to be armed with more knowledge 
– albeit the quality and relevance of this knowledge was contested – and 
the volume of vaccine-sceptic data available to parents raised questions 
that professionals found it difficult to answer without preparation.109 
Parents have always sought and received information from sources 
other than the government and medical professionals. Folk knowledge, 
self-care guides and informal networks had existed for centuries, and 
continued to do so even as the power of biomedicine increased.110 What 
was different was the amount of information and the speed at which it 
could be delivered through this new communication network. Anti-
MMR campaigners had used the internet to deliver previously obscure 
academic journal papers to journalists to help fuel the evidence for their 
cause and keep the debate in the popular press.111 While we must be 
careful not to overstate the reach of the web – only 5 per cent of 
respondents in a 2003 study said that they got their science news mainly 
from the internet – this was undoubtedly a new issue for public health 
professionals to deal with.112 It also offered a platform for solutions.
The government therefore sought to inform the public and commu-
nicate the risks and benefits of MMR through a new website called 
‘MMR The Facts’.113 Hosted on the nhs.uk domain, it used an interactive 
map feature to show how MMR was used safely across the world. Brit-
ain’s place as a modern nation in a global public health network was an 
important selling point. According to NHS information, only less-
developed and obscure nations did not trust MMR. The map also pro-
vided ample statistics on MMR usage in different countries, and how 
many cases statistical modelling estimated could be prevented if non-
adopting nations were to use the vaccine.114 This type of risk communi-
cation extended to the ‘myths and truths’ section of the site, which used 
WHO data and published papers to dispel the ‘Top 10 Myths about 
MMR’.115 The main content of these static pages did not change over the 
course of the crisis. However, there was an element of interactivity in 
the ‘Your questions answered’ section. Site users could fill in a form, 
and a team of experts at the NHS would reply. The top questions were 
kept on the main ‘questions’ page. The Internet Archive has captured 
around forty of these questions, covering a wide range of topics from 
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specific enquiries about personal circumstances to broader requests for 
more data on vaccination and autism.116 Although it was clearly curated 
and mediated through the form of the website, this did at least represent 
an attempt by central government to speak directly to parents on issues 
about vaccination in the same medium through which they consumed 
other information about health decisions.
However, it was not just parents who needed access to reliable infor-
mation. Researchers had found that many health workers’ knowledge 
about MMR was poor. For example, many did not understand the 
reasons for the second dose, believing it to be a booster to the first dose 
rather than an important element in ensuring herd immunity.117 NHS 
staff themselves acknowledged that it was difficult when presented with 
vaccine-sceptic material for the first time to respond to parents in a 
meaningful and reassuring way.118 And, as members of the public, 
medical professionals were affected by the scares too. Very few were 
experts in immunology, and clear information was difficult to obtain.119 
The government’s main advice to practitioners, the ‘Green Book’ on 
immunisation, was a rather weighty document and could not be readily 
updated to reflect the ever-changing field of vaccination science and 
public debate. In Scotland, specific information was sent to general 
practitioners in ‘discussion packs’ so that they could speak to parents 
and ‘explore related concerns together’.120 In England, the Department 
of Health set up a sister site to ‘MMR The Facts’ to include up-to-date 
information on MMR and all the other childhood immunisations. The 
MMR section included a succinct explanation of why the government 
refuted the paper by Wakefield and colleagues, what extant literature 
there was on the link with autism and the statistical details on why the 
risks of not vaccinating far outweighed the risks of MMR. It then made 
the political case, refuting suggestions that it was simply looking to cut 
costs, “bully” parents or deny people choice. It concluded by setting out 
the moral case for the vaccine:
There is no doubt that parents always face real dilemmas when it comes 
to protecting their children’s health. All want to do what is right by their 
children. … However, it is the Government’s responsibility to ensure 
that the care and treatment it makes available is the best possible. … All 
the experts advise that MMR is the safest and best option and that single 
vaccines are definitely second best. For this fundamental reason, the 
Government does not support the use of separate vaccines.121
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Talking about risks was by no means new. In the 1940s the govern-
ment’s main defence of diphtheria immunisation was that children were 
twenty times more likely to die of diphtheria if they were not immu-
nised.122 But the focus on risk communication in this way was a product 
of its time. The growing popularity of risk as a category of sociological 
analysis was born out of and in turn influenced the rhetoric around 
health and society at the turn of the millennium.123 The venue for the 
communication outlined here, the World Wide Web, was certainly new, 
reflecting the growing access to the technology and its increasing influ-
ence on parents’ decision making. The major turning point in the MMR 
narrative, however, was the detective work and subsequent publications 
of Brian Deer, the freelance investigative journalist. He published 
damning reports on Wakefield and his work in the Sunday Times, British 
Medical Journal and Channel 4’s Dispatches documentary series. After 
this point, the public debate on the MMR–autism link appeared to be 
relatively settled. While some publications, including the Daily Mail 
and the satirical/investigative magazine Private Eye, ran pieces ques-
tioning this new consensus, the number of references to the subject 
dropped significantly in both the medical and popular press (see Figure 
5.2).124 It was also after this point that MMR vaccination began to 
recover to pre-crisis levels.
Conclusion
While the MMR vaccination rate dropped across Britain until 2004, 
the Department of Health saw nothing like the extremes experienced 
with pertussis. There, rates fell from 79 per cent to 37 per cent in three 
years.125 With MMR, uptake in England fell from 92 per cent in 1996 to 
80 per cent in 2004. Based on the aetiology of measles and the expecta-
tions and successes of the WHO and Department of Health over the 
early 1990s, this was a public health problem; but in historical context, 
it was relatively mild. Figure 5.3 shows that measles notifications did 
indeed increase, but the aggregate number of cases remained moder-
ate by 1980s standards. In Scotland, MMR uptake remained above 
87 per cent throughout the crisis. Indeed, when London is factored 
out of the national figures for England, it is clear that regional varia-
tion remained part of the story of vaccination rates in British public 
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health (see Figure 5.1). It was also evident that the public had not lost 
its faith in vaccination. The clamour for the separate vaccines, even in 
MMR-sceptic newspapers such as the Daily Mail, indicated that even 
parents who wanted to avoid the trivalent vaccine were willing to go to 
great lengths to ensure that their children remained protected against 
infectious disease. However, outbreaks of measles in London at the 
time of the crisis, and in Swansea in 2012, showed that even these 
relatively small changes could have disastrous consequences.126 In the 
latter case, the fear of MMR had largely dissipated, but many parents 
had not taken steps in the years following the crisis to ensure that 
their children were protected. Much like with the smallpox outbreaks 
seen in Chapter 2, there was a lingering problem for public health 
authorities in convincing parents to use vaccination as a preventative 
rather than epidemic control tool. As a result, when measles broke 












































1968 – Measles vaccine introduced
1988 – MMR introduced
Figure 5.3 Notifications of measles in England and Wales, 1940–2015. 
Logarithmic scale.
Source: Public Health England, ‘Measles notifications and deaths in England 
and Wales: 1940 to 2016’, www.gov.uk/government/publications/measles-
deaths-by-age-group-from-1980-to-2013-ons-data/measles-notifications-and-
deaths-in-england-and-wales-1940-to-2013 (accessed 2 August 2017).
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queues outside doctors’ offices as parents sought to have their children 
vaccinated.127
MMR, then, lives on. It is a cautionary tale for public health workers, 
just as the generation fighting the crisis at the time looked back on 
pertussis.128 As the rise in online anti-vaccination activity and growing 
mistrust of political authorities threaten once again to reduce uptake 
of vaccination among certain groups, the MMR crisis is held up as 
an example of how people can be misled by misinformation and 
how public health professionals must remain ever vigilant.129 It even 
formed part of the 2011–12 Leveson Inquiry into the conduct of the 
press.130
Public health researchers’ concerns have changed since the begin-
ning of the century. MMR is not simply being used here, therefore, as 
a lesson from history from which direct predictions of future action can 
be gleaned.131 Vaccine crises in other countries led the WHO and the 
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization to create a Strategic 
Advisory Group of Experts (SAGE) to investigate how such drops in 
confidence could be avoided in the future. In some countries, progress 
towards world vaccination goals had stalled. In high-income countries, 
pockets of non-vaccinators caused health authorities to worry about 
high-risk, geographically concentrated areas with poor herd immu-
nity.132 SAGE identified that the main reason for these problems was 
vaccine hesitancy. The MMR crisis in the United Kingdom and subse-
quent debates in other high-income countries formed part of this analy-
sis – especially the difficulties around convincing populations to take 
the vaccine against the swine flu H1N1 virus.133
Yet hesitancy as a concept grew out of changing ways of seeing non-
vaccinators in the wake of MMR and emphases on risk communication 
in the previous decade. As Heidi Larson’s work showed, few parents are 
completely pro- or anti-vaccine; rather, their attitudes towards specific 
vaccines at specific times can be changed. By focusing solely on indi-
viduals when they become a problem for public health authorities, this 
fluid state can be obscured.134 This is a story borne out by the history 
of vaccination in Britain since the Second World War. Parents did not 
abandon or adopt vaccination as a technology wholesale. Enthusiasm 
for diphtheria immunisations waxed and waned over the 1940s. Small-
pox vaccination was embraced as a form of epidemic control, but 
treated with indifference by the majority of the population in the 1950s 
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and 1960s. Polio vaccine was hailed a modern marvel; and yet both the 
government and the public had an awkward relationship with it until 
the oral vaccine became widely available. And even at the height of the 
pertussis vaccine crisis, immunisation rates for other diseases remained 
relatively robust.
While this chapter has used the language and framework of hesi-
tancy, this concept has been developed by researchers for investigating 
present-day public health problems. It must be historicised. It is itself 
born out of the historical period covering MMR. Convenience did not 
appear to be a great issue. The reforms to the general practitioner con-
tract and the introduction of MMR meant that access to the vaccine 
was straightforward, and there were incentives throughout the system 
for following up on defaulters. While there were still issues of monitor-
ing and access in some inner-city areas and amongst some popula-
tions,135 public health officials did not face the same hurdles as those 
explored in the first section of this book. Confidence was a different 
matter. Declining trust in state authorities meant that anti-government 
voices carried an air of legitimacy. With a hostile press, the growth of 
twenty-four-hour news channels and increasing access to the internet, 
some parents’ confidence shifted towards other sources of expertise.136 
Contemporaries also pointed to increased complacency and the idea 
that vaccination had, ironically, become a victim of its own success. As 
the threat of measles and other infectious diseases receded (Figure 5.3), 
some parents became less motivated to seek out vaccination, or felt that 
they could afford to wait and try out alternative vaccines and vaccina-
tion schedules.137 This was, in some ways, the language of apathy recon-
stituted in a different era – albeit one that was more grounded in the 
sociology of risk and wider qualitative studies of parental attitudes 
through surveys and systematic literature reviews.
This is not to say that qualitative investigations into the issues sur-
rounding hesitancy had not been conducted before the crisis and its 
aftermath. Questions about parental attitudes were being asked of per-
tussis vaccine and MMR going back to at least the 1980s.138 The ways 
in which they are now being used to explain and measure vaccine con-
fidence as an indicator is, however, historically intriguing.139 SAGE has 
done so through breaking hesitancy into three constituent parts: con-
fidence in a vaccine and vaccination authorities; convenience of access 
to vaccination; and complacency about the risks of inaction.140 What 
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history shows is that confidence, convenience and complacency have 
manifested in different ways at different times. They have not been 
universal, either within populations or across all types of vaccine. More-
over, the fact that imperfect levels of these three qualities have still 
resulted in the general public following government guidelines says 
much about how well established and accepted vaccination was in the 
post-war period.
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Conclusion
When the National Health Service Acts were passed in 1946 and 1947, 
two vaccines were part of the routine infant vaccination schedule. By 
2018 these had increased to seventeen.1 Ninety-four per cent of children 
received the pentavalent diphtheria-tetanus-acellular-pertussis, polio-
myelitis and haemophilus influenza type b vaccine before their first 
birthdays in England and Wales in 2014–15.2 Polio is no longer endemic 
in Britain and has nearly been eradicated worldwide. There were 18,596 
notifications of diphtheria in England and Wales in 1945. In 2016 there 
were nine.3 For the public health profession, this has been a major 
achievement over a period of some seventy years. As we have seen, this 
progress has not been linear, nor consistent. Nevertheless, the mature 
vaccination system in Britain has created and reflects Jacob Heller’s 
vaccine narrative – people believe that vaccines work, that they are safe 
and that they are an integral part of the modern, functioning British 
state.4 Anxieties over outbreaks such as the 2012 measles outbreak in 
Swansea also seem to suggest that vaccination is part of being a good 
British citizen.5 Vaccination is not simply imposed upon the British 
public. It is something which the public demands of its government and 
its fellow citizens.6
The preceding chapters have shown how the routine immunisation 
of children became the status quo in Britain after the Second World 
War. Modern vaccination programmes based on laboratory science and 
state-guided public health administration arrived on a national scale in 
the 1940s. The success of the anti-diphtheria campaign during the war 
showed both to the Ministry of Health and to the general public that 
vaccination could be an effective public health tool. Building on adver-
tising and education techniques employed in other jurisdictions in the 
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inter-war period, the lack of compulsion in the diphtheria immunisa-
tion campaign gave it credibility. These new health tools – born from 
modern vaccinology and without the baggage of the imposition and 
unpleasant nature of smallpox vaccination – could now be exploited. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, improvements in research and manufac-
turing techniques led to new vaccines which could be introduced to a 
receptive public. Indeed, for the high-profile ones (such as Salk’s polio-
myelitis vaccine) there was active demand from citizens. But such 
demand was also tempered by concerns about other risks, such as 
vaccine damage, convenience and financial sustainability.
Thus, the public played a key role in shaping public health authori-
ties’ priorities. The general trend was toward the increased use of vac-
cination, in terms both of the number of vaccines available and of 
percentage uptake among the population. This relationship between 
the public and public health led to an expansion of the vaccination 
programme and provided the authority for its maintenance. But this 
relationship still needed tending. Uptake was not always optimal, and 
occasional bouts of apathy (either across the population or in specific 
localised examples) required the intervention of MOHs and the Min-
istry of Health. In some cases, the government reminded parents of 
their responsibilities and the very real dangers posed by diseases that 
might return. In others, such as smallpox, general disinterest among the 
population, coupled with expert analyses of the risks posed by the 
disease and the vaccine, meant that the United Kingdom’s smallpox 
vaccination programme was dismantled in advance of those of many 
other European countries.
The two crises outlined in Part II of the book, somewhat paradoxi-
cally, provide the best example of how the British public believed in 
vaccination. For while specific vaccines could become the centre of 
controversy at certain times, the vaccination system as a whole stood 
firm. With both pertussis vaccination and MMR vaccine, immunisation 
rates recovered relatively quickly following initial scares. Furthermore, 
uptake of vaccines that were not directly associated to whole-cell per-
tussis vaccine or MMR was not dramatically affected. Similarly, there 
were reports in both cases of parents demanding separate vaccines in 
order to avoid the Urabe mumps strain within the trivalent vaccines 
that had been identified as potentially dangerous. Nevertheless, the 
public understood the relative risks of disease symptoms and vaccines, 
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and the inconvenience of presenting children for vaccination, differ-
ently to epidemiologist advisers in the government. Faith in vaccination 
still relied upon the moral and political authority of the scientific and 
administrative communities that vouched for the safety and efficacy of 
both the vaccines themselves and the mass immunisation programmes 
that underpinned them. In the aftermath of the thalidomide or BSE 
crises, or during major political debates about the viability and future 
of the welfare state, such authority was dented. Experiences with these 
crises led to a reappraisal of how vaccinators communicated with the 
public, producing a greater academic and administrative emphasis on 
hesitancy and decision making about vaccination. The hope was that 
analysing and monitoring for signs of faltering confidence could predict 
and prevent such crises before they occurred.
The five themes explored in this book – apathy, nation, demand, risk 
and hesitancy – all help to answer the main question posed in the 
Introduction: how did routine vaccination become normalised in 
Britain after the Second World War? In drawing together these ideas, 
this conclusion makes some final observations on a thread that runs 
throughout the chapters. How did the public fit into British public 
health over the post-war period? How was the public identified; and 
what was public about public health? These are important questions, 
given the centrality of the relationship between British citizens and the 
British government across the vaccination programme. This relation-
ship drove the development of the vaccination schedule. As we have 
seen, the government had expectations of the population and, in turn, 
the population made demands on its government. But these demands 
did not remain unchanged. The same is true of the public.
Janet Newman and John Clarke have argued that publicness – that 
is, representations of the concept of the public – is a useful lens for 
discussing historical change.7 This form of analysis is designed to move 
away from solely talking about the public sphere. Partly this is because 
the public sphere is only one element of publicness; and partly it is 
because of the critique that many narratives surrounding the Haberma-
sean public sphere often describe a decline from a “golden age”.8 Moreo-
ver, the limits of publicness have varied across time and according to 
what sort of public is under discussion. Newman and Clarke thus draw 
attention to three ‘discursive chains’, of which the public sphere is only 
one. First, there is the belief that the public is embodied by citizens, or 
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the people, which in turn represents the nation. Second, one can argue 
that the public is manifested in the public sector, which represents the 
actions of the state. Third, the public are created through legal and 
democratic value systems, best expressed through the aforementioned 
concept of the public sphere.9 This is the public space (physical or 
metaphorical) in which debates about the people and the state can be 
articulated. Each of these may have been considered more important 
relative to the others at different times or circumstances. This book has 
largely focused on how debates about publicness played out in the 
public sphere. Evidence of public activity is inferred and identified 
through official statistics, utterances in the press and the actions of 
voluntary organisations and representative bodies claiming to operate 
in the interests of the public. The two themes left to explore are what 
this public sphere activity says about the people and what this in turn 
says about the role of the state.
To tackle the first discursive chain, the public were discussed in 
public health discourse as “the population”. The way that the govern-
ment constructed apathy in Chapter 1 exemplifies this. Defining the 
public through statistical returns – and then inferring public behaviours 
through changes in these statistics – was a common practice in the vac-
cination programme throughout this book. Rises and falls in uptake 
and morbidity (either over time or in comparison to other national and 
local authorities) were used to measure the success of vaccination 
efforts. Thus, the drop in the number of immunisations between 1949 
and 1950 was considered troublesome in its own right. The solution, 
building on pre-existing ideas and conventions surrounding the dis-
semination of public health information and local MOHs led the Min-
istry of Health to focus its attempts on an advertising campaign. 
Resource constraints meant that it targeted its interventions on specific 
publics: those living in local authorities with low response rates relative 
to their peers. Over time, these statistical measures became more 
detailed, as did the means to analyse them. As Chapter 3 showed, the 
growth of the medical civil service both created and interpreted data 
for directing policy.10 The foundation, first, of the JCPV (1955) and, 
later, of the JCVI (1962) provided the basis for this. In later years, 
health researchers paid greater attention not just to immunisation 
figures but to public attitudes through surveys. These had been per-
formed as one-off studies in the 1940s for diphtheria but became 
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routine from the late 1980s onwards through the Public Health Labora-
tory Service’s COVER and regular studies of mothers’ attitudes to 
immunisation.11 These not only allowed for the identification of prob-
lematic behaviour within the public but also provided baseline meas-
ures to evaluate any intervention into such behaviour. This approach 
– which would form the basis of discussions around hesitancy in 
Chapter 5 – showed how conceptions of the public had evolved. Instead 
of semi-arbitrary target figures like 75 per cent for diphtheria or small-
pox vaccination in the 1950s, epidemiologically and politically derived 
goals came from within the Department of Health and from interna-
tionally agreed standards with the WHO. Increasingly, outbreaks of 
manageable diseases became an embarrassment to the British authori-
ties and the British public. During the MMR crisis, part of the educa-
tion and risk communication campaign emphasised how other nations 
used immunisation. Advanced nations were supposed to avoid out-
breaks of vaccine-preventable diseases; less-developed nations experi-
enced them regularly.
Statistics were also used to sell the narrative that vaccination was not 
just for the good of the individual, but a sign of modernity, technologi-
cal advancement and national pride. The national scope and character 
of the vaccination programme were therefore significant. Even where 
programmes were administered at the local level, they required national 
direction, financing and oversight. The national government’s priorities 
and actions had been important in the inter-war period too. Experi-
ences in other countries with diphtheria immunisation and BCG for 
tuberculosis had influenced the ways in which those vaccines were 
introduced in Britain.12 Similarly, constant comparisons with the United 
States’ IPV drove the course of the IPV campaign in Britain during the 
1950s and early 1960s. While these discussions mainly concerned vac-
cines and the science surrounding them, they also reflected deeper 
ideas about who the “British public” were in “British public health”. The 
nation (as highlighted in Chapter 2) came across strongly through the 
smallpox campaigns. Here, the British public was a body that needed 
to be protected from outside infection. Sometimes this was from foreign 
people, as seen with the reaction to Pakistani immigrants in the 1961/62 
outbreak. At other times, foreign places were seen as the contagion, 
with people merely the mules, such as Australasian tourists in the 1950 
outbreak. Even today, visitors to “exotic” countries are often obliged to 
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receive vaccines against diseases such as yellow fever. Campaigns to 
control infectious disease also worked on a national level. This was true 
in their administration – decisions about national policy were taken 
jointly between the four home nations – and in their goals. Concerns 
over apathy towards the diphtheria programme were that a disease that 
was on the verge of elimination within Britain might return. The 
demand for polio vaccine in the 1950s reflected the British public’s call 
to be protected from the disease, with vaccination and eventual eradica-
tion considered to be the most sensible way of achieving this. The 
management of risks, as discussed in Chapter 4, was also constructed 
at a national level. Immunisation was offered to all children in Britain 
to protect the entire population living there. At the same time, risks 
could be localised. This localisation could be geographic, such as with 
concentrated attempts to improve diphtheria or poliomyelitis vaccina-
tion in certain local authority areas; or demographic, such as with tar-
geted rubella vaccination campaigns in the 1970s for girls and young 
women, or foreign-language adverts in South Asian newspapers. As 
discussed, internationally agreed targets would become increasingly 
important from the 1970s through the WHO and the rise of global 
public health initiatives.
While the state clearly defined the public in these administrative 
terms, the public also spoke back. Through this we can see that the 
government’s definitions and treatment of the public did not always 
accord with the public’s demands and expectations. Indeed, while it is 
clear that the British public demanded protection by the government 
against threats to the British public’s health, it did not at all times agree 
that mass routine vaccination was the only or preferred solution. With 
smallpox, parents were more likely to avoid routine childhood vaccina-
tion than to present their children, but the immediate threat of disease 
could change behaviours. Fear was a motivating factor. In areas where 
there were outbreaks of smallpox, thousands would queue for hours 
outside the MOH’s clinic for emergency vaccination. There appeared 
to be “soft” support for the polio vaccine among the general public, but 
it was only when a prominent footballer died that young adults pre-
sented themselves for vaccination in large numbers. Even with the 
success of the diphtheria programme in the 1940s, interest was revived 
in the 1950s by leveraging the greater demand for protection against 
whooping cough and creating multi-dose vaccines. The Ministry of 
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Health had hoped to revive demand for diphtheria immunisation as a 
good in its own right, but had to be pragmatic in order to achieve its 
public health goals. The pertussis and MMR crises also emphasised that 
the public weighed risks very differently to the government in some 
circumstances. For not only were people worried about infectious 
disease, but they were also anxious about the risks of the vaccines them-
selves. Voluntary and consumer organisations weighed in on the debate 
in this period, reflecting and creating a greater demand for choice and 
transparency in health-care decision making.13 While the government 
demanded that the public continue to use the government-approved 
vaccine, many parents sought alternative forms of protection (such as 
separate vaccines or abstention from the process entirely until safety 
could be guaranteed). The government did retain a degree of authority 
throughout the period, as did the narrative that modern states and 
scientific methods could protect people through vaccination. Uptake 
recovered within a few years of both crises, reflecting a deeper long-
term confidence in vaccination and the belief that it could protect the 
public from dangerous diseases. But in periods where the credibility of 
administrative, scientific and political establishments was under strain, 
the conditions were ripe for crises of confidence in vaccines and vac-
cination programmes.
If the government played a key role in defining and responding to 
the public as a population, it is also vital to interrogate the role of 
the public sector, or the second of Newman and Clarke’s discursive 
chains. The government’s use of bureaucratic and statistical tools was 
by no means restricted to public health policy. It reflected a wider 
shift in governance in Britain and other liberal democracies from the 
mid-twentieth century onwards.14 Vaccination grew in importance 
during a period in which technocratic, state-led solutions to complex 
social problems were considered both viable and desirable. Newman 
and Clarke argue that the post-war period and the foundation of the 
welfare state mark a point where the public sector became a much 
more visible and important aspect of publicness.15 This builds on T. 
H. Marshall’s idea of the post-war period as an era of social rights, 
one in which health care and the wider welfare state became integral 
to the function of modern government.16 Martin Moore has shown 
how public health and general practice increasingly routinised health 
care, a process that accelerated after the fiscal crisis of the 1970s. A 
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greater emphasis on preventative medicine meant that the control 
of chronic conditions (or, in the case of vaccination policy, the risk 
of infectious disease outbreaks) became politically necessary, in line 
with the government’s financial priorities. At the same time, devel-
opments in bureaucratic technologies for identifying and managing 
such risks had been harnessed and promoted by health professionals 
and co-opted by the state.17 As Virginia Berridge has argued, post-war 
public health is characterised by the use of mass media, evidence-based 
medicine and a focus on individual behaviour.18 The chapters of this 
volume also emphasise these changes. But what does this activity say 
about how the state constructed the public? Moreover, what does this 
say about what responsibilities the government felt that it had towards 
the public’s health, and about what the public demanded from its 
government?
Government approaches to risk, as highlighted in Chapter 4, help to 
explain the relationship between the public sector and citizens during 
this period. Primarily, the state intended to reduce the burden of infec-
tious disease through vaccination. In the 1950s, apathy was problematic 
because it risked the return of diphtheria as a common and widespread 
disease. Intervention through education and pressure on local authori-
ties was considered a necessary health response because a deterioration 
in this element of public health was unacceptable to both the govern-
ment and the general public. Similarly, the demand for IPV in the 1950s 
stemmed from the public’s desire for protection from infectious disease 
and the belief that the British state had a duty to provide such protec-
tion. At the same time, collective responsibility for vaccination was 
re-emphasised through campaign literature and posters. While the 
private choice of parents remained, and compulsion was never re-
introduced, citizens were expected to vaccinate both for the good of 
their own children and for the collective health of the nation as a whole. 
Such concepts of health citizenship were internalised as well as being 
imposed by government campaigning.19 However, the risks to be 
managed through such behaviour changed over time. Once the state 
had succeeded in reducing the burden of infectious disease, it then 
sought to ensure that those infectious did not return. Complete eradica-
tion and its preservation required different forms of communication. 
The public had contradictory expectations with regard to disease man-
agement. On the one hand, parents had ceased to be overly concerned 
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about diseases that were now so rare that few had direct experience of 
severe complications or death. To some extent this was evident in the 
diphtheria programme in the 1950s, but was considered especially 
prominent with pertussis in the 1970s and measles in the 1990s. On 
the other hand, reports of the increased morbidity of vaccine-
preventable diseases reflected poorly on the government and the nation 
as a whole. These contradictions flared up in the pertussis crisis when 
the risks of both a whooping cough epidemic and a potentially danger-
ous vaccine had to be weighed against each other. In part, this led the 
government to strengthen its public health measures, such as incentivis-
ing general practitioners to vaccinate the entire child population, and 
the increased use of multi-dose vaccines like MMR.
This relationship between the public and the public sector was ever 
changing. This can be shown through the way in which hesitancy 
evolved as an analytical tool in the 2010s, as detailed in Chapter 5. 
Apathy was construed as a passive state by public health authorities in 
the 1950s with regard to diphtheria. In the twenty-first century, they 
were much more likely to talk about decision-making processes, hoping 
to influence these through effective risk communication. British gov-
ernance structures had become more concerned with risk management 
and harm prevention in the post-war period.20 Vaccination was no dif-
ferent – but the risks identified by public health authorities and the 
public changed over time. As in other arenas, risk became increasingly 
identified with financial cost. In the 1950s, apathy presented the pos-
sibility that diphtheria morbidity would cease to decline, perhaps even 
returning. Outbreaks of diphtheria remained the major cause of 
concern. As the vaccination programme established itself, however, 
these immediate threats dissipated. Many vaccine-preventable diseases 
became rare, meaning that any outbreak was damaging to the govern-
ment’s reputation. By the 1980s, disease rates were not framed as human 
tragedies so much as financial ones. Thus, the vaccination system 
became a front-line tool in reducing unnecessary public expenditure, 
and an investment whose benefits far outweighed the potential costs. 
These could be more accurately measured due to increased statistical 
monitoring both within Britain and by bodies such as the WHO.
The public, too, expressed risk in different ways. The general swell of 
approval for poliomyelitis vaccines showed a demand for protection 
from the disease. In the 1970s, such demands for protection were 
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framed by voluntary organisations, consumer groups and advisory 
bodies. Moreover, while the public clearly felt that it was the job of the 
public sector to protect it from disease, it also expected protection from 
other dangers – which could include the vaccine itself. It would be 
simplistic to say that the public became less compliant with government 
advice over the post-war period. This was not some great rebellion as a 
result of the 1960s. Publics were non-compliant in the 1950s, as seen 
both in the decreasing uptake of smallpox and diphtheria vaccines 
among some populations and in the demands for improvements to the 
polio vaccination programme. Similarly, the acceptance rate of MMR 
in the mid-1990s – exceeding 90 per cent – suggests that in some ways 
there was greater compliance from the public in the later period. Rather, 
when there was a breakdown in trust between the public and the gov-
ernment, for reasons not always directly related to the science of vac-
cines or vaccination, the break was more dramatic and more vocal.
The public in 2018
From the autumn of 2017, hepatitis B was added to the British child-
hood vaccination schedule.21 The clamour over extending meningitis 
vaccine to all children also shows that parents continue to demand that 
the government protects them from infectious disease.22 In 2017–18, 
uptake of MMR remains well above 90 per cent in all home nations of 
the United Kingdom. By the standards of the 1960s, this is a remarkable 
achievement. The vast majority of people appear to accept the general 
narrative that vaccinations work, they are safe and they are an integral 
part of a modern functioning state.23
The challenges facing public health authorities today are different 
than they were some eighty years ago when nation-wide diphtheria 
immunisation was introduced. Throughout this volume, the govern-
ment’s attempts to improve uptake were based mainly on increasing 
national vaccination rates. At times, this meant focusing on particular 
local authorities and specific vaccines. But, broadly, successes or failures 
have been measured by increases or decreases in national statistics rela-
tive to various targets. Today, mature vaccination programmes are 
having to deal with different threats. There are geographically and 
socially concentrated communities whose children are under-vaccinated 
for a variety of reasons. Some of those have been convinced that certain 
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vaccines do not work – such as through the influence of anti-vaccination 
campaigners on the Somali-American community in Minnesota.24 
Others, particularly middle-class parents, doubt the need for or safety 
of vaccines produced by pharmaceutical companies and governments 
whose motives they find suspicious.25
There is a narrative among some in the public health community that 
this is inevitable. Public health is a victim of its own success.26 Robert 
Chen and Beth Hibbs offer a model of the evolution of an immunisa-
tion programme. As vaccine coverage increases, the disease declines; 
but through increased usage, the number of adverse events also climbs. 
At a certain point, this results in a loss in confidence. Because the 
disease is rare, the adverse events get more media coverage. As vac-
cination rates dip, an outbreak of the disease occurs – which is also 
rare, and therefore newsworthy. This restores faith in the vaccine until, 
eventually, the disease is fully eradicated.27 Of course, this is an overly 
simplified model for explaining vaccine crises. Chen and Hibbs were 
writing after several pertussis scares in different countries, but before 
the MMR crisis started to bite. It neatly encapsulates, however, why 
apathy may set in and how this can lead to a drop in confidence in a 
particular vaccine. It also shows that public health researchers and prac-
titioners are aware that progress towards disease eradication is rarely 
linear.
There is a clear issue here. These debates have been refracted through 
the politics of public health. Health authorities believe that vaccination 
is a universal good, that highly vaccinated populations are healthier and, 
therefore, that people ought to present themselves and their children 
for vaccination when required. This is a political view for which many 
have sympathy. But it means that explanations of the public’s behav-
iour have centred on why people do not vaccinate and what can be 
done to get them to change their minds. Since the early 2010s work on 
vaccine confidence has begun to focus on the factors that affect parents’ 
choices, but much of this work is also used to assess hesitancy.28 Since 
parents’ decisions are known to be affected by their communities, local 
and national circumstances, and attitudes towards medical science, 
culture plays a key role. And if parents behave differently according 
to culture and space, they also behave differently across time. This is 
where history can offer insights for vaccination debates. The demand 
for IPV in the 1950s might inform debates about vaccine confidence; 
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the apathy around diphtheria might say something about complacency. 
Perhaps more pertinently, the debates around vaccination policy in 
Britain since the Second World War show us that the ways in which 
the public’s behaviour has been described have also been historically 
specific. Vaccine confidence and hesitancy happen to be the latest in a 
global context. Through approaching these issues historically, we can 
explore these other constructions of public behaviour and see how 
publics have responded to authorities in different ways.
To end, it is worth taking another historical perspective – that of 
scale. Public health authorities believe that we are heading into another 
period of crisis. The return of measles in North America and several 
European countries has left governments puzzled and worried in equal 
measure. In Italy, there have been violent clashes with doctors over the 
introduction of stricter compulsion laws.29 Protests in California have 
followed the decision to end conscientious objection to vaccination for 
parents wishing to enrol their children in public schools.30 Even in 
Britain, where the spectre of compulsory smallpox vaccination loomed 
over the twentieth century, there is serious consideration about whether 
forcing parents to vaccinate their children might improve public health 
outcomes.31 Opponents appear to be emboldened by online communi-
ties, protests and legal cases. A 2017 ruling in the European Court of 
Justice appears to pave the way for circumstantial evidence to be 
accepted as proof of vaccine injury in compensation cases, rather than 
the use of scientific evidence “beyond reasonable doubt”. The conse-
quences for vaccine manufacturers could be devastating – and, given 
the already-rising costs of vaccines and the declining number of com-
panies producing them, this could threaten the stability of vaccination 
programmes that have taken decades to evolve.32
In a world where the risk of measles and other infectious diseases 
can be managed through vaccination, it is not surprising that govern-
ments and publics have sought to ensure that protection is universally 
available. But, as Mark Drakeford and Ian Butler demonstrate in their 
work on scandals, crises have to be manufactured. They do not emerge 
value-free from scientific facts.33 If there is a crisis today, it is a histori-
cally specific one. The 1950s IPV supply crisis was rooted in post-war 
anxieties about Britain’s place in the world and the unfulfilled promises 
of technological progress. The 1970s pertussis crisis emerged alongside 
deep concerns about the role and function of the British welfare state. 
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The 2000s MMR crisis flourished in an age of mass media, the inter-
net and mistrust of political and medical authority following a host of 
scandals. So what of today’s crises? They are portrayed as a result of a 
declining faith in science, the rampant individualism of certain types 
of parents and a sense that we have forgotten just how deadly measles, 
polio and diphtheria really were. This is not just a crisis about declin-
ing vaccination rates – it reflects a wider moral panic about globalisa-
tion, “post-truth politics” and the lack of faith in traditional forms of 
expertise.
Uptake of key vaccinations has stalled or even declined among 
certain populations. Nevertheless, uptake remains historically high. 
Given that well over 90 per cent of children in the United Kingdom 
receive the recommended vaccines, it would suggest that the vaccine 
narrative has survived among the vast majority of the public. The events 
and processes described in this book do not deny that there is a crisis 
brewing today. But they suggest that this too shall pass. Public health 
authorities are in the unenviable position of seeking a perfection which 
they may never obtain. The public may elude precise measurement and 
may not completely comply with official advice. For the most part, 
however, they want and demand vaccination – for (and of) themselves 
and others.
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